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BLESSED PIUS X AND THEOLOGY

"LEO XIII was the Pope of kings, of emperors, of courts, of chanceries, of bishops; Pius X is the Pope of Theology and of Canon Law, the Pope of the poor, the lowly, the parish priest." [1] Such a judgement would scarcely be challenged, except for one item: does Bl. Pius X have a better claim to the title, "Pope of Theology," than Leo XIII? The facts seem to support such a claim, although they are not well known. Pope Leo XIII is everywhere hailed as the instigator of a revival of philosophy and theology in the Church, and rightly. Conscious of the eddies of unorthodox or dangerous thought that stirred in many Catholic universities and seminaries, Pope Leo XIII urged the restoration of Thomistic philosophy and theology. His very insistence and the actual

[1] Quoted by R. M. Huber in his "Biographical Sketch of Pope Pius X," a chapter of *A Symposium on the Life and Work of Pope Pius X* (Washington: Confraternity of Christian Doctrine, 1946), p. 16.

restoration of such study aroused an opposition, which till then had been more or less unobstrusively undermining the foundations of Catholic thought, and brought it into the open. However, it was left to Leo's successor, Bl. Pius X to deal with the opposition in its most virulent forms and, at the same time, to foster the growth of a sane philosophy and theology within the Church.

Providentially, then, the holy Pontiff was forced to turn his thoughts frequently to the state of philosophical and theological thinking within the Church. Apart from any historical circumstances, the motto of his reign, "*Instaurare omnia in Christo,*" would have led his thoughts in the same direction, for the mind must first be the "mind of Christ," if the heart is to be His. The Holy Father was quite conscious of this connection; in his first Allocution to the Cardinals, he says: "Since Christ is Truth, Our first task is to be the teacher and herald of truth." [2]

A reader of this short allocution is surprised to note that it it almost entirely devoted to this question of the defense and propagation of truth. It would seem that the Holy Father clearly foresaw what was to be the great preoccupation of his Pontificate and even the accusations that his actions in this sphere would arouse.

He points out that there is an abiding thirst in man for the truth, that almost by instinct he is led to embrace it lovingly and to cling to it whenever it is presented to him. Yet, there is also the fact of sin and the deep wound that man's intellect and appetites suffer because of it. As a result, there are many who hate nothing more than the sound of truth, which unmasks their errors and curbs their lusts.

Nevertheless, the duty of a Supreme Pastor is clear, and always has been: everything that is true and good may be embraced by the Church, approved and even fostered by Her: errors and vice must be condemned. To those who cling to error, such action on the part of the Pope may seem obscurant-

[2] *ASS*, XXXVI, p. 194.

ism, obstructionism; but the Holy Father insists: "We are not trying to delay the progress of humanity, but to prevent its destruction." [3] During the remainder of his Pontificate, there were many who refused to accept this evaluation of the Holy Father's actions. He was the Pope who condemned "Modernism"; therefore, he was the Pope who opposed progress, especially in philosophy and theology. It is this judgement that has predominated in the minds of many whenever there is a question of Bl. Pius X and theology. We should like to show that the Holy Father most explicitly mapped out a program of true progress in the fields of sacred learning and was in no sense opposed to real progress in any field of human knowledge.[4]

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On several occasions, Bl. Pius X rejected the notion that true progress was opposed to the faith or condemned by him. Even in his first Encyclical, "E Supremi Apostolatus cathedra," he stated that "it is not true that the progress of knowledge extinguishes the faith; rather it is ignorance; and the more ignorance prevails the greater is the havoc wrought by incredulity." [5]

Perhaps the fullest exposition of the holy Pontiff's mind is to be found in his Encyclical, "Communium Rerum," issued in honor of the eighth centenary of the death of St. Anselm. He sees a parallel between the times of St. Anselm and our own and takes pains to point it out. "Then, again, by a deplorable aberration, the very progress, good in itself, of positive science and material prosperity, gives occasion and pretext for a display of intolerable arrogance towards divinely revealed truths on the part of many weak and intemperate minds." [6]

In the following words, Bl. Pius X puts his finger directly on

[3] *Loc. cit.*

[4] We have elsewhere considered the relation of Bl. Pius X and Modernism. *Vide* "Pius X and the Integrity of Doctrine," in *A Symposium on the Life and Work of Pope Pius X*, pp. 50-67.

[5] *ASS*, XXXVI, pp. 136-137.

[6] *ASS*, I. For this and the following quotations, cf. pp. 376, ss.

the source of many difficulties: " There was at that time a class of light-minded and vain men, fed on a superficial erudition, who became incredibly puffed-up with their undigested culture and allowed themselves to be led away by a simulacrum of philosophy and dialectics." Perhaps no words could better express the obstacles that lie in the way of those outside the faith and the dangers to those of the faith than "undigested culture." If it was a danger in the times of St. Anselm, how much greater is it today? For several centuries, now, in every sphere of human culture, there has been a tremendous development; most of it has been outside the influence of the faith, much of it has been hostile to the faith. Men who unconsciously are formed by such culture are rarely led to Christ, but rather away from Him. And all because it is " undigested," unordered. There are some who feel that it is better for the arts and sciences to be freed from the direction of philosophy and theology and the faith; what they fail to see, perhaps, is that then the arts and the sciences strive among themselves for the supremacy that belongs only to wisdom, human or divine.

The Holy Father is equally severe on an opposite reaction to progress in human knowledge: " Others again there were of a more timid nature, who in their terror at the many cases of those who had made shipwreck of the faith, and fearing the danger of the science that puffeth up, went so far as to exclude altogether the use of philosophy, if not of all rational discussion of the sacred sciences."

The Holy Father points out that the pretensions of the vain are bound to be frustrated: " But these should remember the many mistakes and the frequent contradictions made by the followers of rash novelties in those questions of a speculative and practical order most vital for man, and realize that human pride is punished by never being able to be coherent with itself and by suffering shipwreck without ever sighting the port of truth." No one can deny that much truth has been accumulated in all fields of human endeavor through the recent centuries; yet recent events have only proven the truth of the Pontiff's warning that without the ordering of faith and true wisdom the

best fruits of man's genius are indifferent and may as easily be turned against man as used for his temporal assistance.

Blessed Pius X is no less brusque with the fearful: " Midway between these two excesses stands the Catholic practice, which, while it abhors the presumption of the first group . . . also condemns the negligence of the second in their excessive disregard of true investigation and the absence of all desire in them ' to draw profit from the faith for their intelligence.' . . ." This attitude is especially blameworthy if it is found in those whose office " requires them to defend the Catholic faith against the errors that arise on all sides." In an earlier Encyclical, " Iucunda sane," commemorating the thirteenth centenary of St. Gregory the Great, the Holy Father had made a more direct application of this warning to those who are obliged to defend the faith: " Gregory rebukes a bishop who, through love of spiritual solitude and prayer, fails to go out into the battlefield to combat strenuously for the cause of the Lord: ' The name of Bishop, which he bears, is an empty one.' And rightly so, for men's intellects are to be enlightened by constant preaching of the truth, and errors are to be efficaciously refuted by the principles of true and solid philosophy and theology and by all the means provided by the genuine progress of historical investigation." [7] These words apply with only slightly less force to all theologians, who are the official teachers of the Church under the Pope and the Bishops.

It is clear, then, that Blessed Pius condemned neither true progress in the field of human science nor feared to confront it with the truths of the faith. Yet he was forced to condemn the men who thought they were doing this very thing, the Modernists. Why? Because they went about the task in the wrong way and ended up in heresy. With ruthless clarity, the holy Pontiff lays bare the reasons for the shipwreck of their efforts and we may summarize them here, for the true path lies in the opposite direction. Modernism is the fruit of " a perversion of mind "; but its more remote causes are in the moral and intel-

[7] *ASS*, XXXVI, pp. 522-523.

lectual order. Pride and curiosity in the moral order; ignorance of scholasticism, Christian tradition and the magisterium of the Church, in the intellectual order.[8]

As remedies against the errors of Modernism and as a sure guide for all intellectual activity of Catholics in their attempts to integrate sacred and profane learning, the Holy Father suggests two means—a deep faith and a profound knowledge of St. Thomas.

* * *

The basic need is faith; a vital faith such as inspired these words of Bl. Pius X: "The times indeed are greatly changed; but, as we have more than once repeated, nothing is changed in the life of the Church. From her Divine Founder she has inherited the virtue of being able to supply at all times, however much they differ, all that is required not only for the spiritual welfare of souls, which is the direct object of her mission, but also everything that aids progress in true civilization, for this flows as a natural consequence of that same mission." [9]

In these few lines we also find the answer to the debate that is being conducted at the present time concerning the place of the Church in the world. It is not the primary task of the Church to fashion a civilization or inspire a culture; yet, by fulfilling her primary mission, the building of Christ's kingdom on earth, it necessarily follows that the human scene will be affected. If the Church performs her task and men live according to the demands of Christ's charity and justice, a civilization must result. Moreover, insofar as perverse human institutions lead men away from Christ, there is a serious obligation on the part of Christians to try to rectify them. As the Holy Father perfectly expressed himself: "Brevi, terras expiando coelis comparare cives." [10] The purifying of earthly things is not for their sake, but for the sake of men who are to be won for heaven.

[8] *Vide* "Pius X and the Integrity of Doctrine" in Symposium, p. 62.
[9] "Iucunda sane," *ASS*, XXXVI, p. 527.
[10] *Allocutio*, *ASS*, XXXVI, p. 194.

In the Encyclical, "Jucunda Sane," the Holy Father continues the words just quoted: "Truths of the supernatural order, of which the Church is the depositary, necessarily promote everything that is true, good and beautiful in the order of nature, and this is accomplished more efficaciously in proportion as these truths are traced to the supreme principle of truth, goodness and beauty, which is God." [11] We should note that the Holy Father is not laying claim to a power of jurisdiction, but offering the gift of illumination, inspiration and guidance. He goes even further and indicates some of the advantages the faith has to offer to science, morality and art.

"Human science gains greatly from revelation, for the latter opens out new horizons and makes known sooner other truths of the natural order. It opens the true road to investigation and keeps it safe from errors of application and method. Thus does the lighthouse show many things which otherwise would never be seen, while it points out the rocks on which the vessel would suffer shipwreck." [12] Earlier in this same letter the Holy Father has some remarkable words to say in regard to modern science. "Those who are shaken in their faith by critical science as well as those who condemn it fail to see that they start from a false hypothesis, that is to say, from science falsely so-called, which logically forces them to conclusions equally false. For given a false philosophical principle, everything deduced from it is vitiated. But these errors will never be effectively refuted unless by bringing about a change of front, that is to say, unless those in error be forced to leave the field of criticism in which they consider themselves firmly entrenched for the legitimate field of philosophy, through the abandonment of which they have fallen into their errors." [13] The Holy Father seems to be saying here that no error in science (and there are purely scientific errors) is dangerous to the faith; it is the philosophical or pseudo-philosophical that must be carefully scrutinized by Catholic thinkers.

The applications that the Holy Father makes in the field of

[11] *Loc. cit.*, p. 527-528. [12] *Loc. cit.*, p. 528. [13] *Loc. cit.*, p. 521.

morality do not differ from those made more extensively by his predecessor, Leo XIII. He continues: "Finally, the arts, modelled on the supreme exemplar of all beauty, which is God Himself, from Whom is derived all the beauty that is found in nature, are more securely drawn from vulgar concepts and more efficaciously uplifted towards the ideal, which is the life of all art." [14]

All this might seem to be very far from philosophy and theology; yet the Holy Father is not unmindful of the fact that the bridge between the faith and human culture must be thrown by philosophy and theology; this is implied in the words quoted above: "And this is accomplished more efficaciously in proportion as these truths are traced to the supreme principle of truth, goodness and beauty, which is God." This is the task of theology with the assistance of philosophy. Another aspect of the same task is clearly stated by the Holy Father in another context: "For just as the opinion of certain ancients is to be rejected, which maintains that it makes no difference to the truth of the faith what any man thinks about the nature of creation, provided his opinion on the nature of God be sound, because error regarding the nature of creation begets a false knowledge of God; so the principles of philosophy laid down by St. Thomas Aquinas are to be religiously and inviolably observed, because they are the means of acquiring such a knowledge of creatures as is most congruent with the faith; of refuting all the errors of all the ages, and of enabling man to distinguish clearly what things are to be attributed to God and to God alone. They also marvelously illustrate the diversity and analogy between God and His work." [15]

With extraordinary clarity the saintly Pontiff saw the providential role of a sane philosophy in the integration of human life; its task was to penetrate as far as it is given to the human mind the natures of things as they are in themselves. Theology is primarily interested in the order of all things from and to

[14] *Loc. cit.*, p. 528.

[15] *Motu Proprio* "Doctoris Angelici," June 29, 1914. *Vide* Maritain, *Angelic Doctor*, p. 264.

God; but man must be sure to order only right things, not perverted things, to God. And it must be careful, besides, not to distort things in the very act of ordering them to God, or to neglect their proper natures. All these dangers are avoided by true philosophy.

A brief insight into the tremendous task that faces the Catholic thinker and theologian is given by the Holy Father in a slightly different, and perhaps, unexpected, context. In a letter addressed to the French bishops regarding Catholic Action, the Holy Father advises: " Choose some from among your priests, men who are active and level-headed, possessing the degrees of doctor in philosophy and theology, and a thorough knowledge of the history of ancient and modern civilization, and apply them to the less elevated and more practical study of social science, in order that at the right time they may be put at the head of your Catholic Action." [16] This is a program that must be adapted by any Catholic thinker who wishes to integrate the vast fields of human culture with the faith.

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When Blessed Pius X insisted on the need of theology and philosophy, he had no doubts about what theology and philosophy he meant—scholastic theology and philosophy, certainly, for as he said in the Encyclical " Pascendi ": ". . . There is no surer sign that a man is on the way to Modernism than when he begins to show a dislike for this system (Scholasticism) "; but more particularly, the theology and philosophy of St. Thomas. We have already cited one text, which also gives the reason for the Holy Father's preference, at least, for the philosophy of St. Thomas. In fact, none of the recent Pontiffs have written so strongly in favor of St. Thomas. It is clear that the saintly Pontiff was not interested only in a certain uniformity of doctrine within the Church; he saw in the system of St. Thomas the objective truth that the Church during the ages had assimiliated and used in the explanation of sacred

[16] Quoted by Sommers, S. J., " Catholic Action—Lay Apostolate " in *Symposium*, p. 131.

doctrine. Hence he could say that if the fundamental theses of Thomism are removed or in any way impaired, "it must necessarily follow that the students of the sacred sciences will ultimately fail to perceive as much as the meaning of the words in which the dogmas of divine revelation are proposed by the magistracy of the Church." [17]

We could multiply quotations from Bl. Pius on the importance of a profound knowledge of St. Thomas, but that is not our purpose here. We wished merely to recall the two fundamental truths on which, under God, Bl. Pius X based his hopes for the restoration of all things in Christ: the power of the truth revealed to us by God Himself; the power of human reason under the guidance of the faith to make the intellectual integration that is the forerunner of the moral and spiritual renovation of the human race in Christ.

In retrospect, is not the outcome of a Pontificate launched under the heroic motto: "To restore all things in Christ," rather pathetic? Are we not tempted to disappointment, somewhat as we might be tempted when we consider the results of a Holy Year that bore the brave title: "The Year of the Great Return and the Great Pardon." Who have returned? What has been restored? Pius X would not now be a blessed, if he had not already strengthened our faith in this regard. In his very first Allocution, he uttered these words: "Certainly, we cannot hope to accomplish what Our Predecessors failed to accomplish, that truth will conquer all errors, stamp out all injustice; but, as we have said, we shall never stop trying. And if our desire is not to be fulfilled perfectly, at least, with God's help, the reign of truth shall be strengthened in good men and extended to countless others of good will." [18]

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[17] "Doctoris Angelici." *Vide* Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 265.
[18] *ASS*, XXXVI, p. 197.

TOWARD AN EVALUATION OF MUSIC

THERE is general acknowledgment that the music of the eighteenth century achieved a certain perfection. Biographers, critics, theorists and, most significant of all, composers themselves have testified to the excellence of the music of that period. It is worth investigating, therefore, why—so far it can be determined—the music of the eighteenth century achieved this perfection for, although the fact of this perfection is common knowledge, an explanation of it is not usually set forth in an analytic manner, i. e., in relation to sound principles of art and to principles of music specifically.

Such an investigation is worth while, not merely as a matter of historical interest, but insofar as it may be instrumental in seeing how music of the present time can likewise achieve a different, but nevertheless related, excellence. To do this, however, we must examine, at least briefly, sound principles of art both generally and specifically. This is not an easy task, since it requires both philosophy of art and a concrete knowledge of music. Too often, in ventures of this kind, music suffers from non-musical philosophers or from non-philosophical musicians neither of which, alone, is adequate for a critical examination of music. We must try, then, to combine both approaches and see if something of a reasoned explanation can be given for the perfection of eighteenth century music and what light this may throw upon twentieth century music. Let us begin with a few things about art in general.

All art arises from something very natural in us. It is based on the natural desire we have to imitate or to make representations. This begins in our earliest childhood. We delight in the representations we make of things, actions, and people around us. It is also the first way we begin to learn things, for we grasp something in these representations which we did not

previously know. From this universal desire of imitation springs our interest and delight in art, for art itself is simply the developed formation of this natural tendency in us to make or behold imitations of things around us.

And so we say that art imitates nature. As with all statements which are fundamentally true, a superficial understanding of them makes them appear obviously false. The superficial understanding of " art imitates nature " is that art *copies* nature. Now, the statement " art copies nature " is foreign to the whole notion of art and should be rejected. But, in rejecting a false meaning of " art imitates nature," the principle that art imitates nature is often rejected altogether. This, however, merely goes from one error to another.

The correct meaning of " art imitates nature " consists in understanding that art has two points of origin—not just one. One origin of the representation in art is in nature, understanding " nature " broadly to mean anything external to the mind of the artist. The other origin is in the imagination and mind of the artist. To recognize *only* the origin in nature is to reduce imitation in art to copying—and this is false. But to recognize *only* an origin in the mind of the artist—as though he made something entirely new—is to attribute absolute creation to a human artist and to make him God. This is stupid as well as false. Moreover, all the ideas and images in the human mind ultimately derive from reality outside the mind and this, basically, is why art must have a relation of imitation to nature.

Consequently, art imitates nature in the sense that the artist makes a representation of something which *could* exist in nature, but which *actually* does not. To imitate nature, then, does not mean to make a likeness of things precisely as they are in reality. Shakespeare's Hamlet, for example, is not just a person who existed historically; the play would fail as art if that were so. Hamlet is a *type* of man realized in the representation made by Shakespeare. In this way we see how art, in imitating nature, also perfects nature; it adds an intelligibility

and beauty not found in nature as such. This permits the artist his proper originality of representation without allowing him illusions of grandeur. The artist is neither a mere passive reproducer nor an unqualified creator; he is, in a word, imitatively creative.

As another general point, we should consider what the end of art is. We can determine this by asking why we delight in works of art. We are drawn to art because this delight follows upon a certain type of knowing realized only in art. This knowing consists in perceiving a unity and order and splendor of parts in an artistic whole. It is, in fact, a type of knowing that is a perfect balance of sense and intellectual knowing. Through the senses, we perceive the proportions of the singular object; through the mind, we grasp a universal characteristic realized in the singular object. For example, we sense the proportion, line, design, and color in Rembrandt's painting of "The Man with the Helmet." We also grasp a certain type of man realized in the representation. We can call this the contemplative end of art—the delightful knowledge we gain through the artistic representation.

At the same time, there is an instrumental or accompanying end of art. This is achieved by what can be called the purgation of the emotions. This arousal of the emotions is a more proximate end of art, for it is the arousal and consequent release of the emotions which induces most of us to seek the enjoyment we find in art. This emotional experience is an *integral* part of artistic appreciation. Those who have tried to deny the role of the emotions altogether in art have not yet grasped the elementary notions of art, or perhaps they have reacted too strongly against excessive romanticism in art.

This double end in art—a kind of contemplation and the emotional purgation—follows upon man's combined sense and intellectual powers. This is why art is so peculiarly and properly human, why it is too high for beasts and too low for angels. Art does not give us the most profound knowledge attainable by man; it is a mistaken notion of art to think that

it is supposed to do so. But it does give us knowledge most pleasingly proportionate to human nature.

With such general points as these in mind, we can now turn to music specifically. Music differs from the other arts in its means of imitation and its object of imitation. There is a difference also in manner of imitation, but this need not concern us in our present consideration.

Rhythm, harmony, and melody—as realized in tones—are the means of imitation in music. They are also the elements of music and are realized originally in the human voice, a point some composers seem to have ignored. The fact is, of course, that music first began with song, and while music has developed in many respects from early vocal music, its point of origin in the human voice can never be ignored. This is also why melody is the most formal and most important means of imitation in music even though rhythm, in one respect, is a more basic element. In the growth of music as an art form, musical instruments were employed as substitutes for the human voice and by way of increasing the means of musical representation and expression.

The object of imitation in music—and this is the most fundamental point about music—is the movement of the emotions as reflected in the movement of the human voice. This basic point, somewhat strangely, has often been misunderstood, ignored, or even denied by some musical theorists and composers. They have been led into this error, as we have already noted, by a misapprehension of imitation in art or by supposing that imitation in music consists primarily in copying the twittering of birds, the braying of donkeys, or the puffing of steam engines. This sort of thing, however, is quite foreign to the proper object of imitation in music and is used rather for extrinsic effects. Proper imitation in music means simply the representation of the movement of the emotions as produced intelligibly and artistically by the composer in tones. Inductively and historically, it is precisely this which music constantly exhibits as its object of imitation. Furthermore, rhythm, melody, and harmony are unintelligible in music—and

are unintelligible as *means* of imitation in music—except in relation to the movement of the emotions through the voice as the object of imitation in music.

A scale in music functions as the principle of melodic and harmonic development. Since the object of imitation in music, as explained above, is something given (for music simply would not exist as an art form without its object of imitation), a scale is determined in conformity to the object of imitation. It is in terms of this that we can see, on quite objective grounds, the perfection of what is called the natural scale. The natural scale is not necessarily the best possible scale (nor it is "natural" in the sense of wholly given by nature), but it is it a scale progression which is theoretically sound and which, in practice, has yielded more fruitful results than any other progression of tones. The test in practice is a matter of record. The theoretical consideration can be indicated as follows.

The natural scale is, first of all, a miniature imitation of the movement of the emotions through the voice. Whether we go up the scale or down, there is an artistic imitation of the slight arousal and release of the emotions. The very movement or progression of the natural scale reflects an initial movement of the emotions: a slight tension and a slight release. This scale progression is thus a healthy seed of musical representation.

This is because another principle of art is realized so perfectly in the natural scale, namely, the progression of a beginning, middle, and end. Let us use the key of *C* as an illustration. A beginning, quite simply, is that before which nothing has happened—the first tone of the scale: *C*. The middle is that which requires something before it and after which something must come. This is attained in the natural scale progression by the tones *E-F*—a half step progression, in contrast to the preceding whole step progressions of the scale. This half step progression represents musically a resolution but not, in the key of *C*, a complete resolution. The end is that after which nothing else comes and before which all has taken place. This is attained by the last progression *B-C*, also a half step pro-

gression, giving a complete resolution musically. Thus, we have the beginning *C-D*, the middle *E-F*, and the end *B-C*.

We might here contrast briefly the natural scale with the so-called whole tone scale, a progression of six whole steps. The whole tone progression, by definition, has no distinction of parts. Each is a whole tone; each is, at least theoretically, equal in all musical respects. Consequently, the whole tone progression has no diversity and contrast from which an intelligible order can be formed, and hence there is no order of parts which the mind seeks in hearing tones. Furthermore, as is immediately evident, a whole tone progression would not realize the principle of beginning, middle, and end, which is why it is not fruitful or an enduring principle of music. The whole tone progression does have a certain immediate appeal to the emotions by its very indetermination, which generates certain sensuous impressions and evokes various moods. But it achieves this effect by directing the emotions away from the ordering they should have to reason—an ordering which consists in the emotions being aroused and released rationally and not, for example, left unresolved or in a state of indetermination. The use in fact of the whole tone progression, by Debussy and others, has shown it to be only of limited value. And even Debussy does not consistently use it as a *source* of tonal progression, but more by way of inducing certain effects and moods and by way of derivation from and contrast to the natural scale, wherein lies its special but limited value.

For similar reasons, a purely half tone progression or twelve tone progression is unsatisfactory artistically as a *basic* musical progression. It is as indeterminate and arbitrary as the whole tone progression, built as it is on wholly equal intervals or parts. As a derivation from the natural scale, it also has a limited value but, conceived as a primary musical progression, it fails to attain the end of music: the representation in tones of an intelligible movement of the emotions.

We could, at this point, relate these general and specific points to the music of the eighteenth century and see how they are realized in the compositions of that period. For example,

the composers of that time (such as Mozart, Haydn, Handel, Bach, Vivaldi, Scarlatti, and others) were quite aware artistically of the object of imitation in music, for their compositions amply testify to the representation of the intelligible movement of the emotions. At the same time, they were well-ordered men of art in that their representation of the movement of the emotions was subject to the ordering of reason—not, on the one hand, as dominated too severely by reason nor, on the other hand, as seducing reason to the extent of subordinating reason to emotional violence. They also employed the natural scale to its full artistic possibilities, which entailed tempering the natural scale, losing thereby some precious musical qualities, but gaining greater means of musical development. All this, however, can be summarized best in terms of another principle of art which is consistently realized in all great works of fine art.

This principle is that all art seeks the intermediate between extremes—the intermediate, not as the mediocre, but as the best. A work of art is judged to be true and good—and hence beautiful—as it avoids an excess or a defect. The intermediate is like the bull's eye of the target; the good archer consistently hits there and nowhere else. The extremes, however, are realized in a variety of places and ways, departing more or less from the center of the target, including even missing the target altogether. In fine art, the true mean is hard to realize; it is comparatively easy to aim more or less at the true mean without actually hitting it. But for the man of art, for the man who is an artist in the full sense of the term, the true mean is attained consistently and with a facility born out of artistic maturity. He simply knows what to do and how to do it, and his artistic integrity precludes his being led astray by false considerations of what the true mean in art is. Let us take this general principle that good art seeks the best, as the intermediate between extremes, and examine at least the elements of music in terms of it. It can also be used to show how eighteenth century music, for the most part, achieved this true intermediate whereas later romantic music and contemporary

music, despite advances in some respects, generally depart from the true intermediate.

Rhythm is regular (the natural accent falling on the first beat of a group of tones) or irregular (the natural accent being shifted in a group of tones, or the time value being altered, as in syncopation). Music suffers by defeat if regularity is pursued to the point of monotony. Music suffers by excess if irregularity is pursued to the point of inducing a state of disordered agitation in movement of the emotions. Either extreme, pursued directly, attacks the end of music: the tonal representation of the movement of the emotions in conformity with reason. The intermediate in rhythm is the judicious combination of the two which fully realizes the end of music.

Melody, so far as it can be analyzed, is based upon a unity, proportion, and order of tones recognizable as such by the mind *through the ear* and representing the arousal and release of the emotions. Music suffers by defect if melody has little or no relation to the movement of the emotions (sometimes to the extent that melody is not even a recognizable element in a composition), or if the unity and order of tones tends to be determined by purely intellectualistic or arbitrary principles of tonal progression as, for example, in the twelve tone progression (so far as it aims at atonalism), which is more a technical manipulation than an artistic principle. Music suffers by excess if melody sacrifices an intelligible unity or order of tones to sheer emotional intensity, making the emotions as such the principle of tonal progression instead of the reasoned order of the emotions. This latter extreme was pursued by the romanticists to the point of emotional exhaustion by the end of the last century. The true mean in melody acknowledges the emotional content present, but balances it by informing the tonal representation of the movement of the emotions with an orderly progression induced by reason.

Harmony is the combination of single tones and the succession of such combinations. Let us confine ourselves here to the question of consonance and dissonance. Consonance consists

in various degrees of tones blending with each other, such as octaves, fifths, fourths, and thirds. Dissonance consists in various degrees of tones conflicting with each other, such as seconds, semitones, sevenths, ninths, etc. Now, as is well known, there is a popular current notion that the distinction between consonance and dissonance is purely relative. This position, fundamentally, is false. It has plausibility to the extent that *some* relativity is involved, which only means this, that if one subjects himself long enough to dissonances, he can get conditioned to them to a point where some dissonances seem, comparatively, consonant. A seventh chord, for example, in relation to a more complicated combination of dissonant intervals, appears in sound less dissonant and hence relatively consonant. And in another respect, a fifth chord or a fourth chord seems less consonant than a third chord, although historically the fifth chord or interval was treated as consonant in advance of the third and, analytically, realizes a more consonant proportion of tones. This is also because of a certain relativity, in that there is an austere quality in the interval of the fifth which, in relation to the warmer and more effeminate quality of the third, makes the third appear more pleasant, which is then considered to be more consonant.

Such relative considerations do effect the distinction of consonance and dissonance, but only accidentally. Consequently, it is a false argument to conclude that this means the distinction between consonance and dissonance is purely relative. There is, after all, the objective basis for distinguishing consonance and dissonance. This objective basis can be stated thus: in general, as the relation of vibrations of tones becomes more complex, the tones become more dissonant, as the theory of harmony manifests. (The tempering of the scale offers no real objection here, since the difference in tempering does not involve modifications distinguishable by the ear, i. e., a well-tempered fifth cannot be distinguished by the ear from a pure fifth. In other words, the well-tempered fifth is a close enough approximation to the pure fifth both to satisfy the theoretical point about relation of intervals and also to secure the ad-

vantages in harmony arising from a well-tempered scale). The same objective basis for distinguishing between consonance and dissonance is reached in a derived manner by Helmholtz which, in effect, consists in recognizing that every interval contained in a major or minor triad, along with inversions, is a consonance, the other intervals being dissonant.

A more artistic reason (as distinct from a purely theoretical reason) for the distinction between consonance and dissonance rests upon a point that the uncritical admirers of dissonance usually ignore altogether. This point is that consonance and dissonance are the musical representations of the repose and movement of the emotions. Consequently, to deny any distinction between consonance and dissonance is really to deny some elementary facts of life, namely, that the emotions by nature move from one state of repose to another state of repose. That is, by nature, we are aroused emotionally but we are also —at least in a fairly well-ordered life—resolved again emotionally. This is the movement of the emotions which music seeks to imitate artistically in tonal progression. The uncritical admirers of dissonance as such fail to recognize that dissonance does not musically resolve the aroused emotions. (It might be noted here that contemporary interest in and somewhat exclusive emphasis upon dissonance reflects the underlying agitation and spiritual unrest of modern life).

We can now state the mean and extremes in music concerning consonance and dissonance. Music suffers by defect if it is consonant to the point of dullness and inactivity—if it fails to arouse the emotions at all artistically. Music suffers by excess if it is dissonant to the point of maintaining the emotions in an unresolved state of turmoil or agitation. Hence the intermediate, as the best, is that judicious combination of consonance and dissonance which realizes fully the end of music, including the arousal *and* the resolution of the emotions.

The perfection of eighteenth century music, so far as it can be stated summarily, consists in realizing, for the most part, the true mean in music. It consistently realizes the intermediate as the best because it most fully realizes the end of music.

Its intermediate, then, is like the point of a pyramid stretching above the two extremes of the base. It exhibits the qualitative perfection of combining regularity and irregularity in rhythm, of combining emotional expression and rational order in music, of combining consonance and dissonance in harmony.

By contrast, the music of the romantic period—roughly the music of the nineteenth century—despite certain technical advances, more often tends toward an extreme rather than the true mean because, in general, it misconstrues the end of music. The essence of romanticism (in its historical meaning) is simply this: unlimited emotional intensity is the end of art. Thus conceiving an extreme as the end of art, the romantic composers, often with admirable technical ingenuity, tended to subordinate everything else in music to this excess. Thus, for the most part, they failed to realize the proper end of music which requires, what the consistent romantic will never admit, the subordination of the emotions to reason and therefore an artistic limitation to the arousal of the emotions.

Likewise, contemporary music (roughly, the music of this century), so far as its conflicting tendencies can be summarized, has tended toward an extreme rather than the true mean in music. Composers in the earlier part of this century seemed to aim above everything else to break completely with the past—a purely negative and, to that extent, an unfruitful goal. This was perhaps somewhat inevitable insofar as contemporary music was generated out of the emotional exhaustion of the romanticists, impelling early twentieth century composers, in one respect, to an opposite extreme—to the defect of attempting to deny altogether the tonal representation of the movement of the emotions.

Some contemporary composers thereupon buried themselves in technical manipulation for its own sake. In a somewhat feverish search for anything new, they devised third-tone progressions, quarter-tone progressions, and even tone progressions no ear could distinguish. They embraced dissonance as an end rather than as a means of musical representation. They combined tonalities. They tried to deny tonality. In the twelve

tone progression (which has an artistic, if limited, use), they adopted the completely arbitrary and inartistic principle that no tone of the series could be used until all the other tones had been employed. As a consequence, themes and progressions sounded just as well played backwards as forwards, and were written accordingly, which is the logical conclusion of attempted atonalism in music.

Nevertheless, such technical manipulations as these do not represent the whole story of contemporary music. Nor is it the whole story to determine the perfection of eighteenth century music as though that were an absolute perfection in music. The point, rather, is to see how the strictly classical composers achieved their perfection at their time as an aid to seeing how contemporary music can achieve its perfection at this time. Happily, much of the musical adolescence which has plagued contemporary music now seems to be passing. Contemporary music will realize its own great possibilities, not by returning to the exact music of Mozart, Haydn, Handel, Bach, and others —for that is *not* the solution—but by returning, with the modern technical advances at their command, to the enduring principles of musical art which the strictly classical composers achieved in their way. The sound principles of art will always remain, but they are ever subject to further and greater realization. The last decade or two has seen something of a swing in the direction of returning to these sound principles of art. A theoretical recognition of the perfection of eighteenth century music can help to realize the latent perfection of twentieth century music. But we shall have to wait and see if this realization will occur—in the second half of the twentieth century. The point is: the greatest music could yet be written.

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HEGELIANISM AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIND

I

"IN today's battle between two radically different philosophies of life in all the Russian satellite countries—the Communist concept and the Christian ideal—the Catholic Church seems to stand quite alone." [1] So writes Bohdan Chudoba a former member of the Czechoslovak Parliament now living in this country. In his outline of the transference of the Czech Protestant leaders to Communist allegiance in what he calls "a tragedy of spiritual desertion," Chudoba traces through three well-marked stages the decline and fall of the Czech Church. The initial one came with the shock of the first World War; the next arrived in the period following Versailles when the new stress on progress was accompanied by the stripping of dogmas regarding Christ and His Gospel down to the vaguest of generalities. The third and final stage or area of degradation of the Christianity those people of the Slav family had professed for centuries came quickly after the watering-down process of Christianity's tenets took place. In May, 1948, the general synod of the Czech Church proclaimed that the moral duty of all believers was to support the Communist revolution and fight American "imperialists." Thus swiftly was the drama of degeneration of Christianity played out on Czechoslovak soil! But it reveals in microcosm the process that has gone on continuously and insiduously ever since the Protestant rebellion. In Germany, for example, which cradled the so-called "Reformation"; where, in the sight of the last-century historian Froude, that "Reformation" moved "onward to its manhood," the full-grown movement produced as its crowning product the super-state

[1] *America*, November 12, 1949.

of which both the Third Reich and Stalin's Russia are modern types.

Chudoba's picture is that of the development in one sector of the gigantic world struggle between the subjectivism of the last four-and-a-half centuries and the *philosophia prima*. The inevitable result of that subjectivism arrived in the Hegelian projection of the super-state when the German speculative idealist originated his metaphysico-political basis for tyranny. Nietzsche implemented the conception with his notion of supermen united in one state, a notion that eventuated, in the realm of action, in Hitler's Third Reich. Karl Marx contributed dialectical materialism with outgrowths in the Russian regime. All who present pseudo-philosophic grounds for their political absolutism are in Hegel's debt, diabolic as that debt has proved itself to be.

"I saw how Hegel with his almost comically serious face sat like a brood-hen upon the fateful eggs," Heine (who had been Hegel's pupil in Berlin in the 1820's) wrote from Paris thirty years afterward. For a century ago, midway in the nineteenth century, the hatching of those fateful eggs was in evidence throughout Europe. The poet-pupil of the philosopher who defined the state as the actualization of the concrete freedom of the citizens comprising it (as parts of a whole) declared that the "Maestro" had once whispered to him that there is no God. And when that other Hegelian-disciple Marx retranslated his master into economic terms he uncovered what had heretofore been the hidden denial of God in the arch term-juggler's *System*. Though Hegel is conceded to be the inventor of a false philosophy—not by any straightforward falsification of obvious truths but by subtleties that seemed to take account of the unifying nature of truth—Hegel's influence is still rampant except in Catholic teaching. The unsoundness of his *System* was discovered and denounced by Soren Kierkegaard at about the same time (in the mid-nineteenth-century) that Heine felt called on to warn his public against that German rationalist, Hegel. What Kierkegaard found unendurable in his own search for a philosophy of life and faith was Hegel's blithe

placing of philosophy over and above revealed religion; but though in his own trinity of values Kierkegaard reversed the order, making religion superior to art and philosophy respectively, he was still a subjectivist product of his age.

Hegel's metaphysical inventions found their modern expressions in various forms as his philosophy of the " self-determining spirit " swept the western world. Its twin stresses on the individual and the state appear, with emphasis now on the one and now on the other, indistinctly glamorized philosophies of self-reliance and national self-expression. One of many like instances appears in W. E. Henley's noted poem *Invictus*, ending with the idea that nothing matters, neither laws nor punishments, besides the " unconquerable soul ": " I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul "! This shows the individual in all the extravagance of Hegelian freedom unlimited. Another example, also from the poets, is in the works of Walt Whitman where the stress falls both on the individual and (equally) on individuals in terms of an evolving mystical community; for Hegelianism had long since spread to the New World, and the whole tenor of *Leaves of Grass* is evidence of it.

II

In the writing of Edward Carpenter in England, a British disciple of Whitman, we learn of " the brotherhood of nations and of men " soon to come on earth. In this new community, the Union-Now dream of the last-century cleric, the property-proud individualist was to be replaced by one who represented true citizenship; and this true citizenship came by virtue of the conscious collective application of principles of equality and freedom which Carpenter declared were manifest in each individual as " the inward Man." [2] Moving toward that new brotherhood, mankind, as envisioned by Edward Carpenter

[2] *Civilization: Its Cause and Cure* (London Swan, Sonnenschein, 1902), Essays on Modern Science. Carpenter's Whitmanesque poems are in " *Towards Democracy*." All that was needed to reform political economy was to " let a new axiomatic emotion spring up (as of justice or fair play instead of unlimited grab)," this writer held.

(true to the Hegelian social-evolution-idea atmosphere of the day), had to pass through the horrors of a capitalist civilization; for the opposing terms of the Carpenter dialectic were present in a terrible dual self-consciousness in which man's feeling of oneness with his neighbor warred with a competitive business urge. And though this evolutionary middle-state would give way to the ideal society or true democracy yet it remained, like Edward Bok's view of poverty in a young man's life: a good thing to grow away from. Rousseau did not hold more fondly to the thought that our civilization is a great evil than did this English political "seer," though to Carpenter it was a necessary step in the progress toward the future community. As fervently as any Communist, and with the same kind of religious zeal, the Britisher looked forward to the coming of the order of which he sang in these words:

> The brotherhood of nations and of men
> Comes on apace. New dreams of youth bestir
> The ancient heart of earth—fair dreams of love
> And equal freedom for all folk and races.

That hopes of impending revolution were astir in the hearts and minds of Carpenter's countrymen appears from the fact that his treatise, *Civilization: Its Cause and Cure*, first published in 1889 went through several reprintings even down into our own century. The widely-read work (purporting to show how "civilization" had wrecked man's instinctive social-unity purpose, evidenced in his first Eden innocence and appearing in the evolving existences on this planet before man's own advent) advocated the acceptance of the "inward Man" theory as that which alone might bring health, happiness, social-unity—including a unity with the lesser animals, the earth and the starry heavens themselves. Its use of the idea of the natural goodness of men plus its espousal of the ideal of social unity combines Rousseau with the political teaching of Hegel. Its brotherhood is one of Edenites.

Yet Carpenter, a Cambridge product and a clergyman of the Church of England, in his thoroughgoing mystical socialism,

represents the same trend manifest in German nationalism overtly in its politics from Bismarck on. In their reorganization of education after the great defeat by the Allies in 1918, for all the touted democracy of the Republic's aim, we find a prominent educator saying officially that " only unreserved devotion to the state can be the objective of civic instruction," and " the state is a moral community to which other groups, cultural or otherwise, subordinate themselves." [3] Another phrasing of the same idea is that, as a " great trust," the state is " the living organism which has been handed down from the dim past." [4] If, at first glance, German nationalism seems to contradict the Carpenter theory, a second look shows that this " living organism " for the Germans is no more and no less than the culminating stage in those evolving stages of Carpenter's evolution-theory of political organization; indeed it is the same as the last classless society of Communist aspirations. In short, it represents the realized *civitas Dei*, the perfect community of perfect persons, of which a word later on. And this state-myth had been operative assuredly at the time over three thousand German university professors and secondary-school teachers signed a manifesto on October 10, 1914, two months after the first World War began, containing this statement: " *We firmly believe that the salvation of the whole of European civilization depends on the victory of German militarism.*" [5] That is, the Germans' victory to these educators was essential to the maintenance of all Europe's welfare since, Hegelian-taught as they were, civilization was actually believed by them to have reached its crowning height in the German nation.

III

Hegelian individual freedom, almost of the unlimited type Henley sang, is the Marxists' goal in their ultimate classless

[3] *The Reorganization of Education in Prussia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927), pp. 19-20.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Essays and Addresses* by John Burnet (New York, 1930), Chapter " Kultur " reprinted from Burnet's *Higher Education and the War* (London, 1917), p. 169.

society. That freedom is to follow the passing of the violent state of the dictator which arises just to destroy the capitalist stage. For this Marxist plan for a classless future of perfect freedom for each person is precisely the same succulent bait proferred by Hegel in his stress on individual rights which forms so important a part of his philosophy of the state. In practice, as both Germany and Russia have shown all too clearly, these rights are transformed into merely the " rights " of being expendable by the state. Hegel had of course been influenced (through Kant) profoundly by Rousseau's *Contrat social* with its *volonté de tous* theory of government, a theory that is not only fundamentally false but caricatures the truth of political sovereignty. This theory, in fact, repeats on a large scale the Protagorean doctrine, which Socrates once blasted, that " man is the measure of all things."

The social-contract notion rests on the seriously mistaken theory that man's nature left to itself is as simple and innocent as it is wise and reasonable. Carpenter's " inward Man " principle presupposes such unspoiled human nature even in the face of the fact that the Anglican cleric should have known that man's Eden innocence and pure-reason function fell together. Only through the Redeemer may man reach again to the living Spirit behind his laws, that Spirit Who is the one only Source of Christian political sovereignty.

Hegelianism's metaphysical ground is actually based on a far-off pagan cosmology, that of Empedocles and Mani. Nevertheless his philosophy of the state, along with all our modern theories which are based on that philosophy, grossly caricatures the Christian teaching of the Mystical Body of Christ as represented by the Church and its members. In St. Paul's teaching in the twelfth chapter of his first letter the Corinthians reference is made to the members of this Body which, like those of the physical body, must mutually help one another for the good of the whole. (It should be noted in passing that the analogy used here is a kind of reverse one; to understand physical organisms we first analogize them after the manner of a community, each member showing diversity in its functioning, each " will-

ing " the good of the whole.) For in St. Paul's picture of the Christian community each member has the mind of Christ; thus it applies only to the Mystical Body and is not in any sense representative of the ordinary human groupings made up as they are of variously imperfect and differing minds.

In the philosophy of the super-state—though a reciprocal relation between the rights of the person and his duties toward the whole of which he is a part is declared to obtain—the relationship is really expressed well in the old limerick about the " young lady from Niger who smiled as she rode on a tiger," for the " rights " are almost at once swallowed up in the " duties " and the end of that ride is inevitable:

> They came back from the ride
> With the lady inside,
> And the smile on the face of the tiger.

All individual responsibilities in the super-state are shifted to the central " social mind." Attempts to tie up totalitarianism with the vocabulary of Christian unity referred to above, appear in the use of the Nazi term *Gemeinschaft* (communion) for the Third Reich. In the Nazi sense *Gemeinschaft* meant the fellowship and solidarity of the Nordics; the *Volksgemeinschaft*, so often on Hitler's lips, was held indeed to represent an earthly *Gemeinschaft der Heiligen* (communion of saints), the main sense in which the German term for community had been used before Hitler.

But the *Volksgemeinschaft* was merely the projection of the arbitrary subjectivist will of the little Austrian paper-hanger on a political group; and what it really represented was precisely the same thing invoked in the Hegelian *Staat* philosophy. Nor does it differ in its metaphysico-political aspects from the theory acted on by the imperialists of the Bismarck-Wilhelmian regime or the Marxists' doctrines or Edward Carpenter's democracy-prophecies. Each and all are merely the personifying and deifying of what has been named variously, " *der Staat,*" " *Volksgemeinschaft,*" " the Proletariat," and " the inward Man." All are special forms of Hegel's super-state.

It was stated earlier that Kierkegaard was a reactive product of Hegel, and thus himself a thorough-going subjectivist. In the swift descent of Kierkegaard's " existential " philosophy into Sartre's atheism appears the ease and directness of the descent of subjective idealism into nihilism. This course also is obvious in the Marxian materialism into which Hegel's speculations plummeted when the Hegelian economist turned his subjectivist teacher " right side up." These various theorists (without realizing it) show what happens when subjectivism is carried to its logical end. For Hegel's " Absolute " in philosophy is simply human reason; and its complete inability alone to save man from himself is witnessed repeatedly in history.

Not only in political spheres does the Hegelian fateful egg-hatching go on. In a recent deliverance we find Lin Yutang popularly philosophizing as follows: " The soul is the functioning of man's personality . . . the existence of the human soul is to be sought in our tears and laughter." [6] This is subjectivism with a vengeance—a sentimental vengeance, for the sentimental is simply " the despair of materialism " (to use Heine's apt phrasing). On the other hand we read in an excerpted chapter from Albert Einstein's recently written book, which is represented as the garnering of the wisdom of his " later years," that the Good, the True, and the Beautiful are to be sought within man's mind.[7] A corollary to this man-centered humanist's thesis (which places the existence of the soul not in tears and laughter so much as in " science ") is the ruling out of a personal God. His arguments against actual miracles are on a plane with those against belief in the Hebraic-Christian God; that is, by all our laws of logic and scientific experience they are utterly false, being based wholly on the type of rationalism that the great Greeks exploded twenty-five hundred years ago. Against the Protagorean contention that " man is the measure of all things," final proof was provided by Aristotle (the father of logic, who made science itself possible) not only that God exists

[6] *The Saturday Review of Literature*, July 8, 1950.
[7] *The Fortnightly* (London), August, 1950.

but that our very use of language is incontrovertible witness of His continually activating Presence.

So much for Lin Yutang and Einstein. And even in such a writer as Arnold Toynbee, who has lately tried to restore some of the lost Christian thinking to our era, we find the taint of the Hegelian modern mind. In what follows, a short *résumé* of his teaching will be given for contrast with the fundamental thought of a lesser known but far sounder historian-philosopher, last century's Frédéric Ozanam. Ozanam's position will be reviewed in turn as exemplifying the truly Christian view of the events of history. (For he saw all things through the First Truth by which everything else is true.)

IV

Toynbee's well-known view of history (his rout-rally-rout account of phases) is nothing but Hegel's, applied to specific events by a magistral hand.[8] (The Toynbee shibboleths, or " justice " and " freedom," have the old Hegelian-balance ring.) This modern historian's dynamic picture with its arrays of images and symbols is intended to present an evolvement where a higher synthesis replaces two opposing cultures in the various challenge-response rhythms he purports to see in the course of man's life (or lives) on this earth. In this view the devil is represented in a Faustian sense as God's helper; indeed Toynbee portrays history as a series of bouts between God and the Adversary. For example, the first of the bouts is supposed to have been in the natural order with a runaway comet acting the enemy role as it sideswiped the sun and threw out our planet among others. In all planes this writer sees the process going on until " matter " has somehow become " spirit " and civilization has grown godlike *en masse*. In short he accepts natural and cultural evolution as axiomatically true.

His progressively " spiritualized " culture, or plurality of cultures running in parallel courses, has unfortunately little more

[8] See *A Study of History* (London, 1935-1939); also *Civilization on Trial* (New York, 1948).

of realizable spiritual content than the ethics of the hive and the herd. For though Toynbee often uses the phrases of a believer in soul who is also very sure of God, his creed is reducible to one of the most primitive myths, being actually an Empedoclean or Manichean type of materialism. These pagan philosophers, it is remembered, taught that good and evil, love and strife, are the begetters of motion and life. Hegel's thesis-antithesis rationalism is—as suggested above—actually based on their cosmic fables, and Toynbee has echoed him in this. Most clearly is the anti-Christianity of Toynbee's teaching shown in his pronouncement that religion is just a product of mingling cultures in the course of human progress.

It is true that Toynbee advocates that man enlist his strength on the side of God and recognize the Adversary for what he is—one who would destroy all wherever possible. As Mephisto says of himself: *Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint!* Thus the British historian hints at a total collapse of civilization—with perhaps the insect world taking over—if man does not fight actively for and with the Spirit of God; and he holds that Spirit represented *in its present form* in Christianity (with, of course, certain Toynbee modifications). However, Toynbee is actually expressing a dialectic materialism of precisely the same order, because based on the same pseudo-philosophy, as that of Karl Marx. No less than Hegel's own, Toynbee's is masked as a defense of Christianity; but it is really set for its destruction.

In Toynbee, then, we have the latest popular philosophizing enemy of the true philosophy in modern culture. As I tried to show in a brief sketch [9] a few years back, Toynbee's concept is a deadly one; and his world picture is as different as possible from that of Frédéric Ozanam, the great Sorbonne scholar and founder of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul. We find, in fact, that Hegel's later contemporary, Ozanam, provides a philosophical antidote to the poison of the German's subjectivistic philosophy of history.[10]

[9] In "Two Historians: Ozanam and Toynbee," *America*, January 24, 1948.

[10] See Ozanam's *Works* (Paris, 1862-1865); also *Dante and Catholic Philosophy* (New York, 1913).

Ozanam's world-history outline was never completely filled in; he died before he had finished the project which he had intended to bring up to date. But we find his account of civilization from a Christian view a truly Christian one and his basic philosophy undergirding that view is itself as complete as it is rewarding. Ozanam (1813-1853), who, incidentally, was almost an exact contemporary of the Danish theologian, Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), had not been brought up in the destructive atmosphere of Hegelianism that darkened the latter's life and thought. Even as a very young man he saw the grave moral and philosophical ills of the nineteenth century; but he also saw them to be resolvable through the Church. Under its aegis, and at the age of twenty, he started his great Society with its worldwide application of Christian teachings in the form of an activating charity for all types and conditions of men. His earlier essay "*Reflexions sur la doctrine de St.-Simon* went directly to the point as it appealed to the young men of his age as to an army to fight for Christian truth as taught and observed in the Church. Here, in the writing of Ozanam at the age of eighteen, we see the presage of the mature philosopher of civilization and the founder of the vast, active organization of charity whose hundreds of thousands of members continue his labor of Christian love. This task, he said to the young everywhere, was theirs to do: "This work [of the Church] is for you young people." It was "for" them in a double sense as his youthful essay shows in these words, calling his friends to the Faith of their fathers:

> You have experienced the emptiness of physical satisfaction and hungered after truth and justice, seeking them in the schools of philosophy or running for them to the modern apostles who have nothing to say which can fill the void in your hearts. Behold, now, the religion of your fathers offers herself to you freely. Do not turn away, for she, too, like yourselves, is generous and young. She does not grow old with the world but, always new, puts herself in the forefront of human progress to conduct it to perfection.

When Ozanam died on September 8, 1853, at the age of forty, he closed a career of extraordinary brilliance and accomplishment. At Lyons and Paris he was known as a leader in

academic circles, though today he is remembered chiefly for the Society he founded in 1833 which past creed, race, nation, carries on its works of mercy to the poor everywhere. In Paris, where he was the Professor of Foreign Literatures in the Faculty of Letters, his lectures on the philosophy of history were crowded with eager listeners. For Ozanam was one of those "persuaded" ones who, as Joubert says, "persuade, as the indulgent disarm," since none gives faith unless he has it. *In lumine tuo videbimus lumen.*

The compendious outline of his plan to write a complete history of mankind is given us in his three important and indispensable reference works for the historian: *The History of Civilization in the Fifth Century, Franciscan Poets in the Thirteenth Century,* and *Dante and Philosophy*. Besides these books there are such essays as the one already cited and the "Two Chancellors of England: Thomas à Becket and Bacon." The success and failure respectively of these two men appear in their different philosophies, the one an exponent of the Christian, the other of the rationalist attitude. This second essay is of particular import to us; for it is on that very basis of Christianity versus rationalism that Ozanam differs from Toynbee, and thus succeeds in his interpretation of history where the modern historian has failed.

V

That Christian historian, the centenary of whose death should be celebrated with some notice of his philosophical acumen as well as of his great work in practical charity, foresees no possibility of collapse for civilization in the way Toynbee has painted it. How could he? Just as he had seen the Church's work to be "for" the young in a dual sense, so he came to see through all his historical researches the Church playing a significant double role in civilization. First, it indoctrinated with the Christian truths; and second, it preserved all that had been good in antiquity. As he saw the Church in the first five centuries preserving ancient treasures in the creation of a

literature of its own suited to the times, he reverently applauded the wisdom motivating such preservation. Not only did Ozanam never tire of manifesting the falsehood of the perennial charge that the Church stifled the legitimate humanity in men (voiced loudly in his era by the earlier English historian, Gibbon) by citing the Church's protection of whatever was of worth in ancient culture, but he also saw in that protection a wise safeguard against the paganism in the depths of human nature which forever sinks into secularism whether in law, art or philosophy; and it is just by the light of Christianity that paganism and/or secularism is seen as a definite backsliding.

For Ozanam not only had a great respect for the individual mind which must know reasons but he saw in that mind what he called "the secret bonds by which the ages are knitted together." "The human intellect," he observed in one of his celebrated lectures at the Sorbonne, "has had this honor: the ruin of the ancient world and the irruption of invading hordes have not been able to prevail against it." But, he added with equal insistence, it can be only by the light of Christianity that such an intellect might go, as he said, into the moral catacombs under the soil of paganism to learn the meaning of history. How different from Ozanam's stress on the individual thinker is Toynbee's grandiose story of the rout-rally-rout process in civilization! Here as little account of the individual in the life of cosmic challenges and reponses is to be found as in Hegel's evolutionary theory of peoples and ideas. Ozanam's interpretation of historic progress, on the contrary, holds firmly to the belief that each man is answerable in his place and time for himself *and* social conditions; and he is answerable during all these centuries of error where wandering replaced—and in this century that replacing is far more obvious than in Ozanam's day—advancement in various social orders. But God's Hand on society never permits its total collapse; He can only wait until society may be brought back over whatever dark painfilled path it has erred to realization of His laws. (The swiftness with which Hegelianism has wrecked the western world, rendering man helpless, is, in this sense, good.)

Over and over the great Christian scholar reiterated in this form and others the truth he had voiced in his earlier essay about the Church's role in civilization: "She does not grow old with the world, but, always new, puts herself in the forefront of human progress to conduct it to perfection." For the Christian even as he tries to obey the command, "Be ye perfect!" knows that it is God's world. And, because of that most real Presence in history, mankind can never err irremediably. The Light, in Ozanam's words, always burns on somewhere; and where it burns is the forefront of civilization and not elsewhere.

In his panoramic vision of the centuries of Christianity, Ozanam saw illustrated the process which he knew to be continuous to the very end of time: that of God's militant Church in the maintenance of its establishment on the earth. "The world," he told his students at the Sorbonne, "was never left without some luminous center where it might relight its torches," adding that in the time-span of his survey of Christianity in its early centuries the Gospel failed in the East only to dawn on the North; and when Italy's great schools were cut off by the Lombard invasions, literary zeal rose in the heart of Ireland's monasteries. In Italy itself, following the Lombard conquests, Christian letters would have been lost, Ozanam writes (in his work on "Dante and the Thirteenth Century," reviewing God's work in history up to that period),[11] had it not been for monasticism which was organized on the very eve of danger. "What is there astonishing," he says," in the fact that the monks preserved antiquity? They were themselves antiquity." Ozanam mentions further that heroic priest, St. Gregory the Great, the pontiff "raised up to meet the perils of those evil days," two centuries before Charlemagne was crowned Emperor of the Romans at the hand of Leo III; later in the thoughts of Gregory VII the French historian discerns "the genius for government which emancipates and enlightens," and in the German emperor's visit to him at Canossa "the triumph of civilization over the barbarian world."

[11] Translated by Lucia D. Pychowska (New York, 1913). *Cf.* footnote above.

Thus in history Ozanam might trace the course of learning just as Bossuet traced in history the course of religion and empire. When three men, Lanfranc, St. Anselm and Peter Lombard, went to northern Europe to inaugurate the revival of learning there, it was, the historian contends, only one of the many directive acts of Providence which "watched over the destiny of art as well as over the mutations of the nations," Lanfranc in giving greater exactness to dialectics, and St. Anselm in his writings which invigorated metaphysical discussion, and finally Peter Lombard's lending to theology the form of his *Sentences* which later "seemed to be fixed forever in the *Summa* of St. Thomas"—each of these men had his task marked out for him. Thus the Church taking her stand on the truths that men ought to believe and weighing their deeds with the weight of eternity saw to it also that while barbarism might usurp, it could never rule exclusively.

Today Ozanam would rejoice as he rejoiced in the past at the preservation of tradition in the Church and hence in Christendom. In today's Armageddon where those believing in God are called on to defend themselves against the armed might of those who do not believe in Him we find the Roman Church, as in the era Ozanam writes of, as well as in Ozanam's own times of Christian social adjustment, preparing for a concord of the priesthood and the government and developing even in the midst of their discords.[12] Thus Hegelianism, which has affected so profoundly the modern mind, itself may be seen by some future Ozanam not only as a usurpation of the ever-present barbarism in the human mind—which it, of course, is—but also as the doctrine whose darkness of deeds came to throw into new relief the regenerative thought in the Gospel

[12] That concord means, of course, the Christianizing of government. Ozanam's solution to social and governmental problems, Thomas P. Neill tells us in his new book, *They Lived the Faith* (Milwaukee, 1951), "was not understood until after the publication of Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* in 1891." Dr. Neill adds that Ozanam's views were the ones followed by the Church when it was possible to separate the wheat of democracy from the chaff of Liberalism: "His social and economic views can be found in *Rerum Novarum*, his political views in Leo XIII's *ralliement* policy." (p. 163) "God," says Ozanam, "leads the world thither."

of Christianity. For so the Church's struggle against paganism and heresy goes on that minds may be set free, as Ozanam saw; since only those times which have faith neither in God nor in man, only impious ages, believe in an eternal night. In Mr. Chudoba's observation quoted at the beginning of this paper—that in the present war between two wholly differing philosophies of life the Church seems to stand quite alone—we see the power and the glory as well as the potential kingdom of God on earth in that solitary, blessed vigil which extends to the gates of Hell and beyond.

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NATURAL NECESSITATION OF THE HUMAN WILL

I. The Existence of Natural Necessitation of the Human Will

1. Introductory Remarks

An examination of the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on the natural appetite or natural necessitation of the human will will be valuable for several reasons. First of all, it should result in a collection and coordination of the scattered teachings of St. Thomas on this point. Although St. Thomas does teach formally and explicitly about the natural necessitation of the human will in his *Summa Theologica* and *De Veritate*,[1] nevertheless much of his teaching on this subject is to be garnered only from incidental remarks he makes while discussing other topics. The student engaged in studying these other topics, which are often more important, is sometimes left with a confused notion of the natural necessitation of the will. These pages will help to dispel the confusion. Secondly, a knowledge of the Angelic Doctor's views on the natural appetite of the human will is not only worthwhile for its own sake, but is invaluable for an understanding of related problems. For instance, in refuting the attacks of the determinists upon the free will of man, it is essential to know to what precise extent the human will is determined, and in what way. Then again, there is the important related problem of man's natural desire for the vision of God, and the question whether any proof for the existence of God can be drawn from this desire. A general review of the teaching of St. Thomas regarding the natural appetite of the human will provides the requisite background for the study of these more specialized problems.

[1] Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 82, aa. 1, 2 and *De Veritate*, q. 22, aa. 5, 6, 7.

With these purposes in mind, therefore, an attempt will be made in the following pages to assemble the relevant texts of St. Thomas and to group them so as to bring out the fact, extent, and nature of the necessitation of the human will. Such an examination will be timely, too, inasmuch as the whole question of the proper interpretation of the doctrine of St. Thomas about this necessitation has been raised recently in an inquiry [2] which reaches conclusions quite contrary to those of the traditional commentators on the writings of the Angelic Doctor. In the course of this study, the opinions of the most famous commentators will be presented. In any question of interpretation of St. Thomas, the presumption stands in their favor. We shall strive to discover whether, in the present case, this presumption is sufficiently justified so that we may still abide by their interpretation, or whether, on the contrary, the traditional interpretation must be discarded in favor of the new one.

2. GENERAL PROOFS FOR NATURAL NECESSITATION OF THE HUMAN WILL

In proving that the human will is naturally necessitated, St. Thomas makes no appeal to our introspective experience of the fact; just as neither does he do so to prove that man has free will, beyond making a vague general statement, which may include introspective evidence, that "manifest evidences indicate this, whereby it is apparent that man freely chooses one thing, and refuses another." [3] Cajetan, indeed, alludes briefly to our experience of natural necessitation: ". . . happiness in general, which we experience ourselves to desire naturally." [4] But St. Thomas passes over this because, just as in the case of free will, he is more interested in giving an objective proof that will present not only the existence of the fact, but also

[2] William R. O'Connor, "The Natural Desire for Happiness," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXVI (January, 1949), pp. 91-120.

[3] St. Thomas, *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 1. All future references will be to works of St. Thomas, unless otherwise indicated.

[4] Cajetan, *Commentaria in Summam Theologicam*, I, q. 82, a. 1, n. 7. (Leonine edition.)

the reason why it must exist. In doing so, he employs three arguments.[5]

The first argument is a proof from analogy. It is drawn from the parallel or proportion between the intellect and the will. Examples of this first proof may be seen in the following passages:

> The movement of the will follows the act of the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally. Therefore, the will, too, wills some things naturally.[6]
>
> Just as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to first principles, so, too, the will naturally and of necessity adheres to the last end.[7]

This argument is presented at least once (in the first example above) as a separate proof; but it is more often[8] given as a sort of conclusion of the other proofs, which are more basic. For the argument from the parallel between the intellect and will at once brings to mind the question: why the parallel? Although such a parallel is observable in several other aspects of the intellect and will and hence may be supposed to hold good, too, for natural necessitation, still the parallel must, in the latter case, have its proper cause. St. Thomas proceeds, therefore, to explain this fundamental cause in his second proof. The reason why both intellect and will have natural operations is that both are natures. As distinct powers ordered to their proper operations, they are certain specific things in the genus of nature, for they are intrinsic principles of operation.

Perhaps the best explanation of the second proof is given by St. Thomas in his *De Veritate*, in a somewhat lengthy passage which really constitutes a polysyllogistic argument. It begins as follows:

> For the evidence of this, it must be understood that in ordered things the mode of the first thing must be included in the second, and there must be found in the second not only what belongs to it

[5] Cf. Cajetan, *loc. cit.*, n. 6.
[6] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1, *sed contra.*
[7] *Ibid.*, I, q. 82, a. 2.
[8] *Ibid.*, a. 1; and I-II, q. 10, a. 1.

according to its own proper notion, but also what belongs to it according to the notion of the first mode . . .

Having laid down this general principle as his major premise, St. Thomas proceeds to prove it by two examples:

. . . just as it belongs to man not only to use reason, which belongs to him according to his proper difference, which is rational, but also to use sense or food, which belongs to him according to his genus, which is animal or living. And we see likewise in sensible things that since the sense of touch is the basis, as it were, of the other senses, there is found in the organ of each sense not only the property of that sense whose proper organ it is, but also the property of touch; just as the organ of the sense of sight not only senses white and black, inasmuch as it is the organ of sight, but also senses hot and cold, and is corrupted by excesses of them, according as it is an organ of touch.

The next step in the reasoning process is to lay down the minor premise, its proof, and the obvious conclusion:

Now nature and the will are ordered in this way, that the will itself is a certain nature, for everything which is found in beings is a certain nature. And therefore one must find in the will not only what is of the will, but also what is of nature.

To complete his polysyllogism, St. Thomas adds to this conclusion another minor premise and deduces the desired conclusion concerning natural appetite, which he immediately proceeds to distinguish from free will:

But this belongs to every created nature, that it be ordered by God to good, naturally desiring it. Wherefore there is in the will itself a certain natural appetite for the good suitable to it; and, besides this, it has the ability to desire something according to its own determination, not of necessity; this belongs to it according as it is will.[9]

The same argument is elsewhere given briefly and in a general form applicable to more than the will: "Each power of the soul is a certain form or nature and has a natural inclination towards something. Hence each power desires by natural appetite that object suitable to itself." [10]

[9] *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5.

[10] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3.

A variation of this argument appears in another passage of St. Thomas. Here the fundamental principle is still that the will is a nature, but the implicit minor premise is a truth which is axiomatic with St. Thomas; namely, that nature is determined to one thing. The latter truth replaces the statement that God inclines all natural things to good: "The will of the rational creature is determined to one thing to which it is naturally moved . . . because natural action is always presupposed to other actions.[11]

Another variation of this second proof uses the minor premise, in the first part of the polysyllogism, that nature is the first principle in every thing. This premise is evident from the very definition of nature.

It is necessary to posit natural dilection in the angels. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that the prior is always preserved in the posterior. But nature is prior to the intellect, because the nature of anything is its essence. Hence that which is of nature must be preserved also in those beings having an intellect. But this is common to every nature, that it have some inclination, which is natural appetite or love.[12]

There is in the angels a certain natural love and a certain elective love; and the natural love is the principle of the elective love, because what belongs to what is prior always has the notion of a principle. Since, therefore, the nature is the first thing in every being, what belongs to the nature must be the principle in every being. This is evident in man, both as to the intellect and as to the will. For the intellect knows principles naturally, and from such knowledge in man is caused the knowledge of conclusions, which are not naturally known by man, but through discovery or through teaching. In like manner, the end is related to the will in the same way as a principle is to the intellect.[13]

Nature is said in many ways. For sometimes it denotes the intrinsic principle in movable things, and such a nature is either matter or a material form . . . In another way, any substance or any being is called a nature; and according to this, that is said to be natural to a being which belongs to it according to its substance; and this is what is essentially in a thing. But, in all beings, those

[11] *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 4, ad 5.
[12] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 1.
[13] *Ibid.*, a. 2.

things which are not essentially in them are reduced to some thing which is essentially in them, as to a first principle. And therefore it is necessary that, taking nature in this way, the principle, in those things which belong to a being, always be natural. And this is manifestly apparent in the intellect, for the principles of intellectual knowledge are known naturally. In like manner, too, the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.[14]

The Angelic Doctor's third proof rests on the premise that the principle of all movements must be something immobile. This premise is susceptible of several interpretations. For instance, the First Mover is immobile in the sense that He is in no way a subject of movement. But clearly this is not the sense intended here, for St. Thomas does not mean to imply that the will is not the subject of both necessary and free movements. In another way, even the subject of a movement may be called immobile, inasmuch as it perdures throughout the movement, whereas the terms of the movement do not. Taking our idea of movement chiefly from local motion, we are perhaps accustomed to picture to ourselves the terms as permanent and the subject as passing from one term to the other. But from the metaphysical point of view, it is more correct to say that the substance remains, in itself, immobile, while the former accident disappears or is removed and the new accidental term is introduced. Viewed in this way, the subject of a movement can be called immobile: " Every movement presupposes something immobile. For when a change as to quality is made, the substance remains immobile; and when a substantial form is changed, the matter remains immobile." [15]

Yet neither can this interpretation suffice for the present case. The will is indeed the immobile subject of all its own movements, both necessary and free ones alike. But the necessary movements are distinct from the free ones, and the meaning of St. Thomas is that the necessary movements themselves, or rather the will considered not in itself alone but precisely as already moved necessarily, constitute the immobile principle of the free movements. This third interpretation alone suffices to

[14] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1. [15] *Ibid.*, I, q. 84, a. 1, ad 3.

distinguish free movements from naturally necessitated ones, and to prove the need to postulate the existence of the latter. For there can be no free choice about means to the end unless there already exists, as its immobile principle, necessitation as to the end, at least in general. The will adhering to the last end in general can be called immobile because its movement towards that end has already been irrevocably finished. It is incapable of further movement in that direction because its potency along that line has been exhausted, since it adheres to the end in such a way that it is unable not to will it, or to will its opposite. But in willing a means, the potency of the will is not so exhausted that it is incapable of willing other means, or of revoking its choice, for it chooses freely. That the will thus necessarily willing the end is the principle of the elective movement towards means is evident, for there can be no willing of means until the end has been willed.

This seems to be the meaning of such statements of St. Thomas as the following:

> The principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.[16]
>
> Now just as is the order of the nature to the will, so is the order of those things which the will naturally wills to those things with respect to which it is determined by itself, not by nature. And therefore just as the nature is the foundation of the will, so the appetible object which is naturally desired is the principle and foundation of other appetible things.[17]

It seems, therefore, that the foregoing interpretation is the proper one for the premise that the principle of all movements must be something immobile, insofar as it is used in the third proof for natural necessitation of the human will. The movements in question are free ones, and their immobile principle is the will as necessitated naturally with regard to the end. St. Thomas presents this third proof in conjunction with the other proofs:

[16] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1.

[17] *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5.

A thing is said to be necessary from this, that it is immutably determined to one thing. Hence, since the will is indeterminately related to many things, it does not have necessity with respect of all, but with respect of those things only to which it is determined by natural inclination . . . and because every mobile thing must be reduced to something immobile, and every undetermined thing to which the will is determined must be the principle of desiring those things to which it is not determined; and this is the last end.[18]

In like manner, neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, just as the intellect of necessity adheres to first principles, so the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness. For the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what pertains naturally to a being, and immovably, must be the foundation and principle of all the other things, since the nature of the being is the first thing in every being, and every movement arises from something immovable.[19]

3. THE SPHERE OF NATURAL NECESSITATION

The three proofs of St. Thomas establish the conclusion that there is something which the will, of its very nature, wills necessarily, and not freely. This conclusion does not mean that it is necessary for the will to will; that is, to bring forth its act. The object which necessitates the will is not its own act, but the last end in general. Moreover, it is precisely with regard to its own act that the will has freedom, not necessitation: " the will is mistress of its own act, and it belongs to it to will and not to will." [20] Nor does this conclusion mean that the will must bring forth an act of love or desire for the last end in general. For that very act is finite and particular; it may be directed towards a last end, but it itself is not the last end, and hence it cannot necessitate the will. What this conclusion does mean is that if and when the will does produce an act, there is a certain object, namely the last end in general, at which that act must necessarily in some way terminate, regardless of the fact that it may simultaneously terminate freely at some particular good. We shall have occasion later to discuss more fully this temporal

[18] *Ibid.*, a. 6.
[19] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 1.
[20] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 3, *sed contra.*

simultaneity of natural and free willing. For the present, it suffices to point out that when we say the will wills something necessarily, we refer to a necessity of specification or determination of object, not to a necessity of exercise of the act by the subject. The will always remains free as to the exercise of the act; that is, as to efficiently eliciting or imperating an act. Nevertheless, with regard to specification on the part of the object willed, there is necessity in the will as to a certain object, so that the will, free to elicit an act or not, must nevertheless, if it does elicit an act, elicit one directed to this object and not to its opposite. St. Thomas clearly teaches that the necessity which is natural to the will is a necessity of specification: "If, therefore, the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all, since it cannot will the opposite." [21] Nor can it be urged that this natural necessity is also one of exercise. This would mean that the will is always actually willing what it naturally wills; and this is contrary both to experience and to the teaching of St. Thomas, as the following passages show:

> The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of movement, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by another not.[22]
>
> The first good is *per se* willed and the will *per se* and naturally wills it; yet it does not always actually will it, for it is not necessary that those things which are naturally suitable to the soul always actually be in the soul, just as principles which are naturally known are not always actually being considered.[23]
>
> . . . beatitude, which the will is unable not to will, in the sense, namely, that it may will its opposite.[24]
>
> Man of necessity wills beatitude . . . Now I say *of necessity* as to the determination of the act, because he cannot will the opposite,

[21] *Ibid.*, q. 10, a. 2.
[22] *Loc. cit.*
[23] *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5, ad 11.
[24] *De Malo*, q. 6, ad 7.

but not as to the exercise of the act, because one is able then not to will to think of beatitude, because even the very acts of the intellect and will are particular . . . Thus, therefore, as to some things the will is necessarily moved on the part of the object, but not to all things; but on the part of the exercise of the act, it is not moved of necessity.[25]

St. Thomas has based his proof for natural necessity on the fact that nature is determined to one thing, and hence to one activity, since action follows being, and hence to one object. But an object can necessitate only by way of specification, not exercise. The chief commentators on St. Thomas agree with him in this teaching:

As the desire of beatitude is natural objectively, so is it not in our power objectively; and as it is free elicitively, so is it in our power elicitively. Hence in desiring beatitude in general we merit not by reason of the natural object, but by reason of the act chosen.[26]

An object necessary as to specification is given for this life also . . . But as to exercise, nothing necessitates the will, if it proceeds with advertence, except God alone, seen clearly.[27]

St. Thomas understands by natural desire . . . an act elicited by the will which is natural and determined as to the specification of the act, but not as to the exercise . . . the sense of his words is that, if the last end and beatitude in general be proposed to the will, the will is indeed able to elicit and not to elicit an act about that object; but if it elicits an act about it, that act will be pursuit, and the will cannot flee such an object.[28]

[25] *Ibid., corpus.*

[26] Cajetan, *Comment.*, I, q. 82, a. 1, n. 18. Cf. also *ibid.*, I-II, q. 13, a. 6, n. 1: "Note that the author attributes to choice each freedom, namely as to the exercise of the act and as to the specification, as is clear in the text, intending to manifest from this the difference between the simple act of the will and choice. For the simple act of the will, namely volition or willing, which was treated above, is not universally free as to the specification of the act; for it is terminated at some object necessarily, so that it cannot be terminated at the opposite, as is clear from what was said above. But choice is always free, both as to the exercise of the act and as to the specification."

[27] John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philosophicus*, Pars IV, q. XII, a. IV (Reiser edition; Turin: Marietti, 1937), III, 401a16-36.

[28] Sylvester Ferrariensis, *Commentaria in Summam Contra Gentiles*, I, cap. 5, n. V, 3. (Leonine edition.)

The will, then, has a certain natural necessity as to the specification of its act. This necessity is distinct from coactive necessity; that is, from that coercion which is violence. For the source of a violent action is external, and the one suffering violence confers nothing towards the action, since the latter is against its nature or intrinsic principles. This means that in the case of a rational being, the violent action or movement is contrary to the inclination of his will:

> Necessity is twofold: namely, coactive necessity—and that can in no way befall a willer—and the necessity of natural inclination . . . and by such necessity the will wills something necessarily . . . Now although the will wills the last end by a certain natural inclination, it is in no way to be conceded that it is forced to will it. For force is nothing else than the induction of a certain violence. But the violent, according to the Philosopher, is that whose principle is outside, the patient conferring no energy; as when a stone is thrown upwards, for it is in no way, so far as it is a question of its own accord, inclined to this notion. But since the will itself is a certain inclination, because it is a certain appetite, it cannot happen that the will will anything and its inclination be not towards that thing; and so it cannot happen that the will violently and forcedly will anything, if it will it by natural inclination. It is clear, therefore, that the will does not will anything necessarily by a coactive necessity; yet it wills something necessarily by a necessity of natural inclination.[29]

The natural necessity of the human will, therefore, is distinct from coercive necessity. Unlike the latter, it is compatible with free choice:

> Liberty, according to Augustine, is opposed to the necessity of coaction, but not of natural inclination.[30]

The will, inasmuch as it is rational, is related to opposites, for

[29] *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5. Cf. also *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 14, a. 2: "Necessity is twofold: one, indeed, of coaction, which is done by an extrinsic agent, and this necessity, indeed, is contrary both to nature and to the will, each of which is an intrinsic prinicple. But the other is natural necessity, which follows natural principles, for example the form, as it is necessary for fire to heat, or the matter, as it is necessary for a body composed of contraries to corrupt."

[30] *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5, ad 3 *in contrarium*. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 1, ad 1: "The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity 'does not take away the liberty of the will,' as he himself says."

this is to consider it according to that which is proper to it, but inasmuch as it is a certain nature, nothing prevents it from being determined to one thing.[31]

The will is divided against natural appetite taken with precision, i. e. which is natural only, just as man is divided against that which is animal only; but it is not divided against natural appetite absolutely, but includes it, just as man includes animal.[32]

Natural necessity, indeed, is more than compatible with free choice: it is prerequisite for it, since it is its principle. Determnation to the good and end in general is the root of indetermination as to particular goods and means. But for this very reason natural movement and free choice are distinct acts, although they proceed from the same power, the will; for free choice is about means, not the end, and about particular, not general good. Moreover, free choice is undetermined as to specification as well as to exercise, whereas, as we have seen, natural necessitation is determination as to specification. Now free choice is proper to the will precisely as it is will: " for this is proper to the will inasmuch as it is will, that it be mistress of its acts." [33] But natural necessitation is something the will shares in common with other powers, inasmuch as they are certain distinct things in the genus of nature. Consequently, the will's mode of causality differs from that of nature; for free will is indeterminately related to many goods, whereas nature is determined to one thing:

The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause from another; for some things happen naturally, and some are done voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner proper to nature, which is determined to one thing. But since the will is founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent; just as what belongs to a prior cause is shared by a subsequent cause. For in every thing, being itself, which is from nature, precedes volition,

[31] *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5, ad 5 *in contrarium.*
[32] *Ibid.*, ad 6 *in contrarium.*
[33] *Ibid.*, ad 7 *in contrarium.*

which is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.[34]

St. Thomas and Cajetan also distinguish natural necessity from necessity of the end, whereby the will, in the supposition that a certain end is willed, is necessarily brought to bear upon the means which are seen to be indispensable for the attainment of the end. Such necessarily willed means are also, of course, to be distinguished from means willed freely both as to specification and as to exercise; but, like naturally willed objects, they fall under freedom as to the exercise of the act. We shall see later that necessity of the end is closely akin to the natural necessity whereby certain goods are willed by reason of their connection with happiness; nevertheless, natural necessity and necessity of the end are distinct, and the distinction is more apparent in the case of the naturally willed proper objects of the will, for here end is clearly opposed to means, and the general to the particular:

> But the necessity of the end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way; and thus from the will to cross the sea arises in the will the necessity to desire a ship. In like manner, neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will.[35]
>
> The second conclusion is that the will can will something from necessity of the end, or of supposition.—This is proved: because when only by one means can one arrive at the end, he is necessitated to that one means, as is clear in the approach to islands. The third conclusion is: the will wills something by natural necessity.[36]
>
> But besides the fact that the will necessarily desires its natural end, it also desires of necessity the things without which it cannot have the end, if it knows this; and these are the things which are commensurate with the end; just as, for example, if I desire life, I desire food.[37]
>
> Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will the things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; just as we will to take food to conserve life, or to

[34] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1, ad 1. Cajetan's commentary on this text, too lengthy to quote here, is very valuable for an understanding of this point.

[35] *Ibid.*, I, q. 82, a. 1.

[36] Cajetan, *Comment.*, I, q. 82, a. 1, nn. 5, 6.

[37] *De Potentia*, q. 1, a. 5.

take a ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will those things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a stroll, since we can take a stroll without a horse. The same applies to other means.[38]

But the will is not of necessity brought to bear upon those things which are towards the end, if the end can exist without them.[39]

II. The Extent of the Natural Necessitation of the Human Will

1. The problem of the number of objects willed by natural necessity

Having proved that the will is subject to a certain natural necessity, we must now consider the question: how many and what objects does the will will by this natural necessity of specification? The casual student may well run into a problem here, for this question is variously answered by St. Thomas. At times St. Thomas insists that only one object is naturally willed, whereas at other times he lists several objects so willed. It is necessary to consult many passages in his writings in order to determine his true and consistent answer.

As an example of the listing of several objects, we may note a passage in the *Summa Theologica*. In it, St. Thomas first draws a parallel between the natural movement of the intellect and that of the will. Next he shows that the intellect is in potency to four kinds of propositions; namely, first principles, demonstrable (or rather demonstrated) conclusions seen to be so necessarily connected with first principles that the denial of them involves a denial of the first principles, demonstrable conclusions whose denial is not yet seen to involve a denial of the first principles, and contingent propositions. The first two necessitate the intellect, the latter two do not. Similarly, the will is necessitated as to the last end or happiness in general (corresponding to first principles) and as to particular kinds of goods having a demonstrated necessary connection therewith (corresponding to demonstrated conclusions). But it is free

[38] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 3. [39] *Contra Gentiles*, I, cap. 81.

as to particular goods not so connected (corresponding to contingent propositions) and as to goods which are in fact necessarily so connected, but whose connection is not yet known (corresponding to demonstrable conclusions):

For there are certain particular goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy; and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness; namely, those whereby man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless until, through the certainty produced by seeing God, the necessity of such a connection be shown, the will does not adhere of necessity to God, nor to those things which are of God.[1]

Cajetan, commenting on this article, says that goods which are necessarily connected with happiness and which correspond to demonstrated conclusions "are manifest, as to be, to live, to know, the denial of evil, and the like. For all these and like things we desire by natural appetite as to the specification of the act, just as we do happiness."[2] St. Thomas mentions these goods elsewhere:

The principle of voluntary movements must be something naturaly willed. But this is: good in general, towards which the will naturally tends, just as also any power towards its object; and also the ultimate end itself which, among appetible objects, has itself in the same way as the principles of demonstrations among intelligible objects; and universally, all those things which belong to a willer according to his nature. For by the will we desire not only those things which pertain to the power of the will, but also those things which pertain to each of the other powers and to the whole man. Hence man naturally wills not only the objects of the will, but also the other objects which belong to the other powers, as the knowledge of truth, which belongs to the intellect, and to be and to live and other things of this sort, which regard natural subsistence; these are all comprehended under the object of the will as certain particular goods.[3]

[1] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 2.
[2] Cajetan, *Comment.*, I, q. 82, a. 2, n. 2.
[3] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1.

On the other hand, St. Thomas also teaches that only *one* object necessitates the will, namely happiness or the last end in general; and John of St. Thomas agrees with him in this:

> In all things which fall under choice, the will remains free, having determination in this respect *alone*, that it naturally seeks happiness, and not determinately in this or that thing.[4]
>
> The will is not of necessity moved by any object except the last end.[5]
>
> An object necessary as to specification is given for this life also, and it is *one only*, namely happiness in general, inasmuch as it is the formal reason for desiring good things.[6]

Opposed to these passages are those passages cited above which enumerate a number of different objects which necessitate the will. The multiplicity of these objects becomes even more manifest when we examine in particular each of the goods which St. Thomas lists as a good which necessitates the will.

2. WHAT OBJECTS ARE WILLED BY NATURAL NECESSITY

It seems that we can find at least five different objects or groups of objects which are naturally willed. For the Angelic Doctor teaches that man naturally wills:

(1) Good in general:

> The angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the same way that anyone else, not seeing God, is disposed towards the universal notion of goodness. But it is impossible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming at what is good, or for him to will to turn away from good precisely as such.[7]

[4] *In II Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, *solutio*. Italics mine.

[5] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 80, a. 1. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 13, a. 6: "The perfect good *alone*, which is happiness, cannot be apprehended as an evil or as lacking in any respect. Consequently, man wills happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy." Cf. also *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 7: "No good overcomes the power of the will, as if moving it of necessity, except that good which is good according to every consideration, and that is the perfect good *alone*." Italics mine.

[6] John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III, 401a16-21.

[7] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 62, a. 8.

The will cannot help clinging to the good as good, because the will is naturally ordered to the good as to its proper object.[8]

The will naturally wills good.[9]

From this natural determination towards good in general it follows that the will must will every object that it wills under the appearance, at least, of good:

Consequently, in order that the will tend towards anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good. Therefore the Philosopher says that an end is a good or an apparent good.[10]

Now since the desire of good is naturally implanted in every creature, no one is induced to sin except under some aspect of apparent good.[11]

Sin is not committed through free will except through the choice of an apparent good.[12]

(2) Secondly, man naturally and necessarily wills his own happiness in general, although he may not know in what particular object his true happiness consists. St. Thomas also uses the word *beatitude* for happiness, and happiness or *beatitude* is synonymous with a man's own perfection: "By the name *beatitude* is understood a rational or intellectual nature's ultimate perfection; and hence it is that it is naturally desired, for every being naturally desires its ultimate perfection."[13] The following passages are a few of the many in which St. Thomas declares that the human will naturally desires happiness in general:

Every rational mind naturally desires happiness, indeterminately and in general, and about this it cannot fail; but there is not in

[8] *Ibid.*, ad 2.

[9] *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 6, ad 15. Cf. Cajetan, *Comment.*, I, q. 82, a. 1, n. 7: "For since nature is determined to one thing, to desire has only as much of naturalness as it has of determination to one thing. Hence if the act of some power is determined to one object so that it cannot be towards its opposite, it is natural as to the specification of the act; because it is naturally specified by such an object, from which it cannot turn towards the opposite, as is clear about desiring with respect of the good."

[10] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 8, a. 1.

[11] *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 10.

[12] *Ibid.*, ad 11.

[13] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 62, a. 1.

particular any determined movement of the will of the creature to seek happiness in this or that thing.[14]

For our will is not moved of necessity by such delights, but is able to adhere to them and not to adhere to them, because none of them has the aspect of the universal and perfect god, as happiness has, which we all will of necessity.[15]

Now every will naturally desires that which is the proper good of the one willing, namely perfect being, nor can it will anything contrary to this.[16]

The will naturally and of necessity wills beatitude, nor can anyone will unhappiness.[17]

For the will cannot be about unhappiness or evil as such, but always about good and beatitude.[18]

(3) Thirdly, man necessarily wills the last end in general, as other passages from St. Thomas testify:

With respect of the object, the will is undetermined as to those things which are towards the end, but not as to the last end itself . . . But the will of necessity desires the last end, so that it is unable not to desire it.[19]

For to each one belongs one end which he seeks by natural necessity, because nature always tends to one thing.[20]

Choice . . . is not of the last end, which is naturally determined for each one, but only of those things which are towards the end.[21]

For the will is naturally inclined towards the last end.[22]

(4) Fourthly, man in the next life will necessarily will God, clearly seen in the Beatific Vision:

But the will of the man who sees God in His essence adheres of necessity to God, just as we now desire of necessity to be happy.[23]

Now the will can be moved by any good as to its object, but by God alone is it moved sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the movable thing. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good, for its object is the universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal being. But every created good is some particular good,

[14] *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 7, ad 6.
[15] *In X Ethic.*, lib. 3, lect. 2, n. 403.
[16] III *Cont. Gent.*, 109.
[17] *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 3.
[18] *In II Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.
[19] *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 6.
[20] *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 5.
[21] *In I Sent.*, d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, *solutio.*
[22] *De Virtutibus in Communi*, a. 8.
[23] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 2.

and God alone is the universal good. Therefore He alone fills the capacity of the will and moves it sufficiently as its object.[24]

The angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the same way that anyone else, not seeing God, is disposed towards the universal notion of goodness. But it is impossible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming at what is good, or for him to will to turn away from good precisely as such.[25]

(5) Fifthly, there is a fairly large group of other objects which man necessarily wills. It includes life, existence, knowledge, his own utility, virtue, the objects of his various powers and, in general, everything suitable to the willer according to his nature:

If, therefore, the disposition whereby something seems good and suitable to someone were natural and not subject to the will, the will would of natural necessity preferably choose that thing, just as all men naturally desire to be, to live, and to understand.[26]

. . . according to the natural movement of the will, insofar, namely, as it naturally flees death and also injuries of the body.[27]

But there are some effects of His which can in no way be contrary to the human will, because to be, to live, and to understand are desirable and lovable to all.[28]

When it is said that all things desire good, good must not be determined to this or that good but taken in general, because each thing desires the good naturally suitable for it. If, nevertheless, it may be determined to one particular good, that good will be existence.[29]

The will naturally desires the good which is the end . . . and similarly the good which is towards the end, for each man desires his utility.[30]

[24] *Ibid.*, q. 105, a. 4.
[25] *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 8.
[26] *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1.
[27] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 14, a. 2.
[28] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 34, a. 1. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 30, a. 1 ". . . by natural appetite, just as all men will to be and to live." Cf. also *ibid.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 2, ad 3: "The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good; so does whatever is ordered to that end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as to be, and to live, and the like."
[29] *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 4.
[30] *Ibid.*, q. 24, a. 8.

Everyone naturally desires science . . . the desire of man is naturally inclined towards understanding.[31]

The will desires of necessity those things which it considers as things without which there could not be happiness.[32]

The order of the precepts of the natural law, therefore, is according to the order of natural inclinations. For there is in man first of all an inclination to the good according to the nature wherein he shares with all substances, namely insofar as every substance desires the conservation of its existence according to its nature . . . Secondly, there is in man an inclination towards some more special things according to the nature wherein he shares with the other animals, and according to this, those things are said to be of the natural law which nature teaches all animals, as the coming together of male and female, and the rearing of offspring, and the like. In the third way, there is in man an inclination to the good according to the nature of reason, which is proper to him; just as man has a natural inclination to this, that he know the truth about God, and to this, that he live in society; and according to this there pertain to the natural law those things which belong to an inclination of this sort, for instance that man avoid ignorance, that he do not offend others with whom he should live, and other things of this sort which pertain to this.[33]

The angel and man naturally love themselves . . . Man loves . . . his blood relative with natural dilection . . . By natural dilection everything whatsoever loves what is one with it according to species, inasmuch as it loves its species.[34]

Hence by natural appetite man wills happiness and those things which pertain to the nature of the will.[35]

[31] *In Metaphys.*, lib. 1, lect. 1, nn. 2, 3. Cf. *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 9, ad 2 *in contrarium*: "The will also naturally loves and wills something, namely happiness and the knowledge of truth." Cf. also *De Virt. in Com.*, q. 1, a. 5, ad 8: "But if we speak of the contemplative felicity about which the philosophers treated, the will is ordered by natural desire to this delight." Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 12, a. 8, ad 4: "The natural desire of the rational creature is to know all those things which pertain to the perfection of the intellect."

[32] *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 7, ad 18; cf. *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 9: ". . . useful things, which he naturally desires in general."

[33] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 94, a. 2. Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 48, q. 1; a. 4: "And there is in us a certain natural will whereby we desire that which in itself is good for man insofar as he is man; and this follows the apprehension of the reason as it is considering something absolutely; just as man desires knowledge, virtue, health, and the like."

[34] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 4.

[35] *In III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2.

3. SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE NUMBER OF OBJECTS NATURALLY WILLED

How can this multiplicity of objects be reconciled with the various statements of St. Thomas in which he says that one thing alone is necessarily willed? A passage from *De Malo* gives us a clue: "The will of the rational creature is determined to one thing to which it is naturally moved, just as every man naturally wills to be, and to live, and happiness."[36] Certainly, St. Thomas would not openly contradict himself in the same sentence by saying "one thing" and then proceeding to name three. It is evident, then, that he must believe that to be and to live are in some way reducible to and included in the one object, happiness, which alone necessitates the will, as we have seen. Can we not apply the same treatment to the other objects enumerated above, and reduce them all in some way to happiness? St. Thomas himself has enuntiated, earlier in *De Malo*, the general principle for such a reduction: "Therefore it seems thus also about the will, that the will is moved of necessity to nothing which does not appear to have a necessary connection with beatitude, which is naturally willed."[37] It seems, too, that we must reduce all these objects to one, because the proof for the very existence of natural appetite has proceeded from the premise that nature is determined to one thing.

The last end of man is easily reduced to happiness, for numerous passages testify that St. Thomas uses the two terms as synonyms:

> From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. This desire is, indeed, a natural desire, and is not subject to free will.[38]

[36] *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 4, ad 5.

[37] *Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 3.

[38] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 83, a. 1, ad 5. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 60, a. 2: "The will naturally tends to its last end, for every man naturally wills happiness." Cf. also *ibid.*, I-II, q. 1, *prologus*: "Because the ultimate end of human life is laid down to be beatitude." Cf. also *ibid.*, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2: "The will . . . is ordered by natural necessity to the last end, which is clear from this, that man is unable not to will to be happy."

Similarly, both the angel and man have beatitude naturally foreestablished for them as last end; hence they naturally desire it, nor can they will unhappiness.[39]

If there be proposed to the will something good which has the complete notion of good, as the last end for the sake of which all things are desired, the will is unable not to will it; and hence no one is able not to will to be happy, or to will to be unhappy.[40]

In like manner, neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, just as the intellect of necessity adheres to first principles, so the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness.[41]

In making the willing of good in general coincide with the willing of the last end or happiness in general, we are faced with a difficulty: which shall we reduce to which? At first glance it may seem that good is the primary and proper object of the will and that good, not happiness or the last end, must be the one object which necessitates the will. In this view, good and the last end do not wholly coincide. For even though beatitude or the last end is willed in general, it is not precisely as a universal abstraction that it is willed, since the will always goes out to a really existing, particular thing; although it does so because it finds the abstraction predicable of the particular, really existing thing:

Although appetite *always* tends towards something existing *in reality*, which is by way of something *particular and not universal*, yet sometimes it is moved to desire through the apprehension of some universal condition; just as we desire *this* good from this consideration whereby we consider simply that good is to be desired.[42]

Hence to say that the will necessarily wills the last end in general is equivalent to saying that the will necessarily goes

[39] *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 5. Cf. *ibid.*, a. 7, ad 18: "And similarly, the will necessarily desires the ultimate end, which is desired for itself, for all men necessarily desire to be happy." Cf. also *ibid.*, q. 6, a. 1, obj. 8: "But it must be said that the will has necessity with respect of the last end, because every man necessarily wills to be happy." Cf. also *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 8: "The will naturally desires the good which is the end, namely happiness in general."

[40] *In II Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2.

[41] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 1.

[42] *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 4, ad 2. Italics mine.

out to that as yet unknown or unspecified really existing thing —whatever it may prove to be—which embodies the notion of last end; that is, which is such that it must be sought for its own sake alone, and other things for its sake. But it is not correct to say that the same thing holds true for good in general. The will does not go out necessarily to whatever object embodies the notion of good, but only to that object which perfectly embodies it; and this is the last end or highest good. This is proved by the fact that we will some goods freely. Even here there is necessity of specification to the extent that we can will these goods only insofar as they are good, and cannot will them precisely insofar as they are seen to be evil; yet we remain free to reject these things because they do not perfectly embody the notion of good. Hence it seems that good, since it extends to means, too, and since the last end is willed only because it is good, is at once a broader and more primary object of the will than the last end is. If we adopt this view, we must say that when St. Thomas declares that beatitude alone necessitates the will, he does not mean to exclude but presupposes the necessitation of the will towards good in general.

We may, however, adopt another view. According to this interpretation, good is no more primary an object than the last end is, for the will can will no other good before it wills the last end. Nor does the notion of good appear to extend more broadly than does the notion of last end. Although the notion of good extends to means and intermediate ends, they are not good in their own right, but only insofar as they lead to the end:

> But that which is on its own account good and willed is the end; hence willing is properly of the end itself. But those things which are towards the end *are not good* or willed on account of themselves, but in order to the end; hence the will is not brought to bear upon them, except inasmuch as it is brought to bear upon the end; hence the very thing it wills in them is the end.[43]

A question of particular goods must not be allowed to confuse the issue. Just as the will goes out necessarily only to that

[43] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 8, a. 2. Italics mine.

particular thing which perfectly embodies the notion of good, so, too, it does not go out necessarily to any particular thing which in any way whatsoever embodies the notion of end, but only to that which appears to do so perfectly. And just as, in addition to this, the notion of good is also found in freely willed means, so is the notion of the last end found in them, as we shall see.

Indeed, the end is as much the object of the will as good is: "For the will, whose proper object is the end . . ." [44] "The object of the will is the end and good in general." [45] The notions of good and end are inseparable: "The good is what has the notion of an end." [46] This does not, however, imply that good, as such, has the notion of *last* end; only the first or highest good has: "Good has the notion of end, and the first good is the last end." [47]

It seems that the last end is considered in two ways by St. Thomas. In one way, he regards it absolutely in itself, as distinct and apart from means and intermediate ends. In this way, the notion of last end is not so extensive as the notion of good; "But the notion of good, which is the object of the power of the will, is found not only in the end, but also in those things which are towards the end." [48] For this reason St. Thomas can distinguish goodness and the last end as objects which necessitate the will:

> The principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed. But this is: good in general, towards which the will naturally tends, just as also any power towards its object; and also the ultimate end itself which, among appetible objects, has itself in the same way as the principles of demonstrations among intelligible objects.[49]

Even considered in this way there is justification for reducing the willing of good to the willing of the last end. The passage just quoted implies that the last end is the first thing willed,

[44] *Ibid.*, q. 18, a. 7.
[45] *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.
[46] *Ibid.*, a. 4, *sed contra.*
[47] *Ibid.*, ad 1.
[48] *Ibid.*, q. 8, a. 2.
[49] *Ibid.*, q. 10, a. 1.

just as first principles are the first propositions known by the intellect. Again, the last end or highest good is said to be the source of good in general: " For the will is not of any particular good as its object, but of universal good, whose root is the highest good." [50] Presumably, therefore, the willing of good in general springs from the willing of the last end. Other things are good and willed only inasmuch as they are reflections and participations of the highest good and true last end, God. Moreover, other things are good and willed only for the sake of the end, and after the end has been willed:

> Now just as in the order of the nature to the will, so is the order of those things which the will naturally wills to those things with respect of which it is determined by itself, not nature. And therefore as the nature is the foundation of the will, so the appetible object which is naturally desired is the principle and foundation of other appetible things. But in appetible things the end is the foundation and principle of those things which are towards the end, since those things which are for the sake of the end are not desired except by reason of the end.[51]

But St. Thomas does not always consider the end as a separate object apart from the other objects which the will desires. He sometimes considers it in a second way, according as the notion of last end can be found in means, too, just as well as goodness can. We need to complete the teaching of St. Thomas here with those passages wherein he says that every act is for the sake of the ultimate end, and that when the will is brought to bear upon means, it is, by the same act, brought to bear upon the end, too:

> Since the end is willed according to itself, but that which is towards the end, according as it is towards the end, is not willed except for the sake of the end, it is evident that the will can be brought to bear upon the end, as such, without being brought to bear upon those things which are towards the end. But it cannot be brought to bear upon those things which are towards the end, as they are such, unless it be brought to bear upon the end itself. Thus, therefore, the will is brought to bear upon the end in two

[50] *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 8.

[51] *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5.

ways: in one way, absolutely and according to itself; in the other way, as upon the reason for willing those things which are towards the end. It is evident, therefore, that it is one and the same movement of the will whereby it is brought to bear upon the end, according as it is the reason for willing those things which are towards the end, and upon those things which are towards the end. But it is another act whereby it is brought to bear upon the end itself absolutely, and sometimes this precedes in time.[52]

The end and that which is towards the end, insofar as it is considered as such, are not diverse objects but one object, in which the end is as the formal element, as if a certain reason for willing, but that which is towards the end is as the material element; just as light and color are also one object.[53]

Because *every* good has the notion of an end, but good is the object of the will, therefore *anything* willed which is an object of the will can be called end, but that is more properly called end in which the will ultimately tends, because this is what was first willed by it; and therefore it is said . . . that willing is of the end, but choice is of those things which are towards the end.[54]

Because the end, either considered as the reason for willing the means, or else considered absolutely, is necessarily desired in the willing of every object whatsoever, just as the notion of goodness is, the good and the end coincide as the object of the will.[55]

From these various passages it is clear that if we do not consider the last end absolutely and apart from its role as the reason for willing means, the notions of good in general and of

[52] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 8, a. 3. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 1, a. 6: "It is necessary that man desire for the sake of the last end all the things which he desires; and this is apparent for a twofold reason. First, indeed, because whatever man desires, he desires under the notion of good; this, indeed, if it is not sought as the perfect good which is the last end, must be sought as tending towards the perfect good; because the beginning of anything is always ordered to its consummation . . . and so every beginning of perfection is ordered to consummate perfection, which is through the last end."

[53] *In II Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1.

[54] *Ibid., expositio textus.*

[55] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 1: "Now it is manifest that all the actions which proceed from some power are caused by it according to the notion of its object. Now the object of the will is the end and the good." Cf. also *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 7: ". . . but an appetite for his last end in general was implanted in man, so that he naturally desires himself to be complete in goodness."

last end or beatitude in general coincide; whereas if we consider the last end in general absolutely, it is still necessarily connected with the notion of good, because the last end is the thing, as yet undetermined, and known and willed only in general, which perfectly fulfills and realizes the notion of good. Because we will a good thing either because it is the perfect good, completely realizing and embodying the full notion of goodness, or else because it is a partial good leading to the perfect good, which has therefore already been willed, the result is that what the will primarily and necessarily wills is that thing in which is apparently verified the full, universal notion of good. This perfect good is, by definition, beatitude or happiness.[56]
If we adopt this second view, which makes good and the last end coincide as the object of the will, we can take at its face value the statement of St. Thomas that the last end alone necessitates the will. Whether we reduce the willing of good to the willing of the last end, or whether we reduce the willing of the last end to the willing of good, as necessarily connected therewith since the last end is the object which perfectly incorporates the full notion of goodness, we are left, in either event, with only one object necessitating the will.

The last end or beatitude can be considered in two ways, in general and in particular. In the latter way, beatitude is that particular object which fully satisfies and perfects man; in other words, that object wherein the notion of last end and happiness is found to be completely verified. In this way God, clearly seen in the Beatific Vision, is man's true last end in particular, and is to be reduced to the last end in general, or happiness in general, as necessarily connected therewith. For He is the particular object in which the notion of last end is found to be perfectly realized:

> Since in God the divine substance and the universal good are one and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement of love moved towards the divine essence according as it is distinct from other things and according as it is the universal

[56] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 13, a. 6: "The perfect good alone, which is happiness . . . man wills . . . of necessity."

good. And because He is loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him.[57]

Now the perfect good, which is God, has indeed a necessary connection with the beatitude of man, because without it man cannot be happy; but the necessity of this connection does not appear clearly to man in this life, because he does not see God in His essence; and therefore also the will of man in this life does not necessarily adhere to God; but the will of those who, seeing God in His essence, manifestly know Him to be the essence of goodness and the beatitude of man are unable not to adhere, just as our will now is unable not to will happiness.[58]

In order to explain why the connection is a necessary one, we must again recall that the will does not elicit an act towards the bare formal notion of last end or beatitude in general, nor towards that of good in general. These do not constitute an object *quod appetitur*, but the object *sub quo alia appetuntur*. The will goes out to a particular, really existing thing in which the universal notion is found to be more or less realized or embodied. But precisely because, in most cases, it is *more or less*, the adequation between the universal notion and the particular object more or less incorporating it is not complete. An aspect of imperfection or non-good remains, so that when the mind adverts to this element, the will remains free to reject the object as last end, because of the element of non-good which it contains. But in the unique case of God, clearly seen, the intellect can find no element of non-good, but perceives that God is the perfect good; and hence the will, in motion by its very nature towards good and happiness in general, must, if it elicits any act, elicit one specified by this object in which the notions of good and happiness are perceived to be perfectly embodied and realized.

Good is the proper object or specificative of the will. When an object which has no other aspect but that of good is presented to it, the will, unable to go outside the limits of its specification without ceasing to be a will, must perforce tend

[57] *Ibid.*, I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 5. [58] *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 3.

towards it by willing and loving it. Such an object is God, clearly seen in the Beatific Vision to be the perfect good and to have no aspect of evil. In this Vision it is manifestly apparent to the man having it that all that is implied in the concept, and desired in the willing of happiness in general, is to be found in this one object, God.[59] From this it may be gathered that the vision of God is not to be formally identified with beatitude in general, as such. Yet it is necessarily connected therewith, for God is the really existing object fully embodying the notion of beatitude. It is by reason of this necessary connection, and not precisely by reason of Himself, that God, clearly seen, necessitates the will; for the vision of God is a particular good, and particular goods, as such, do not necessitate the will.

In the present life, the necessary connection of God with man's happiness is not clearly seen, because our knowledge of Him is imperfect, analogical, and through His effects. Consequently, God is not an object which necessitates the will in this life. Yet there is a natural desire to know Him implicit in the natural desire for knowledge in general; and man can be said to desire God naturally "inasmuch as he naturally desires happiness, which is a certain likeness of the divine goodness."[60] But natural appetite for God in the present life pertains rather to the fifth group of naturally willed objects, which we must now consider.

In order to show that the fifth group of objects—life, virtue, knowledge, and the like—necessitates the will, we must recall again the principle that whatever can be reduced to the concept of beatitude, as necessarily connected therewith, can be willed by natural necessity.[61] Then we must show that these objects have a necessary connection with beatitude. It is im-

[59] Cf. John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III, 401b13-402a31.

[60] I *Cont. Gent.*, 11.

[61] Cf. *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 3; and *ibid.*, q. 16, a. 7, ad 18; and *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 5. John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III, 402a-42-47, expresses the same principle negatively: "All goods which are not represented as fully good or as having a necessary connection with the full good can displease the will and not necessitate it."

possible to present passages explicitly reducing the willing of each of these objects to the willing of beatitude, but St. Thomas does explicitly mention knowledge, existence, and life, together with general references to the other objects included in this class:

> And what the will necessarily wills, as determined to it by a natural inclination, is the last end, as beatitude and those things which are included in it, such as knowledge of the truth, and things of this sort.[62]
>
> The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good; so does whatever is ordered to that end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as to be, and to live, and the like.[63]

4. THE PROBLEM OF THE APPARENT NON-NECESSITATION OF THE WILL TOWARDS LIFE, KNOWLEDGE, ETC., AND ITS SOLUTION

A problem arises in connection with the willing of this last class of objects. In spite of the statements of St. Thomas that life, knowledge, etc. necessitate the will, the facts of experience seem to prove otherwise. For experience shows that sometimes we do not will these objects, but repudiate them and will their opposites, as in the cases of suicide, willful ignorance, etc. Does such repudiation militate against the natural and necessary willing of these objects? Cajetan poses the difficulty in these words:

> A threefold naturally-willed object is laid down: first, good; secondly, beatitude; thirdly, everything suitable to the willer according to his nature. And concerning the first two, indeed, the reason is rendered evident in the text, but not so concerning the third. And hence one doubts both about it the conclusion and about its

[62] *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5.

[63] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 2, ad 3. Cf. John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III, 401a16-30: "I say that an object necessary as to specification is given for this life also, and it is one only, namely beatitude in general, inasmuch as it is the formal reason for desiring good things. Now in beatitude two things are included; namely, to be, and to be well or happily. For if one is not, he is not happy; and similarly if he is not well, he is not happy; and so his own existence and well-being necessitate as to specification. And whatever is necessary as to specification is reduced to one of these."

reason. About it, indeed, because we experience the opposite while we are choosing things not suitable according to nature, as not to know, not to live.—Nor is it evaded by saying that this is desired accidentally. For neither essentially nor accidentally can we will the opposite of those things which we will naturally, as is clear about the first and second [parts of this threefold object].[64]

Moreover, St. Thomas himself teaches that the deliberate will can act contrary to the natural willing of life: "Christ is said to have been 'offered because He willed it' both by the divine will and the deliberate human will, although death would be against the natural movement of the human will."[65]

Again, the proofs which St. Thomas has given for natural appetite have been general ones. Although necessitation as to good is so obvious that good has been defined as "what all things desire,"[66] and although, as we have seen, Cajetan cites experience as testifying to our desire for happiness, nevertheless no particular proof of natural desire for life, knowledge, etc. has been given by St. Thomas.

All of these facts give rise to the objection that life, knowledge, etc., should not be listed among the objects which necessitate the will. Although the objection is a general one, applicable to all or nearly all of the goods in this class, we shall answer it chiefly in terms of the problem of suicide, because suicide offers the most striking difficulty and is discussed by St. Thomas more fully than, for example, willful ignorance and the failure to live virtuously, and because the principles of the solution to the problem of suicide will suffice, *mutatis mutandis*, for the solution of objections against the natural desire for other goods of this class.

Some may attempt to solve this problem by saying that suicide affords no real objection, because he who kills himself is incapable of an act of *willing* his own non-existence. For there is a tendency among many today to regard every case of suicide as a case of insanity. This opinion, however, is not

[64] Cajetan, *Comment.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1, n. 3.
[65] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 14, a. 2, ad 1.
[66] Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 1, chap. 1.

universally conceded. Ingeniously contrived plans of suicide and apparently rational farewell notes often indicate the opposite. Moreover, Catholic morality, at least, regards suicide as sinful and hence as voluntary and deliberate; even should it be voluntary only in its cause, it must to some extent be foreseen and fore-willed in order to be sinful. Such was the mind of St. Thomas, too, and since he evidently believed that the fact of suicide was quite compatible with his teaching about natural necessitation towards life, we should be able to discover in his writings the principles for a sufficient refutation of the above objection. It should also be noted that even if no act of will were involved in suicide, the same thing could scarcely be said about deliberate repudiation of knowledge and virtue.

In our examination of the Angelic Doctor's teaching on suicide, we may begin with a passage in which he seems to deny that non-existence can be desired:

> Those things which cannot be divided according to nature can sometimes be divided according to the will and reason; hence nothing prevents one from desiring that upon which non-existence follows, as to lack misery, although he does not desire non-existence.[67]

According to this argument, it is not precisely life or existence that one seeks to destroy, but its subject, oneself. Moreover, it implies that one seeks to destroy oneself not precisely as the subject of life or existence, but as the subject of unhappiness. The removal of unhappiness is what is directly willed. Non-existence follows only indirectly and consequently; it cannot be said to be willed, since it is not even considered, and nothing is willed unless foreknown.

But St. Thomas himself gives an answer to this argument. He admits that one can will non-existence, provided it be viewed as a *term whence* in the removal of an evil:

> When one wills to remove something from himself, he uses himself as a *term whence*—which need not be preserved in movement.

[67] *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 3, arg. 5 *in contrarium*.

And hence one can will that he not exist, in order to lack misery. But when one wills to himself something good, he uses himself as a *term whither*. Now a term of this sort must be preserved in movement; and hence one cannot desire for himself anything good when, by having it, he himself does not remain.[68]

Unfortunately, this answer appears somewhat specious in that, as St. Thomas constantly teaches elsewhere,[69] the lack of misery may be conceived as a positive good, freedom, and hence the man seems to will a good when, by having it, he himself does not remain. Yet we shall see that St. Thomas and Sylvester, having made due allowance for the fact that the lack of an evil is a good, make considerable use of this *Removal Theory*, as we may call it in order to distinguish it briefly and conveniently from several other elements which enter into the Angelic Doctor's solution to the problem of suicide. These elements are not mutually exclusive. Nor do we mean, by use of the word *theory*, to imply that any one of these elements, taken by itself alone, either was presented as or is intended to be a complete solution to the problem.

Before considering the opinion of Sylvester, however, let us glance at another answer of St. Thomas, in which he joins the Removal Theory with the *Accidental Theory*, as we may call it,

[68] *Ibid.*, ad 5 *in contrarium*.

[69] Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 7: "For in desiring and fleeing, that something is good and destructive of evil, or that something is evil and destructive of good, are of the same notion. For we call the very lacking of an evil a good . . . Non-existence, therefore, takes on the notion of good, inasmuch as it takes away existence amid sorrows or in wickedness, which is simply evil, although it is good in some respect. And in this way non-existence can be desired under the aspect of good." Cf. also *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 4, ad 4: "But to avoid unhappiness and to seek happiness come to the same thing. And hence it is evident that the desire of those who willed to undergo death was ordered to happiness." Cf. also *ibid.*, sol. 2, ad 3: "Now to lack evil is good, and hence he who desires not to be desires it as good." Cf. *ibid.*, d. 50, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 3: "In another way, non-existence can be considered as removing penal and unhappy life, and thus non-existence takes on the aspect of good." Cf. also *ibid.*, ad 3: "Although not to be is very evil, inasmuch as it takes away being, yet it is very good, inasmuch as it takes away unhappiness, which is the greatest of evils; and thus not to be is desired." Cf. also *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 29, a. 4, ad 2: "For those who kill themselves apprehend this very dying under the aspect of good, inasmuch as it is terminative of some misery or sorrow."

i. e. with the theory that non-existence is willed only accidentally. Essentially, existence necessitates the will; but accidentaly, non-existence may be willed, inasmuch as it takes away unhappiness:

Non-existence is appetible, not of itself, but accidentally, inasmuch, namely, as the removal of an evil is appetible; which evil is taken away, indeed, through non-existence. But the removal of an evil is not appetible except insofar as this evil deprives a thing of some being. What is essentially appetible, therefore, is being; but non-being is appetible only accidentally, inasmuch, namely, as some being is desired, of which a man cannot bear to be deprived; and thus also non-existence is called accidentally good.[70]

Adopting this theory that non-existence is willed accidentally (although omitting the Removal Theory) and adding to it the *Minority Theory*, i. e. the Angelic Doctor's teaching that "nature is determined to one thing, nor does it fall short of it, except in the minority of cases," [71] Cajetan gives his first answer (he has another answer later) to the objection that suicide, willful ignorance, etc. seem to militate against the natural necessitation of the will towards life, knowledge, and the like:

Just as in external things something natural is found in two ways, namely always, or frequently (for the heavenly movements are natural as universally and always failing not from their natural course, but inferior movements are natural as frequently and in the majority of cases failing not), so also in the will's natural movements, naturalness is found in both ways. For the will is naturally determined to some things in such a way that it is not able in any way to will the opposite; but to some things it is thus naturally

[70] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 2, ad 3. Cf. also I *Cont. Gent.*, 81: "Since the understood good is the proper object of the will, there can be willing of anything conceived by the intellect, whenever the notion of good is preserved; therefore, although the existence of anything is, as such, good, whereas its non-existence is bad, nevertheless that very non-existence of some thing can fall under the will by reason of some annexed good which is preserved, although not of necessity. For it is good for some thing to exist, even though another thing is not existent. Only that good, therefore, is the will, according to its nature, unable to will not to exist, which is such that, if it did not exist, the notion of good would be totally taken away. But there is no such good but God. The will, therefore, according to its nature, can will any other thing except God not to exist."

[71] *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 1, arg. 7 *in contrarium*.

determined to some things in such a way that it is not able in any class are the first two willed things enumerated in the text [namely, good and beatitude], but the third kind of willed thing [namely, everything suitable to the willer according to his nature] is in the second class. Hence the will does not seem any more inclined to this third willed thing than a will affected with the habit of an acquired virtue is to the work of that virtue; unless to the extent that an inclination from nature is more powerful than one from an acquired habit. And just as a will habituated in justice can do unjustly, so too the will naturally inclined to a good suitable to the willer according to his nature can will its opposite.[72]

The defects of Cajetan's solution to the problem of suicide are three. As it is stated, it refers only to particular existence. Moreover, it fails to see that the desire to be happy includes a desire to be. Again, it attributes a *failing* necessity to the natural willing of existence, etc. This is a contradiction in terms, if necessity is taken strictly, for he admits with St. Thomas that the necessary is "what is unable not to be."[73] Hence necessity can be used by him here only in the broad sense.

The solution of Sylvester of Ferrara must be considered next. Like St. Thomas, Sylvester joins the Removal Theory and the Accidental Theory. He sees that if happiness is the greatest of goods, then it is equally true that unhappiness is the greatest of evils. Moreover, if existence is desirable only insofar as it is connected with happiness, then it can be undesirable insofar as it is conected with unhappiness; whereas in the latter case non-existence can be considered as connected with unhappiness, and hence as desirable, insofar as it takes away unhappiness.

Sylvester begins, then, by pointing out that existence is, in itself, good and desirable only *secundum quid*; it may, if joined to the deprivation of due perfections, be simply evil.[74] Then he

[72] Cajetan, *Comment.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1, n. 4.

[73] *Ibid.*, I, q. 82, a. 1, n. 1.

[74] Cf. Sylvester Ferrariensis, *Commentaria in Summam Contra Gentiles*, III, cap. 19, n. 3: "Since nothing has the aspect of appetible except by reason of good, to be does not have appetibility except insofar as it has the aspect of good. But . . . according to its substantial being a thing is not called simply and absolutely good,

goes on to show how the lack of an evil is a good, and hence to lack happiness, the greatest of goods, is the greatest of evils. Hence an existence which is joined with this greatest of evils, the deprivation of happiness, is simply evil and only *secundum quid* good and desirable. But non-existence, which is undesirable when considered absolutely in itself, can be considered as very desirable inasmuch as it has accidentally joined to it the removal of that greatest of evils, unhappiness. In this case, non-existence is conceived of as better than existence amid misery; and hence as better, it is more desirable.

Here a doubt occurs to Sylvester: to be, even unhappily, seems better than not to be at all, for non-existence is merely a negation and implies no real being, and hence no good. But he answers the difficulty by pointing out that only as it is considered in itself is non-existence a negation; considered as removing unhappiness it is very good (better than an unhappy existence); its goodness is founded not on any real being of its own, but on the goodness of that real being, happiness, which is the reason for hating unhappiness, and hence for willing non-existence.

But a further doubt occurs: to take away one's very existence means to take away, too, all possibility of obtaining that good, happiness, which is the very foundation of willing not to be.[75] In answer, Sylvester admits that one does not desire to be happy and simultaneously not to exist. There is a simultaneity of the desires for happiness and for non-existence, but not a desire for their simultaneity.[76] He concludes:

but only *secundum quid*; but according to superadded perfections it is called simply good. From this it follows that substantial being is desirable simply and absolutely if it is joined to its due perfections, but taken by itself it is only *secundum quid* desirable. It follows also that human existence itself, joined to the privation of due perfections, . . . is simply and absolutely evil . . . although *secundum quid* it is good. And hence it is simply to be fled, although it is *secundum quid* desirable."

[75] Cf. *ibid.*, n. V: "For all accidental existence presupposes substantial existence; and when the substantial existence is removed, every other existence is removed. Therefore, if one desires non-existence in reality, he does not desire any other existence by reason of which he desires not to be. Therefore, it is false that not to be at all includes some existence by reason of which non-existence is desired."

[76] Cf. *ibid.*, *loc. cit.*: "We do not say that non-existence is desirable accidentally

The saying of St. Thomas, which is also that of Aristotle, namely, that "all things naturally desire to be," is understod as concerning existence completed with due and fitting perfections . . . It is also understood as concerning appetite *per se*. But it is not repugnant to this that some should accidentally desire non-existence, inasmuch as it removes the evil which deprives them of the naturally desired existence.[77]

In Sylvester's solution, the simultaneousness of the desires for non-existence and for happiness presumably could not take place without a lack of consideration by the intellect of the fact that to will not to be takes away all possibility of being happy. Thus non-consideration is indicated as a pre-requisite for the willing of non-existence; a non-consideration, that is, of the necessary connection of existence with happiness.

In criticism of Sylvester's solution, we may say that it is all very good and true, and helps to explain the reasoning of one who kills himself, by showing how non-existence is attractive to him. But it does not answer the question—how can non-existence be willed at all, if existence is necessarily willed?—except by falling back upon the Accidental Theory: essentially, non-existence cannot be willed, nor existence repudiated; accidentally, they can. This is the simple answer Cajetan gave, minus his invocation of the Minority Theory. Hence it is open to the

by reason of some other desired existence of which a man cannot bear to be deprived . . . in such a way as if the appetite were brought to bear simultaneously upon both, namely so that one desired for himself that both not to be at all and some existence should be simultaneous, for this is to desire contradictories; but it is understood to mean that there is some existence which is loved, and of which a man cannot bear to be deprived, and that this is the root and fundament why non-existence is desirable. For from this that one loves happiness most, he detests unhappiness most, whereby he is deprived of happiness; and he cannot bear to be perpetually unhappy and deprived of happiness; and hence, when he sees that he cannot escape unhappiness and the deprivation of happiness except through non-existence, he desires non-existence, whereby he escapes that evil which he detests most. And thus it is clear that being and good is the reason and fundament of the desiring of non-existence; for non-existence is appetible insofar as it removes evil; but the removal of evil is appetible insofar as that very evil is hated; whereas the evil is hated because the opposite good is desired and loved. Hence there is a certain simultaneousness of the desires for non-existence and for happiness, but not a desire for their simultaneousness."

[77] *Ibid., loc. cit.*

criticisms leveled against Cajetan's solution: it considers only particular existence, and fails to capitalize on the fact that the desire for happiness includes a desire for existence. It is also open to the objection originally raised against the Removal Theory: namely, that to lack an evil is a good, and hence for a man to will to lack the evil of unhappiness is for him to will to himself a good, happiness or freedom, when, by having it, he himself would not exist to possess it.

We see in Sylvester's solution his use of the Accidental Theory: existence is undesirable by reason of the evil, unhappiness, to which it is accidentally attached; so, too, non-existence is desirable by reason of the good, freedom, which is accidentally joined with it. The obverse and complement of this theory is the teaching that existence is, considered in itself, desirable and non-existence is, considered in itself, undesirable.[78] We may term this latter teaching the *Absolute Theory*: existence, knowledge, etc. are desirable (although perhaps not necessitating) only insofar as they are considered absolutely in themselves, prescinding from any unhappiness to which they may be accidentally joined; conversely, non-existence, ignorance, etc. are undesirable when considered absolutely in themselves, prescinding from any good to which they may be joined. St. Thomas makes use of this theory to explain that it is only existence considered as disjoined from unhappiness that necessitates the will: "It is not necessary to take what was said, namely that to be and to live are naturally desirable to all, with reference to an evil and corrupt life and one which is amid sor-

[78] Cf. *ibid., loc. cit.*: "To be, considered in itself, is a certain good . . . non-existence itself, considered solitarily and according to its proper notion, inasmuch as it is the pure negation of existence, is not desirable, since it has no aspect of good." Cf. St. Thomas, *In IV Sent.*, d. 50, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 3: "Non-existence can be considered in two ways: In one way, in itself; and thus in no way can it be desirable, since it has no aspect of good but is the pure privation of good. In another way, it can be considered as it removes penal and unhappy life, and thus non-existence takes on the notion of good." Cf. also *ibid.*, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2, ad 3: "Nothing prevents a thing which is in itself desirable from being undesirable by reason of something joined to it, as to exist amid sorrows and unhappiness; and hence non-existence is accidentally desired, not indeed insofar as it takes away existence, but insofar as it takes away that evil which rendered existence hateful."

rows." [79] We shall discuss later whether this absolute consideration abstracts only from the circumstance of unhappiness, and if so, whether such absolute consideration is the kind which is required for necessitation of the will.

Finally, there is the *Non-consideration Theory* to be taken into account: these goods do not necessitate the will if the intellect fails to consider their necessary relation to beatitude. It has already been shown that only those goods necessitate the will which are *seen* to be necessarily connected with beatitude.[80] This teaching may be found, too, in these passages of St. Thomas:

> In like manner, the end does not always necessitate in man the choosing of the means to the end, because the means are not always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or *if they be such, they are not always considered in that light.*[81]
>
> Not every cause necessarily induces its effect, even if it be a sufficient cause, because a cause can be impeded so that sometimes it does not attain its effect, just as natural causes, which do not of necessity produce their effects, but in the majority of cases, because in the minority they are impeded. Thus, therefore, that cause which makes the will will anything need not of necessity do this, because an impediment can be offered through the will itself, *by removing such consideration as induces it to will, or by considering the opposite*, namely that what is proposed as good is, in some respect, not good.[82]

Cajetan welds all these theories together in his second solu-

[79] *In IV Sent.*, d. 50, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 1.

[80] Cf. *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 3: "Therefore it seems thus also about the will, that the will is moved of necessity to nothing which does not appear to have a necessary connection with beatitude, which is naturally willed." Cf. *ibid.*, q. 16, a. 7, ad 18: "The will desires of necessity those things which it *considers* as things without which there could not be happiness." Cf. also *De Potentia*, q. 1, a. 5: "But besides the fact that the will necessarily desires its natural end, it also desires of necessity those things without which it cannot have the end, *if it knows this*." Cf. also John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III, 402a42-47: "All goods which are not *represented* as fully good or as having a necessary connection with the full good can displease the will and not necessitate it." All italics mine.

[81] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 13, a. 6, ad 1. Italics mine.

[82] *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 15. Italics mine. Note that St. Thomas here denies true necessity to a cause which fails in a minority of cases.

tion to the problem of suicide. This solution follows so closely after the first solution that he must have had it in mind at the time he gave the first solution; but for purposes of brevity he did not at first give his full solution, since he realized that he would so soon have to comment more thoroughly on the problem. In the second solution, Cajetan begins by repeating, in effect, what he said in the first solution.[83] Then he continues:

> Note that to be, to live, and the like can be taken in two ways. First, as they are certain particular gods, according to themselves. And thus they can, although rarely, be repudiated, for the reason that they have annexed the defect of some good which is sought, as is clear in those who kill themselves, for they desire a certain good, for instance freedom, the opposite of which is joined to their life, etc.[84]

Here we may note that Cajetan explicitly states that his consideration of existence according to the Absolute and Accidental Theories is a consideration of existence as it is a *particular* good. Nor does he indicate that he ceases to regard it as a particular good as he goes on to give the important second way in which it may be considered:

> In the second way, as they are necessarily connected with beatitude. And thus, to the extent that it lies on their part, they cannot be repudiated; but if the will has an act towards them as such, it must be that it have about them an act of volition, just as about beatitude, for the reason assigned in the text.[85]

Finally, Cajetan brings in the Non-consideration Theory, as he continues:

[83] Cajetan, *Comment.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 2, n. 5: "Because, as we have said, the will is naturally determined as to specification to the third kind of willed things, for instance to be, to live, etc., as in the majority of cases, the effect does not necessarily come forth, for it can be impeded; therefore it is said in the text that any particular goods, even to be, to live, to understand, do not necessarily move the will as to the specification of the act, for they can be repudiated. Yet in such a way that in the majority of cases the aforesaid are not repudiated, but if the will be brought to bear upon them, it tends towards them by an act of volition, and rarely one of nolition, as happens in those who despair, and the like."

[84] *Ibid.*, n. 6.

[85] *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

But I have said, to the extent that it lies on their part, because although these things so connected have thus such great efficacy that they necessitate as to specification, yet if that connection is unknown or unconsidered or not sufficiently seen, they are impeded from this efficacy. Yet it was not necessary for the author to express this here, both because he is speaking about the efficacy of the object on its part, and because there is always implied the due approximation, from the defect of which this comes about.[86]

This solution of Cajetan's is valuable for its use of the distinction of the two ways in which these goods can be considered, and for its incorporation of all the various theories we have enumerated. But it is open to the objections raised against each of these theories. The chief difficulty is with the interpretation of his use of the Absolute Theory; is absolute consideration a consideration of a particular existence? He said, as we have seen, that he is considering it as a particular good, but perhaps the word *good* is to be emphasized rather than the word *particular* or the word *existence*; i. e. he may not mean to treat of particular existence, but existence in general; the latter, however, is not so extensive as good in general, for there are other goods besides existence. Thus he may be using the word *particular* to designate a specific class of goods, but not a particular *existence*. If so, all is well.

Again, it may be urged that any absolute consideration of existence is a consideration of existence in general, for it is a consideration only of what essentially belongs to the notion of existence. But an objection against this may immediately occur: the existence which necessitates the will is always a particular existence, in the sense that it is the existence of a particular person. Existence is particularized by something accidentally joined to it, namely, this subject whose it is, for existence is a predicable accident of its subject. If this, too, should be all that Cajetan means, again, all is well. For it is true that the existence which a man necessarily wills is his own, just as the beatitude a man wills is his own. But this does not preclude this very existence of his from being willed in general,

[86] *Ibid., loc. cit.*

just as the beatitude a man wills as his own, and so is the good he wills, and yet they are willed in general.[87] For this is merely to take the word *particular* in the sense of *proper*, and in a sense different from that in which we here oppose it to in *general*. Proper existence can be further particularized by circumstances and qualifications which adhere to it after the fashion of predicamental rather than predicable accidents. For there are many ways in which a man could conceivably exist, i. e. many particular kinds of proper existence, e. g. in the present life, or in some future state, with the body or without the body, with or without happiness, with or without the good features of his present life, and with or without a host of other features. Now if a man merely wills his own existence, abstracting from *all* these other conditions and circumstances, he wills his own existence in general. But if absolute consideration means merely that he prescinds *only* from the circumstance of unhappiness, he has not got beyond an existence particularized by all the other circumstances attached to it. If this is what Cajetan means by the words *particular goods*, and if such are the goods which are considered absolutely in themselves, as he says, then such absolute consideration does not seem to be sufficient for the necessitation of the will, at least in the case of existence. For my own particular present existence could be considered absolutely, in this sense, prescinding *only* from its happiness or unhappiness. This interpretation of absolute consideration might suffice for a solution to the problems of vice and ignorance, for we necessarily will only to *be* wise and virtuous, not to *become* wise and virtuous.[88] But the distinction between

[87] Compare these texts: III *Cont. Gent.*, 109: "Now every will naturally desires that which is the *proper* good *of the one willing*, namely *perfect* being." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 62, a. 1: "By the name *beatitude* is understood a rational or intellectual nature's ultimate *perfection*, for every being naturally desires *its* ultimate perfection." *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 7, ad 6: "Every rational mind naturally desires *happiness, indeterminately and in general*." *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 3: "The will naturally and of necessity wills *beatitude*, nor can anyone will unhappiness." Italics mine.

[88] Cf. *In Metaphys.*, lib. 1, lect. 1, n. 4: "And therefore man naturally desires science. Nor does it stand to the contrary if some men do not engage in the

being and becoming cannot be applied to existence itself. The absolute consideration accorded to existence must be a consideration of existence in general, if the Absolute Theory is to answer the problem of suicide satisfactorily. (It is also a better solution to the problems of ignorance and vice to say that we necessarily will knowledge and virtue only in general).

The Angelic Doctor's own view of absolute consideration seems to imply that it is the consideration of a thing in general. For he contrasts it with the consideration of a thing as it is related to the end and circumstances.[89] But it is existence taken in general which is necessarily connected with beatitude.[90] All that is pre-requisite for a man to be happy is that he in some way *be*; no accidentally determined kind of existence is required (other than the accident that he be joined to his beatifying object, of course; but this yields not only existence, but happy existence; taking existence precisely as a pre-requisite for happy existence, only existence in general is required: any circumstantially different type or other of existence will suffice, so long as it is human existence, and one's own). Therefore, *a pari* it is existence in general, too, that St. Thomas has in mind when he speaks of existence considered absolutely in itself. This is confirmed by his distinction of absolute consideration from consideration according to circumstances and end.

In favor of Cajetan, it must be pointed out that even if he

pursuit of this science, since frequently those who desire some end are, from some cause, restrained from the pursuit of the end, either on account of the difficulty of arriving at it, or on account of other occupations. And thus although men desire science, nevertheless not all men engage in the pursuit of science, because they are detained by other things, either by pleasures or by the necessities of the present life, or else they even, on account of laziness, shun the labor of learning."

[89] Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 48, q. 1, a. 4: "And there is in us a certain natural will whereby we desire that which according to itself is good for man insofar as he is man, and this follows the apprehension of the reason as it is considering something absolutely, just as man desires knowledge, virtue, health, and the like. There is also in us a certain deliberate will following the act of the reason deliberating about the end and the diverse circumstances."

[90] Cf. *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 3: "But it is manifest that particular goods of this sort do not have a necessary connection with beatitude, because man can be happy without any of them."

regards absolute consideration as the consideration of a particular existence, he does so only to show how existence is considered when it is *repudiated.* It does not necessarily follow that he also believes the absolute consideration requisite for the *necessitation* of the will by existence to be a consideration of a particular existence.[91]

The point we wish to make here is that only existence considered in general is requisite for the necessitation of the will. Neither Cajetan nor St. Thomas makes this explicit; it seems to be implicit in St. Thomas's use of absolute consideration, and doubtless Cajetan means to say the same as St. Thomas, but if so, his failure to point out that it is existence considered in general which is necessarily connected with beatitude is misleading, and his use of the word *particular* is somewhat confusing, although it may be explained in one of the three senses we have indicated, namely as signifying a specific class of goods, or else as meaning proper existence, or else as explaining only in what way existence is taken when it is repudiated, and not in

[91] St. Thomas takes absolute consideration to mean the consideration of a thing in the abstract or in general, prescinding from all its accidental circumstances. Cf. *De Ente et Essentia*, cap. 4: "A nature or essence thus taken can be considered in two ways. In one way, according to its proper nature and notion, and this is the absolute consideration of it; and in this way it is not true to say anything about it except what belongs to it according as it is such. Hence whatever else is attributed to it is a false attribution; for example, animal and rational and the other things which fall in his definition belong to man according as he is man, but white or black or anything else which is not of the notion of humanity does not belong to man according as he is man." Cajetan usually speaks in the same way; e. g. cf. *Comment.*, III, q. 14, a. 2, n. 2: "But that movement of the will is called natural will which follows the reason apprehending evil or good, all the circumstances not having been considered, but the bare good object itself, e. g. life, health, or the bare evil object itself, e. g. death, sickness, scourging, etc. There naturally follows upon an apprehension of this sort a movement of the will willing good or refusing evil. And yet, as was said, the consideration of circumstances having been added to the reason, for instance to die for the sake of the good of virtue, there follows in the will a movement of volition with respect of an evil, for instance of death for justice's sake, and of nolition with respect of a good, for instance of life at the expense of virtue." If this is Cajetan's consistent usage, his reference to particular goods in the passage disputed above is perhaps to be taken as meaning a special class of goods; cf. *ibid.*, I-II, q. 13, a. 2, n. 1: "But if it means that it is determined to one *particular* thing, i. e. *one special class* . . ." Italics mine.

what way it is taken when it contributes to the necessitation of the will.

At any rate, it is left for John of St. Thomas to make more explicit what may be implicit in Cajetan and St. Thomas, and what seems to be the truth: the consideration of existence in general is required for the necessitation of the will, although it does not suffice without the further consideration of the necessary connection of existence in general with beatitude. John of St. Thomas points out that the desire for happiness necessarily contains a desire for existence:

> Now in beatitude two things are included; namely, to be, and to be well or happily. For if one is not, he is not happy; and in like manner, if he has not well-being, he is not happy; and so his own existence and well-being necessitate as to specification. And whatever else is necessary as to specification is reduced to one of these.[92]

John of St. Thomas alone points out that he who kills himself desires very vehemently to exist:

> I add, that he who kills himself more intensely desires to be, considered formally, than he who does not kill himself; because from this, that he so ardently desires to be without miseries that he cannot tolerate them nor do without rest or delight, he is therefore so intensely moved to destroy unhappiness that he does not will to tolerate even the subject of unhappiness, which is life itself; yet the other man, who does not so ardently desire to be without miseries, tolerates it. Hence it is clear that they who kill themselves are excessively desirous of beatitude or its conditions, such as delight, plenty, lack of misery, etc., because not for an hour can they suffer to do without them, to such a degree that if they lack them, they will to destroy even the subject, inasmuch as it lacks them, and thus " he who loves his life will lose it," i. e. lose it from excessive love.[93]

Finally, it is John of St. Thomas alone who points out that just as it is formal beatitude or beatitude in general which necessitates the will, and not material beatitude or this particular object in which the formal notion of beatitude is thought to be realized, so, too, it is formal existence or one's existence

[92] John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III, 402a21-30.

[93] *Ibid.*, 402b50-403a21.

considered in general, and not his particular present existence, that is required for necessitation of the will:

> He who kills himself hates existence considered materially and as the subject of unhappiness, not formally, because he desires non-being itself under some aspect of *being*, namely under the aspect of *being* free from miseries, which are certain evils and defects of being.[94]

From all that has been said, it is clear that life, knowledge, etc., considered in general, must be willed, *if* they are seen to be necessarily connected with beatitude. But if the necessary connection of these goods in general with beatitude is not considered, or if this present state of existence, etc. is regarded as a *particular* good and hence is not seen to be necessarily connected with beatitude, they may be repudiated; just as we can now repudiate God, not yet clearly seen to be the realization and, as it were, perfect embodiment of the notion of good. Thus lack of consideration offers an impediment to the willing of these goods, as we have seen.[95]

While existence in general and knowledge in general must be willed, if their necessary connection with beatitude is considered (beatitude consists, for St. Thomas, in an act of the intellect, and knowledge is required in this life as a necessary means towards winning beatitude, as are virtue, health, etc.), still *this* existence or *this* piece of knowledge is a particular good, and a finite one, and at least to that extent evil, and so can be rejected by the objectively-infinite will:

> If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend towards it of necessity. And since the lack of any good whatever is a non-good, consequently that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing is such a good that the will is unable not to will it; and this is happiness. But any other *particular* goods, insofar as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods, and from this point of view they can be either set aside or approved by the will, which can tend towards one and the same thing from various points of view.[96]

[94] *Ibid.*, 402b43-50. Italics mine.
[95] Cf. the texts quoted above, pp. 54, 55.
[96] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 2. Italics mine.

Here, then, is the final answer to the problems of suicide, etc. Considered *merely* absolutely in themselves (we use the word *absolutely* to mean *in general*, but as opposed to relatively, i. e. to a consideration of these general goods in their necessary relation to beatitude), or else considered as particular goods, being, life, knowledge, etc. can be repudiated. But considered in general *and* relatively, i. e. in their necessary relation to beatitude, they must necessarily be willed, so long as this consideration is actual.[97]

This solution makes proper use of the various theories we have been discussing. Its use of the Non-consideration Theory is manifest. It points out that if the Absolute Theory regards particular existence, it may suffice to show how existence is repudiated, but it does not suffice to explain how it necessitates the will. Neither, indeed, does absolute consideration of existence in general, without adding a consideration of its necessary connection with beatitude. This solution amplifies Cajetan's distinction between existence as a particular good considered absolutely in itself and existence considered as necessarily connected with beatitude, by showing that it is only as it is considered in general that existence necessitates the will through its necessary connection with beatitude. It also corrects his use of the Minority Theory, by attributing a true and unfailing necessity (granted the proper consideration) to the willing of existence, etc. For it is precisely to the extent that one of these goods is considered as a particular object, and also precisely to the extent that, through inconsideration, it can be repudiated, that we have a case of that kind of natural inclination which can fail in a minority of instances. And precisely to the extent that these goods are actually considered as general

[97] Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5, ad 11: "The first good is *per se* willed and the will *per se* and naturally wills it; yet it does not always actually will it, for it is not necessary that those things which are naturally suitable to the soul always actually be in the soul, just as principles which are naturally known are not always actually being considered."

and as necessarily connected with beatitude, they have the true and unfailing necessity that the willing of beatitude itself has. Finally, this solution relegates the Accidental and Removal Theories to the role of explaining how a particular existence, etc. can be rejected while one still necessarily wills existence, etc. in general. Thus it answers St. Thomas's implicit objection to the Removal Theory—that it seems to imply that a man wills himself a good, freedom, when, by having it, he himself would not remain to possess it—by showing that he does desire existence in general; if he adverts to it, he desires it actually, otherwise habitually.

Thus this solution has left us with the same conclusion we reached in the cases of good, last end, and happiness. All the objects which necessitate the will do so only when considered in general.[98] The single exception is God, clearly seen in the Beatific Vision, Who is the only particular object which necessitates the will.

This solution also leaves us with the impression that the natural necessity whereby this last class of goods is willed is closely akin to necessity of the end or of supposition. But St. Thomas seems to reserve the latter for the willing of means to a particular end, whereas these goods are general means to a general end, happiness in general. Moreover, they are not merely means. They are in this life, but in the next life existence is a pre-requisite *conditio sine qua non* for happiness, knowledge is essential to it, while society, health, and at least some of the virtues are concomitants and consequences of it.

[98] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1, ad 3: "Something one always corresponds to nature, proportioned to it. For to that which is nature generically there corresponds that which is one in genus; to nature considered in the species there corresponds that which is one in species; and to individual nature there corresponds something that is individually one. Since, therefore, the will, like the intellect, is an immaterial power, there corresponds to it naturally a common unity, namely the good, just as to the intellect likewise there corresponds a common unity, namely the true, or being, or essence. Now under the good which is common there are contained many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined."

On the other hand, such goods as the generation of offspring do not really have a necessary connection with beatitude, yet they can necessitate the will insofar as they *appear* to have one, to the majority of men, and from the natural rather than the supernatural viewpoint. They are primarily natural desires of the lower powers, but also of the will, insofar as it naturally wills the objects of the other powers.

(To be concluded)

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BOOK REVIEWS

Los Dominicos y el Concilio de Trento. By Venancio D. Carro, O.P. Salamanca: 1948. Pp. 227.

In a work that is of equal interest to theologians and historians, Father Carro, who is a competent writer in both fields, presents for the first time an account of the part taken by the Order of Preachers in the remarkable work of one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of Church Councils. Father Carro is well at home in the field, for he is a widely recognized authority on medieval theology and especially on the great Spanish theologians of the 16th century. His work in two volumes, *El Maestro Fr. Pedro de Soto, O.P., Y las Controversias Politico-Theologicas en el Siglo XVI* (Salamanca, 1931), although not widely known among American scholars who, for some unknown reason are prone to discredit Spanish scholarship, is a classic of its kind. His briefer work on the other de Soto, *Domingo de Soto y el Derecho de Gentes* (Madrid, 1930), is an important contribution to the history of international law.

The present work started out as an article in the Spanish Dominican review, *La Ciencia Tomista,* but research on the subject uncovered so much important material that it was decided to expand the original article to the proportions of a book. It is the author's expressed intention to give as complete and objective a picture as possible of the part taken by the Order of Preachers in the work of the Council of Trent, both inside and outside the Council. He admits in the prologue that this is not a definitive history, because much more research remains to be done. As for complete objectivity, Father Carro is too much the Spaniard and too fervent the Dominican to bear even a remote resemblance to that queer specimen of *homo sapiens,* the objective historian. (Does he really exist?) Faced with the evidence of the great work done at Trent by both Spaniards and Dominicans, he often breaks into eulogy. Even though he goes out of his way to give credit to the other Orders and the non-Dominican hierarchy of the Church, one is inevitably drawn to the conclusion that without the Dominican and Spanish contributions the Council of Trent, saving, of course, the guidance and inspiration of the Holy Ghost (as Father Carro explicitly points out), would not have been a success. Yet, in spite of his enthusiastic and frank admiration of the greatness of his nation and his Order, an attitude condemned by the canons of objective historiography, Father Carro succeeds in presenting an objective picture; for the facts are there whether or no the reader shares Father Carro's enthusiasm for them.

The work might be divided into three parts. In the first part, the writer attempts to give a brief history of theology before Trent, with special

attention to theological error; the second part consists of biographies of many of the Dominicans who participated in the Council, the third part is a summary of the debates on the basic doctrines. In the first part great emphasis is laid upon the theological errors that led to heresy. The errors of Luther did not spring suddenly into existence in the 16th century, and they were not invented by Luther and the other heretic theologians (if it is permissible to style Luther a theologian). The seeds of these errors as well as the other errors which caused controversies within the Church in the 16th century were inherited from preceding ages. The seeds that were planted by Lombard in the 12th century, seeds of error regarding original sin, free will, concupiscence, etc., blossomed into the noxious flower of heresy in the 16th. The errors on grace taught by Ariminense and the pseudo-Augustinian school of the 14th century became a basic doctrine of faith for the religious revolutionist of the 16th. Luther's doctrine of justification and his teaching on the remission of sin was a logical development of nominalist error of earlier times. The Protestant creed did not spring Minerva-like from the brain of Luther, Melancthon or any of the other heretics. It had been in incubation for centuries.

At the opposite pole from the Protestants in the 16th century were those Catholic writers and preachers who in their zeal to refute the heretics paid but scant attention to truth and reason, and would have pulled the Church into error just as vicious as the Lutheran in their misguided efforts to defend the Church from the attack of Luther. They, too, found their authorities in former ages, especially in the pseudo-Augustinian school. In order to escape the gaping jaws of both Scylla and Charybdis it was of the greatest importance for the bark of Peter to have a pilot who knew the perilous waters and who possessed the requisite intelligence and intellectual integrity to bring the ship to safe harbor through the raging seas. Peter found his pilot in St. Thomas Aquinas, who was, at that time, not yet a Doctor of the Church. St. Thomas was selected by the Fathers at Trent as the highest theological authority, and the *Summa* was given the place of honor on the altar beside the Bible. This was one reason why the theologians of the Order of Preachers played such an important role at Trent, for the Dominicans knew Thomistic doctrine, and they were the only group who did know it thoroughly.

We must not forget that the early sixteenth century does not stand as one of the high-water marks of intellectual activity within the Church. The fifteenth century had witnessed the decline and fall of scholasticism. The hierarchy of the Church was not composed, as a general rule, of men of either intellectual or moral vigor. The members of the secular clergy were, in many cases, as ignorant as they had been in the 12th and 13th centuries, for Borromeo had not yet begun his great work of ecclesiastical educational reform. Even the great Orders had become corrupt, and the Dominicans and Franciscans of the 15th century resembled those of the

13th principally because they wore (for the most part) the same habit. The Dominicans had lost their intellectual fire, the Franciscans their zeal—and the Augustinians had produced Luther! Then, *mirabile dictu*, at the beginning of the 16th century a reform movement swept through the Order of Preachers, a reform that was particularly intense in Spain where it was the particular concern of the Emperor Charles V—a reform that returned the Dominican Order to its pristine observance, especially in Spain where the 16th century became the *siglo de oro* not only for the nation but for the Order of Preachers.

One particular effect of the reform was a revival of a vigorous Thomism within the Order, with the result that not even in the 13th century did the Order produce so many theologians of distinction. Thus the Dominicans made ready for Trent. Concerning the revival of intellectual vigor and its bearing upon Trent, Cardinal Ehrle, S. J. wrote: "The period of decadence and internal dissolution of scholasticism (the 14th and 15th centuries) was ended only at the beginning of the 16th century. With this century began a third epoch of scholasticism. . . . The principal cause of this restoration of scholastic theology was the Order of Preachers." And within the Order the intellectual reform was owing principally to three men: Peter Crookart, a Belgian, and Domingo de Soto and Melchior Cano, Spaniards. Since the Dominicans were a university Order whose professors held chairs in theology at almost all the universities of Europe, they had great influence in the revival of scholasticism throughout Europpe.

From the very beginning of the Protestant revolt Dominicans were prominent in the battle against it. Cajetan, Tetzel, and Sylvester de Priero, Master of the Sacred Palace, all listed and refuted Lutheran errors. At the general chapter of the Order held in Valladolid in 1523, Garcia Loaysa, Master General, commanded all Dominicans everywhere to combat the heresy with all the force at their command. This order was repeated in a passionate address to the chapter held in Rome in 1525 by the Master General, Sylvester Ferrariense, Loaysa's successor, who warned his subjects throughout the world to stand fast in the Faith even, if necessary, to martyrdom. To what extent these commands from the highest authority of the Order were obeyed by the rank and file it would be impossible to estimate. But we can state with certainty that members of the Order were not idle upon the battle-field of theological controversy. In every country the Dominicans wrote the soundest and most telling refutations of the new theology. Not all the writers were of the stature of Cajetan or Cano; many of their names are all but unknown today but they were, according to Father Carro, recognized as famous theologians in their day, and they contributed not a little to clearing the issues for Trent. Most numerous were Dominicans from Germany and the neighboring countries — James Hochstrate, Herman Rab, John Mensing, Peter Ranch, Cornelius de Sneck, John Dietemberg, Tilmann Smeling, the two Fabers, John Slotanus, John

Host de Romberg, Augustine de Getelen, Balthasar Fanneman, John Heyn, John Bunder, Ambrose Storck Pelagrus, Conrad Necrosius and others.

In addition to waging war on Luther, the Dominicans also had a hand in bringing about the Council of Trent through the influence exerted on Charles V by his Dominican advisers and confessors—Garcia Loaysa, Diego de Pedro and Pedro de Soto. To Loaysa, in particular, much credit must be given. His letters to Charles V from Rome during the pontificate of Clement VII show to what extent his time and energy were devoted to trying to convince the Pope to evoke the Council. But the power and influence of Francis I who held the same sort of spell over the Pope that his ancestor, Philip, held over the Pope's weak-minded and weak-kneed predecessor and namesake, Clement V, proved too much for Loaysa and his royal master. However, Loaysa did not give up; he continued to plead with Clement's successor, Paul III.

The number and quality of the Dominicans at the Council of Trent was, Father Carro says, in proportion to the glorious history of the Order and a testimony to its flourishing state in the 16th century. While not all of them had the genius of a Domingo de Soto, nor the fiery eloquence in debate possessed by the Pope's theologian, Ambrose Catherino, who is often called "the stormy petrel" of the Council, they were all, Father Carro assures us, men of exceptional ability. More than one hundred Dominicans took part in the sessions of the Council in an official capacity, and the influence they exerted upon its decisions cannot be questioned. Many of them were archbishops and bishops. No other Order had such an outstanding representation. In addition to those who attended the Council, other Dominicans, such as Michael Ghislieri, the Master of the Sacred Palace, were at work outside the Council at Rome as advisers to the Pope. Ghislieri, in fact, continued his work in connection with the Council for the remainder of his life, for as Pope Pius V it was he who, according to Pastor, made the decrees of Trent a living reality.

Father Carro substantiates his claim to the great influence wielded by the Dominicans at Trent by outlining the debates that took place on the basic doctrines and showing how the decisions of the Council invariably adhered essentially to the Thomistic position as expounded by the Dominican theologians. He also devotes a good part of his book to brief biographies of the Dominicans who took part in the debates—men, great in their time, whose names are now all but forgotten by the historians. This section of the book is one of its most valuable features, for this biographical material is drawn, for the most part, from such hard-to-get sources as the *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum* of Quétif-Echard and the *Historiadores de San Estéban*. Here is a book that the student of the history of theology cannot afford to overlook.

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Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist. The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. VII. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. Evanston, Illinois: Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., 1949. Pp. 781, with index. $8.50.

At the beginning of the present century, empiriological physics was faced with two paradoxes arising from a study of light. One was the problem of "black-body" radiation which inspired the quantum theory; the other was the Michelson-Morley experiment which led to the theory of relativity. Not only is relativity physics the work of Albert Einstein, but central notions in the quantum system are likewise owed to him. In fifty years, he has changed the course of physics even more than Galileo and Newton.

Following the conventions of the "Library of Living Philosophers," the present volume opens with an intellectual autobiography of Einstein himself. Then follow twenty-five essays on Einstein's work by scientists and philosophers and scholars who are both. The book concludes with Einstein's reaction to his critics, positive and negative, in the preceding section. Following the body of the book, there is a sixty-two page bibliography of Einstein's writings as compiled by Margaret C. Shields. There are twenty pages of index.

As Schilpp writes in the preface, he has again assembled an imposing array of scholars for this latest addition to his valuable series. The essayists represent eleven countries. Six of them hold Nobel Prizes in science. As in the past volumes, Schilpp has failed to obtain an appropriate essay by a scholastic. He states in the preface that he had solicited a study from a Russian source but that the promised essay failed to arrive. Scholastics will be happy to learn from the dust-jacket of this book that the Library is preparing a volume on Maritain, but the fact remains that in the seven volumes of the Library so far published naturalists, logical empiricists, idealists, and even Marxians have been invited to contribute, without a single essay from the growing numbers of scholastics throughout the world.

A Thomist, in reviewing the works of this Library, always feels tempted to sketch out what might have been the missing scholastic evaluation of the philosopher under consideration. According to the title of the present work, Einstein is both a philosopher and a scientist, but none of the contributors make it exactly clear if and where there is a dividing line between his two fields of work. Nor has any of the authors taken the patience to trace out the pre-suppositions of Einstein's work that would connect it up with the common experience of men in which knowledge begins. Thomism has a great contribution to make in this pre-experimental and pre-empiriological area which cannot be dismissed as a common-sense illusion without making the illusion apply to all knowledge including that of the quantum and relativity specialist.

Aristotle could still defend his three principles of motion in pre-experimental physics which goes logically and chronologically before the more

sophisticated and artificial techniques of experiment. Without matter or a subject and without privation (the term *a quo*) and form (the term *ad quem*), motion would be impossible. These three principles involve primarily the actualization of the potential, in so far as it is potential. They do not depend on quantity and measurement which are posterior in our knowledge, by comparison to matter-form-privation. The principles of motion not only escape measurement, but they likewise are below experiment since any effort to experiment them would presuppose their existence. Book I of Aristotle's *Physics* — not to mention the others — can stand in spite of empiriological physics, either in quantum or relativity form. It simply asks and answers questions at the general, pre-experimental level where Einstein's specialized method is powerless.

The very success of quantum and relativity physics poses a problem which cannot be fully answered by simple epistemological distinctions like the one suggested in the foregoing paragraph. If not directly, at least in some indirect and oblique way, the quantum and relativity physicist does enter into a study of nature, and the practical achievements of his discipline could not be explained if he did not in some way or other touch upon what things are. It is timely then to ask whether the quantum and relativity theories, to which Einstein contributed so much, agree or disagree with the Aristotelian account of motion in terms of matter and form. Before answering such a question, it should be pointed out that the matter-form account does not stand or fall on the success of Aristotelianism in tracing its explanation through the maze of modern data. Matter and form are proved on the pre-experimental level of common experience. But the matter-form account can gain in force if it succeeds in finding shadows of itself among the well-grounded empiriological theories of contemporary research.

Quantum physics, the work of Einstein, Planck, Bohr, Compton, Heisenberg, de Broglie, Compton, Schroedinger, and Born, has reached the conclusion that matter in its microscopic dimensions is indeterminate and that only probable states of matter can be predicted. According to the Schroedinger equations, as interpreted by Born, the so-called waves of matter or of light reflect the probability of finding particles. The wave is said to represent varying " probability-amplitudes." How this conclusion is reached and justified is a long story told at various places in the present work.

An Aristotelian would agree that matter is indeterminate, since it is so heavily loaded down with potency, but he would not agree that matter is completely indeterminate since matter is determined to the extent that it is informed. Actually, the quantum physicists do not really mean what many of them say in discussing matter as though it were sheer chance and chaos. For as shown by both the de Broglie wave equation and a Schroedinger wave operator, there are degrees of indetermination depending on the type of particle in question. Thus, an electron has a longer wave-length than a neutron and a much longer wave length than the atom. It can also

be reasoned out that the electron has different degrees of indeterminism depending on the atom in which it is. Hence, the indeterminacy of matter is not radical. It is a modified indeterminism, i. e., modified that is from one type of particle to another and within the same type of particle when it appears in different substances. To speak of a modified indeterminism seems strangely like saying informed matter.

The second theory, almost wholly the product of Einstein's genius, is the theory of relativity. According to the general theory of relativity, the world can be ideally viewed as a huge continuum, an ether-like field, where gravitational phenomena (and possibly electromagnetism) are to be explained by the acceleration of axes of measurement. The acceleration corresponds to curvatures in the continuum, and the curving world-lines are mapped out in terms of non-Euclidian geometry.

The introduction of curvature into the continuum serves to bring out the truth that the relativity continuum is not a radical one. There is a differential structure to the space-time metric. There is in other words not a pure but a modified continuum.

For St. Thomas, the continuous character of the material world arises ultimately from its potential element. Things are alike to the extent that they are potential and continuous. They are differentiated by act or form. Hence, just as " modified indeterminism " suggests informed matter, so does the relativity account of motion in terms of a modified continuum. Working on such notions, an Aristotelian philosophy of nature could have developed a provocative chapter in the appraisal of quantum and relativity physics provided by the volume under review.

Let it be repeated that it would be a mistake to seek a univocal correspondence between Aristotle's account of motion by matter and form and the contemporary view of matter in terms of continuity and indeterminism. The conclusions of present-day physics are reached only across a theoretical apparatus far removed from the common-sense world where philosophy begins. Empiriological and philosophical physics, if we may even put them in the same order of formal abstraction, certainly proceed in opposite directions at the level of total abstraction. Empiriological physics uses a genus-difference approach to matter, while philosophical physics is more interested in matter and form. Just as there is no univocal relation between genus and matter on the one hand and difference and form on the other, so one should not expect that the data of empiriological physics can be transplanted from their status within the universal whole of the classifier to the physical whole of the philosopher's inquiry after causes. The Thomistic philosopher of science, like the Thomistic philosopher of nature, could have made an interesting contribution to this Einstein volume. Thomists, who wish to enter either of these fields as relating to Einstein's work, will find the present book an invaluable mine of source materials.

Of all the volumes in the Library of Living Philosophers, this present one is the best.

Einstein found physics in the face of two dilemmas. Today, in the twilight of his career, there is a new crisis stemming from the two physical systems which he did so much to found. For quantum physics holds to the indeterminacy of matter while the relativity system insists that the world is a strictly determined one. The present volume reveals Einstein as standing alone in favor of the belief that the quantum uncertainty relations are mere temporary barriers that future research will overcome. The other outstanding physicists who touch upon quantum mechanics in their essays feel that indeterminism is here to stay.

Between the dilemmas confronting physics at the beginning of the century and the one facing physics at the present hour, great progress has been made. Such is the history of empiriological research. At this level, each system of physics can see matter under certain aspects, but none can grasp the whole. That is why empiriological physics, in its account of structure, can turn up with only shadows of matter and form. The light—and in the philosophy of nature it is a dim one—belongs to pre-experimental physics which can grasp things as wholes. Experiment, quantitative, selective, capable of grasping only the potential or controllable side of matter, must always yield at best only a partial picture of the real.

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Essays in the History of Ideas. By ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1948. Pp. 376, with index. $5.00.

This selection of sixteen essays from the hundred odd contributions of Prof. Lovejoy to various journals fittingly commemorates a double event. It marks the fiftieth year of his intense study and literary output, as appears from the bibliography appended to these essays, listing the professor's books and his articles from 1898 to 1948; and it celebrates the twenty-fifth anniversary of the History of Ideas Club of John Hopkins University. It was a happy thought of the members of the club to invite its originator to select and revise a number of his essays, most of which are inaccessible to the ordinary reader, as giving a practical and authoritative example of the ideals for which the club stands, namely " the historical study of the development and influence of general philosophical conceptions, ethical ideas, and aesthetic fashions, in occidental literature, and of the relations of these to manifestations of the same ideas and tendencies in the history of philosophy, of science, and of political and social movements " (Foreword

by Don Cameron Allen, p. ix). In accordance with the wishes of his colleagues, the author limits his selection to essays of a historical nature, excluding those which deal with metaphysical or epistemological questions. Students of philosophy will regard this as a privation, but may consider that Prof. Lovejoy's philosophical ideas are sufficiently set forth in his contribution to "*Essays in Critical Realism*," in his "*Revolt against Dualism*," and "*The Great Chain of Being*." Many of the essays do, however, contain much that is of interest to the historian of philosophy, who cannot be indifferent to the aims of this school in tracing the origin and repercussions in a wider cultural field of ideas that are common to philosophy and to cognate sciences and literature.

Prof. Lovejoy explains the aims of the historiography of ideas in his first essay. Specialized research in the twelve fields which cover the history of ideas in one form or another has become so detailed that now it is necessary to set up close collaboration between the specialists in order to bring the results of their investigations to bear unitedly on those elements which are common to their researches. To obtain a synthetic comprehension, to restore the unity thus artificially sundered, with a view to the full understanding of the vicissitudes of any one particular idea, it will be necessary to regard the history of philosophy as the seminarium of the most influential and pervasive ideas. Among such ideas there are certain typical or "unit-ideas" which re-appear under various forms and which have to be distinguished and characterised. One should not be misled by verbal identity, which can so often mask a profound divergence of thought. An excellent example of this is afforded by a subject which figures largely in many of these essays, that of "nature," "wihch has been the chief and most pregnant word in the terminology of all the normative provinces of thought in the West; and the multiplicity of its meanings has made it easy and common to slip more or less insensibly from one connotation to another, and thus in the end to pass from one ethical or aesthetic standard to its very antithesis, while nominally professing the same principles" (p. 69). Prof. Lovejoy then illustrates the truth of this contention, particularly in aesthetics and history, in some very interesting essays, having first, in his fifth essay, distinguished fifteen meanings of the word "nature" in relation to aesthetics, describing the corresponding qualities desired in the work of art.

The two aspects under which nature is principally considered in these essays are those of being a social norm or an aesthetic norm. As a social norm, it inspires the doctrine of a return to nature, to a greater simplicity and a closer kinship with our fellow men. In the essay on Rousseau's "*Discourse on Inequality*," the author distinguishes the chronological, juridical and cultural significations of a "state of nature," and shows that the return to nature advocated by Rousseau is quite different from the crude chronological primitivism ascribed to him by many historians. Rousseau insists on the perfectibility of man, and hence on a certain evolution

in the human species. The relation between him and Monboddo in regard to evolution is treated in the next essay; and the influence of this idea on the development of history, under the leadership of Herder, is considered in a later essay, which also stresses the transition from an absolutist to a relativist conception of human nature.

The imitation of nature is considered chiefly in relation to classical and neo-classical aesthetic theories and to Romanticism. An important essay on the parallel of Deism and Classicism paves the way for these discussions, by formulating the latent assumptions underlying the Enlightenment and constituting its rationalism. These assumptions dominated European thought from the late sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries, and their application to religion resulted in Deism, while Neo-Classicism is their application to aesthetics. This essay is a fine example of the ideals pursued by the school of the history of ideas and of the fruitfulness of its researches. Essential to the Enlightenment was its uniformitarian view of human nature, insisting upon its stability and unchangeableness and the consequent universality and easy accessibility of truth, leading inevitably to a certain primitivism. Nature, as the object of imitation in art, was conceived as orderly and uniform, as regular and well-proportioned. Various influences combined to effect a change in this view of nature, with a corresponding change in aesthetic theory. In eighteenth-century England, the main factors were landscape-gardening, under the impact of new ideas imported by missionaries principally from China, and painting, fostering the view of nature as wild and irregular. While the principle of the imitation of nature remained unchanged, the new concept of nature led to the adoption of new aesthetic theories and to a return to favour of the Gothic style. This tendency was furthered by the spread of the evolutionary idea, and helps to explain much that is characteristic of the German Romantic movement. In several essays devoted to this subject, Prof. Lovejoy distinguishes the many meanings of this much used term, and traces the growth of the movement from its beginnings in Fr. Schlegel at the end of the eighteenth century under the influence of Schiller, disposing by the way of the generally accepted theory propagated by Haym, and dealing with the relation of this movement to Primitivism and Naturalism.

The thirteenth essay is a discussion of Coleridge's attempt to justify freedom, as involved in the responsibility of man for his sins, by recourse to Kant's doctrine of the two worlds, the intelligible and the phenomenal character; and Prof. Lovejoy points out that this theory can save freedom only at the expense of contradiction. The concluding three essays, treating of Milton and the paradox of the Fortunate Fall, the communism of St. Ambrose, and "Nature" as norm in Tertullian, are instances of the wide reach of the erudition of our author, but the theologian will not find himself quite in agreement with Prof. Lovejoy on all the points which are here

raised. One can hardly expect Prof. Lovejoy to be an expert in the theological issues raised by the Fall of Adam; but when he refers to St. Augustine as "manifestly skating on rather thin ice" (p. 290), we are inclined to think that it is rather he himself who has donned the skates in venturing onto the notoriously slippery ground of the relation of the divine decree and Adam's sin. The Professor, this reviewer feels sure, does not wish to appear to solve in one word a problem to which theologians have devoted so many tomes. It does, however, seem that in seeking the sources of Milton's reference to the "*felix culpa*," he limits himself unduly to written records. Surely this was a commonplace of Christian preaching, and familiar to all through centuries of singing of the "*Exultet*" in the churches? It is easy for the historian to underestimate the influence of oral tradition since he seeks documented proof of his assertions; and, perhaps, Prof. Lovejoy will agree that it is indeed fortunate that not all sermons have found their way into print. It is difficult to imagine what good could compensate such an evil.

In treating of the communism of St. Ambrose, one would have desired a clearer recognition of the fact that the saint does not deny the right to private property and is concerned principally with insisting on the social duty of almsgiving in order to restore the equality upset by human greed. The primary destination of natural goods to the use of all men implies, not communism, but the limitation of the right to private ownership in accordance with legal justice. The essay on Tertullian raises issues which cannot be solved, unless one bears in mind the beliefs of that Father regarding the relation of nature and grace. Prof. Lovejoy seems to ignore the Catholic teaching on that point altogether, so that his discussion leaves one unconvinced and unsatisfied. A Catholic maintains the power of reason to know the natural truths which constitute the foundation of religion, without seeing therein any parallel with Deism, or requiring that revealed truth should be cut down to human measure. He is not inconsistent if, like Tertullian, he appeals to the intellect by showing that revealed truth is not in conflict with natural truths, yet stresses the transcendent nature of the object of faith. Catholic teaching on the relation of faith to reason and of nature to grace safeguards both aspects, the human and the divine. Familiarity with this teaching would have enabled Prof. Lovejoy to appreciate the moral excellence of celibacy without thereby depreciating the married state. The fact that celibacy is the more perfect state does not imply that God desires all to embrace it (p. 334), just as He does not desire all men to be philosophers or historians of ideas, however excellent these professions may be. Such criticisms as these, which we feel bound to offer, do not affect the main line of the arguments of the essays; they are but incidental blemishes, and are due, we imagine, to the fact that Prof. Lovejoy is not quite the universal expert; no man can be reasonably

expected to be fully proficient in each one of different fields, as the Professor himself insists so emphatically.

In his preface, the author sums up the general conceptions which have guided him or which he has discovered in the course of his researches. He notes first "the presence and influence of the same presuppositions or other operative 'ideas' in very diverse provinces of thought and in different periods," a principle that is instanced in the parallel of Deism and Classicism. Secondly, "the role of semantic transitions and confusions, of shifts and of ambiguities in the meaning of terms, in the history of thought and of taste," making the task of the historian very difficult, since the same word, such as "nature," can cloak a multitude of changing meanings. Lastly, he draws attention to "the internal tensions or waverings in the mind of almost every individual writer—sometimes discernible even in a single writing or on a single page—arising from conflicting ideas or incongruous propensities of feeling or taste, to which, so to say, he is susceptible." There is, of course, a progress in the thought of most men, and very often an inner discrepancy remains, so that one can falsify the ideas of an author by seeking to press them into a logically consistent whole. But we cannot agree with the opinion that "only the narrowest and the dullest minds are completely in harmony with themselves" (p. xvi), at least when there is question of the mature philosophy of an individual. Prof. Lovejoy is not alone in such a view; it is common to the anti-intellectualist tendencies so wide-spread to-day, and, strangely enough, to such neo-idealists as Bradley and Bosanquet. The absence of change may lead to dullness, but it is not to be identified with the absence of contradiction; even the absence of change may be but superficial, since one can continually grow in penetration of the deeper meaning of truths long in possession, and of their relation to other truths in the development of a systematic view of reality. And the philosopher will ever be more interested in what is true than in what happened to be taught or thought, though this may be of more interest to the historian. We should like to know Prof. Lovejoy's own views on the immutabililty of human nature and of truth; his many studies on primitivism might suggest that he is sympathetic to the uniformitarian and universalist notions which generally form the basis of primitivism, but his tracing of the great chain of being in its historical development, and his enquiries into Romanticism and the rise of evolutionary theories would indicate the contrary view. We hope he shares the Aristotelian teaching, to which he refers in his essay on Monboddo and Rousseau (p. 55), which blends immutability in essence with the power of self-perfection, and recognises the distinction between the power of becoming anything, and actually being that thing. Just as the perfection of which man is capable does not conflict with his unchanging nature, neither does truth, newly discovered or acquired, conflict with those truths already possessed. There may thus

be growth and novelty, without involving either narrowness or dullness. We cannot imagine that Prof. Lovejoy would pride himself on being inconsistent, though his ideas surely have evolved; and he certainly is neither narrow nor dull in these pages which he has unearthed for the benefit of a wider public. He reads easily, and succeeds in keeping the reader's interest throughout, and throws much light on many questions of great cultural importance. We are grateful to him above all for this concrete example of how the school founded by him endeavours to realise its ideals. The history of philosophy cannot but benefit by the researches so patiently and ably carried out by this school, and can hardly hope to fulfil its task adequately without its help; and if the philosopher or theologian feels bound to express disagreement on some points, surely this is but one more sign of the need of that closer collaboration between specialists for which Prof. Lovejoy so insistently and eloquently calls.

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Reality, A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought. By Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. Tr. by Patrick Cummins, O.S.B. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1950. Pp. 432 with index. $6.00.

This work incorporates an article on Thomism which the author wrote some years ago for the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique.* To the article, with a few clarifications, there is added a hundred pages on the objective bases of the Thomistic synthesis, chiefly philosophic, which might not be considered appropriate for a theological dictionary. Actually, however, this philosophical addition makes the original study of theology immeasurably more significant because the content of these added pages were the original inseparable background against which St. Thomas presented his profound theological system. It was always St. Thomas, the pre-eminent metaphysician, who considered the propositions of revelation and the depth of his metaphysical penetration was the source of his genius as a theologian.

Prefaced by a brief summary of the contents of the saint's philosophical and theological writings and an excellent appraisal of the Thomistic commentators since the thirteenth century, the fifty-nine chapters of the work are divided into eight parts as follows: (a) the metaphysical synthesis based on the doctrine of act and potency; (b) the theology of *De Deo Uno* and its rational foundation; (c) the Trinity; (d) the philosophy and theology of angelic and human nature; (e) Redemptive Incarnation; (f) the sacraments in general and the Sacrifice of the Mass, including a brief note on the Church; (g) a summary of chief theses of moral theology; (h) a final

section entitled " Developments and Confirmation " which includes chapters on the absolute importance of the twenty-four theses of Thomism and their derivative propositions; the moderate realism of Thomism with the significance of its fundamental first principles; the opposition of pragmatism; ontological personality; efficacious grace.

It must be immediately said that as one of the most distinguished of contemporary Thomists, Father Garrigou-Lagrange has added a crowning achievement to his long list of brilliant Thomistic treatises. His previous nine major works have been on special problems of Thomistic philosophy and theology. He has now given us his own important *Summa* of both fields in a clear, precise expression that is a delight to read. Here St. Thomas the metaphysician par excellence, possessed of a thoroughly rational and consistent metaphysical system, is the real explanation of St. Thomas the theologian penetrating with remarkable insight into the mysteries of faith because of the sharpness of his philosophical instrument. In the time of the saint it was very evidently true that philosophers became philosophers primarily for the purpose of becoming theologians as the crowning achievement of their thought. No more today than in the thirteenth century can the theologian neglect, or be ignorant of, current metaphysical trends since he knows the profound effect these latter must have upon every detail of theological discussion of his time. Hence this author's concern at the very outset with the details of the Thomistic metaphysical synthesis, intelligible being and first principles, act and potency, and his return at the end of his studies to such philosophical questions as the importance of the twenty-four philosophical theses of Thomism, the realism of the first principles, and the current error of pragmatism as destructive of a sound metaphysics and, therefore, of an acceptable theology or indeed any theology at all.

Here at the very beginning of the author's study of reality the Thomistic metaphysical synthesis is properly seen to be necessary for a rational presentation of the philosophy and theology of one God and the theology of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Of course, the key principle of Thomistic metaphysics is the doctrine of potency and act and its threefold application on the levels of existence, of essence and of operation. This principle at the beginning is proposed by Aristotle to explain the reality of change or becoming in being and at the same time make secure the incontrovertible principle of identity. In this role St. Thomas attributes the principle quite properly to Aristotle. But Garrigou-Lagrange goes on to consider the very distinct and more important metaphysical use of the principle in which act is offered as limited by a distinct principle of potency. In this guise it constitutes the second of the twenty-four philosophical theses of Thomism. The author maintains there is no doubt that in this role the act-potency principle is borrowed from Aristotle. " In this same manner Aquinas, after Aristotle, explains the multiplication of substantial

form . . . Aristotle already taught this doctrine . . . Act, he says, is limited and multiplied by potency; act determines potency, actualizes potency, but is limited by that potency." (pp. 43-44) There is no doubt in this author's mind that Thomism is simply developed Aristotelianism in its most fundamental metaphysical principle. But if this is true is it not strange that St. Thomas as one of the best and most careful Aristotelian commentators of all times nowhere in his commentaries, which constitute so large a part of all his writings, ever attributes this most important limitation of act by potency doctrine to the Stagyrite? The limitation of act by potency is the source of the most important Thomistic doctrine of participation. Actually, we must go to the original Thomistic sections of the saint's writings to find this all important doctrine. Garrigou-Lagrange points to no passage in the Commentaries where St. Thomas can be said to be merely concurring with such Aristotelian principle. We think the only reason for the silence is that the principle is not definitely found in Aristotle. For the Greek mind, including Plato and Aristotle, there is no true conception of the Infinite. The Immovable Mover of Aristotle is in no sense infinite and unique. The infinite is the imperfect because it is without due limit. It is the finite possessing such due limit that is perfect.

If St. Thomas does not borrow this principle of limitation of act by potency from Aristotle we believe it is for the very good reason that he cannot find it in Aristotle. Historically it is much later in the One of Plotinus that we first find the reversal of the Greek imperfect infinite. The neo-Platonist's One is not imperfect but an excess of fullness of being. All other beings are the imperfect or participated beings. If any implication of pantheism can be found in the emanations from the One (and that may be disputed), St. Thomas, of course, clearly sets any such implications aside in his identification of the Unparticipated and Unique One with the Self-Existent Being. His is definitely a metaphysics of existence. Participated beings are participated existences. St. Thomas, it seems to us, is much more eclectic than Garrigou-Lagrange is willing to admit. The terms 'Plotinus' and 'neo-Platonism' are not even listed in the very complete index of this author's work. Of course, it may be said that the source of this key principle of Thomism is of little importance, that what is important is the brilliant use to which St. Thomas puts his participation principle as the key to the unity of his system. This may be true but may not this incorrect ascribing of the key Thomistic principle to Aristotle lead us to suspect a determination to fit everything in St. Thomas into an Aristotelian mould even at the cost of positive distortion of the truth? Certainly there is, at least, the danger of failing to see the very real and very revolutionary character of Thomistic metaphysics if such an attitude constantly prevails.

It has been said that St. Thomas urged Aristotle so much on his contemporaries that he was accused of 'aping Aristotle.' That emphasis could

be explained, however, as simply an effort to counteract what he thought to be some most unacceptable features of Augustinianism with which he contended in his own Order of Preachers. It is of some importance that Thomism should not be forced into this Aristotelian mold at all times. The two systems are far apart on many points even though St. Thomas recognizes the full genius of Aristotle and accepted and used his thought where he considered it to be true. That may be on fewer occasions than was formerly considered to be the case. St. Thomas took truth where he found it, from many sources. He is best understood if he is not thought of as making anything like an irrevocable choice between Aristotelian and anti-Aristotelian positions. Rather the emphasis should be placed on the considerable eclecticism and likewise the profound originality of his synthesis.

All of this, of course, in no way impugns the brilliant and precise summary of Thomistic philosophy and theology as set down in this work. Garrigou-Lagrange is one of the most faithful of Thomistic commentators. He writes out of a vast knowledge of what all other commentators have said and he appraises their excellence and their limitation with even-handed justice, born of a clear understanding of their thought. Incidentally, there is no doubt of the author's admiration for Cajetan as the prince of Thomistic commentators. It is this commentator who most of all is content to be simply and solely a faithful commentator and nothing else. In that lies the value of his work. This author has modelled his own writings upon the work of the sixteenth-century cardinal.

Garrigou-Lagrange frequently sets the views of Duns Scotus and Suarez against many of the important positions of St. Thomas by way of radical contrast and the better to emphasize the soundness of the doctrine of Aquinas. We do not think this is a particularly strong feature of this work. This author is a thorough-going Thomist who knows all the turns of thought even within the Thomistic school. The same cannot be said for his judgments upon either of the most notable of Thomistic opponents within the field of Scholastic philosophy and theology. Contemporary Scotists and Suarezians will not be satisfied with the precise accuracy of this author's presentations of the positions of these philosophers whose cause they espouse. Father Garrigou-Lagrange depends too much upon secondary sources when he is outside the field of Thomistic thought. It would, perhaps, have been just as well if he adhered strictly to the subtitle of this great work, namely "A Thomistic Synthesis." That has been done so succinctly, so superbly, out of the vast storehouse of the author's knowledge of St. Thomas that we should be quite satisfied to ask for no more within the confines of a single volume summary.

It will be noted that the first six sections of this work deal with what may be called the dogmatic portion of the *Summa Theologica* and only one

section, the seventh, expounds the moral portions. In conclusion the author considers that his exposition shows how faithful St. Thomas has remained to his initial announcement in the very first question in the *Summa*, that dogmatic theology and moral theology are not two distinct branches of knowledge but only two parts of one and the same branch of knowledge. "Like God's knowledge from which it descends, theology is, pre-eminently and simultaneously, both speculative and practical having throughout but one sole object: God revealed in His own inner life, God as source and goal of all creation." (p. 343) This conception opposes what the author has called Christian eclecticism and hence he adds sections to show the evils of such eclecticism and the power of Thomism in remedying them. By Christian eclecticism is meant an attempt to harmonize all systems of philosophy and theology. Where Leo XIII says the Church accepts Thomism, the Christian eclectic says he will accept only those points on which St. Thomas, Scotus, and Suarez, for example, are in agreement, as being the important points. Points of disagreement are said to be unimportant, even at times useless subtleties, and may be ignored or treated as mere matters of history. For the eclectic, the very fact that they are disputed shows them to be unimportant.

Actually, however, many of these so-called unimportant disputed points concern most fundamental issues at the very core of the respective positions. It is difficult to conceive a more fundamental point of difference than whether essence and existence are really distinct in finite beings. This can be seen especially in the whole train of consequences which follow according as the philosopher accepts or rejects the real distinction at the root of real being. The categorizing of all Christian philosophies of the Middle Ages and the immediately following centuries under the general title of Scholasticism has probably had more to do with the encouragement of such an eclectic approach than is always realized. Radically different philosophies cannot be logically grouped under a single name. In his "Scholasticism, Old and New" Maurice De Wulf attempted to make just such a definition of Scholasticism but on his own data, and even with his glossing over of important differences, his study really shows the opposite of what he attempts to establish. Garrigou-Lagrange has performed a notable service to philosophy in showing the radical difference of Thomism from that of its contemporaries. This is a fact that is becoming more fully realized by the works of such philosophers as this present author. If St. Thomas himself drew from more systems than that of Aristotle he nevertheless constructed a highly original and very consistent metaphysical system radically at variance with those of other prominent philosophers of his day. Because of that profound difference an eclecticism is impossible. The assimilative power of Thomism absorbs the truth of other systems while rejecting their defects. This absorptive power is here carefully shown in the fields

of cosmology, anthropology, criteriology, ethics, and natural theology. The Thomistic view is generally that of the mean between extremes. There is sacrifice of neither being nor becoming but a thoroughly consistent incorporation of becoming in being as its subject. What is particularly evident at the same time is that this highly rational metaphysical structure of reality is always in touch with concrete sense experience. The purely *a priori* systems, of which Hegel is the classic example, are carefully avoided. All this is being seen so much more clearly today in the very extensive study of Thomism. It is undoubtedly the reason for the more widespread revival of Thomism over that of all the other major systems with which it contended in its own day and in the subsequent centuries to the present. Father Garrigou-Lagrange has here again demonstrated that he is one of the greatest of all the contemporary leaders in that movement. He has written brilliantly of his master.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Idea-Men of Today. By Vincent Edward Smith. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950. Pp. 434 with index. $5.00.

President Hutchins when at Chicago University once enunciated the principle that *ideas* should be given equal importance with *facts*. In his context it would seem that he meant that our society was too pragmatic and not sufficiently interested in great ideas. But one might appropriate his statement to point up a significant phenomenon, namely, that the *ideas* of yesterday have a startling propensity for becoming the *facts* of today. Since some of the *facts* of today, such as the existence of the menacing Soviet Empire, are distinctly terrifying, humanity might today be much more serene if these horrendous facts had been previously recognized and choked off in their larval state as ideas. "How many books, lost today in libraries, have brought about . . . the revolution which we now see with our eyes," wrote Lacordaire. President Roosevelt had never read *Das Kapital*, the book which Karl Marx toiled over in the British Museum while his malnourished family fought off the bill-collectors and Friedrich Engels paid the rent. He did not have to. In the space of a century, the *idea* of *Das Kapital*, incubated by Lenin, watered by violence, had become the monstrous *fact* of Soviet Russia. Goethe's *Faust* aptly describes this transition in the passage which commences: "It stands written: 'In the beginning was the word!' . . ." in which Faust goes on to transform that statement to, "In the beginning was the mind," then to "In the beginning was force," and finally to, "In the beginning was the deed!" It is only too plain in our contemporary world how words have begotten ideas, ideas have begotten force, and force has produced monstrous facts.

If only for this reason, namely, that ideas produce facts, it is timely that Professor Vincent Edward Smith of Notre Dame should have published a book on *Idea-Men of Today*, that in their ideas, fantastic and unreal though they may often seem, we may anticipate what may well be, unless supplanted by other ideas, the facts of tomorrow. We may gain some inkling with what ruthless force ideas can be transformed into social facts from the words of Pascal: "Never does one do harm so fully and so gaily as when one does it out of conscience."

However, it would be wrong to *prejudge* such ideas unfavorably, nor does Professor Smith do so in his survey of fifteen contemporary thinkers, including Dewey, Santayana, Whitehead, Russell, Freud, Marx, Bergson, Kierkegaard, Sartre, Heidegger and Jaspers. The treatment of each is preceded by a succinct and interesting biography, followed by an objective exposition of their ideas as contained in their works, and concluded by a

critique addressed from the point of view of contemporary Catholic philosophical thought. It is often reproached to Catholic manuals that in their expositions of philosophical doctrines other than their own the opponents are given short shrift. Their life's work is summarized in a few lines, their error is skewered in a single sentence, and the guillotine is ready for the next victim. This is somewhat shocking to those who consider these men great thinkers and the problems they have suscitated worthy of a lifetime of study. Such an attitude can, perhaps, be justified by St. Thomas' delineation of the twofold office of the wise man: first, to meditate upon and enunciate the truth; secondly, to attack the contrary falsehood (*Contra Gentes* I, 1). The ordinary student is doing well if he can get some positive grasp of the truth, let alone refute contrary errors. However, if he is to be more representative of that truth he must be able to confront contrary opinions. Furthermore, he must give these opinions a fair hearing.

We feel that Professor Smith has rendered a signal service by the accomplishment of this somewhat Herculean task, that of bringing the unending maze of contemporary thought within reach of the under-graduate and educated layman, and doing so in a fair and objective way. At the price of enormous industry and patience he has methodically, and, one might say, sympathetically, studied the works of the men he treats and has endeavored, without over-simplification, to present the salient ideas contained in those works in a single volume. He has tried to present these thoughts as objectively as possible, eschewing any facile cataloguing, in order to present these thoughts in what may often appear to some as their own magnificent obscurity, nebulousness and self-contradiction. Yet his critique is by no means purely destructive. He is motivated by the belief that "the intellect of man by a natural inclination tends toward the truth, although it may not perceive the reason for the truth" (St. Thomas, *In I Phys.*, 10), and is constantly seeking for new light thrown on the truth by the thinkers he investigates. He appears to fulfill well the norm Aristotle and St. Thomas lay down for such investigations: "When we expound the opinions of others and give their arguments and solve them, and give contrary arguments, we should not appear to condemn the sayings of others *gratis*, i. e., without due reason, as those who reprove the sayings of others solely out of hate, which does not become philosophers, who profess themselves to be inquirers after truth. For it is necessary that those who wish to judge sufficiently concerning the truth should not show themselves as enemies of those concerning whose sayings judgment is to be made, but as arbiters and speakers for both sides" (*In I De Caelo*, 22).

In his critical remarks Professor Smith's approach appears to be principally on the metaphysical plane, which is perhaps fitting since so much of contemporary thought is concerned with the nature of being, with the validity of first principles, and with the objectivity of knowledge. Just as the ideas of his contemporaries often give the effect of a rich ideological

jungle, so Professor Smith's style abounds in felicitous and illuminating metaphors and his reflexions point to many intriguing avenues of speculation. He seems to have fulfilled as well as any man confronted with the "disagreements, vagueness, instability and complexity of modern thought" could, the task he set himself in his Foreword: to present a satisfactory guidebook towards a general view of present-day thought for "the student or educated layman, unwilling or unable to read through the vast output."

Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus (*Diamat*). By I. M. Bocheński. Bern: A. Francke, 1950. Pp. 213, with index. S. Fr. 8 40.

This small volume by the well-known professor at the University of Fribourg is one of the best, most informative, and clear studies on a problem which concerns everyone today. It has been too little understood that the politics, administrative measures, and all utterances on the part of Russian authors, statesmen, or scholars are dictated and fashioned by the recognized philosophy of the Soviet, that is, the particular kind of Marxism which has been developed by Lenin. To Lenin and his faithful disciples there is no philosophy and no science outside of the frame of the prevailing general conception. It is not so much politics which is formed by philosophy as the latter depends on the former. The author has aptly chosen as a motto a quotation from Lenin: "People without a party are equally hopeless blunderers in philosophy as they are in politics." To understand the attitude of the USSR one has to take account of this fact and also of the other that they attribute the same sort of consistency and prevalence in the matter of political and social doctrine to their adversaries. Hence, there does not exist for the representative of "Diamat" any such thing as objective truth; whatever is stated has to be the expression of the basic political conviction or be subservient to the attainment of the political ends. Since the Bolshevist believes with a truly religious fervor in his doctrine, he cannot but conceive of any idea not in agreement with this doctrine as being used to further the ends of a capitalistic and imperialistic world. Imperialism, too, is not defined in any objective terms but only in reference to the one saving truth of Leninism.

It may be difficult for a mind not steeped in such a faith to conceive rightly of the significance of the statements and actions on the part of the USSR. But it is eminently necessary that one form a correct idea of this mentality. The present work furnishes an excellent survey of and introduction to the spirit of dialectical materialism.

The book consists of two parts, preceded by brief remarks on sources and method. The first part deals with the history of dialectical materialism, its occidental and Russian sources, the history of philosophy in USSR and its general characteristics. The second part is a systematic examination of

this philosophy. Introduced by a chapter on the concept and the division of philosophy, it discusses first Realism and Rationalism, then Materialism, Dialectics, its methodology and applications, Historical Materialism and the theoretical value of Dialectic Materialism. A concluding chapter deals with the success of this philosophy, its relation to Christianity and to other philosophies. An appendix brings examples of recantations on the part of Russian scholars, illustrations of the way other philosophers are appraised in Russia, in form of quotations from the *History of Philosophy* by Judin-Rozental (of which there is an English "adaptation" by H. Selsam, 1949), and some remarks on the views on the principle of contradiction. There is also one page reporting on publications up to March 1950, besides four pages with 535 references, a rich bibliography (pp. 185-206), an index of Russian terms and one of Russian names.

One asset of the book is that it uses mainly the original Russian sources. This is important because Western literature, even if written by followers of Lenin and Stalin, is apt to change in a subtle manner one or the other point so as to make it more palatable to the reader.

Were one to write a study on the general characteristics of Western mentality, philosophy would have to be mentioned but hardly as a particularly important aspect. It is different with the Bolshevists. Here, philosophy is considered as the very foundation of politics and life; its study is required. In twenty-two years the editions of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin reached 327,000, those of Voltaire 228,600, of Hegel 200,500, of Diderot 139,100. The History of the Party, containing a chapter on philosophy by Stalin, has been printed in 35,762,300 copies, whereas a best-selling work of fiction reached but 300,000. These facts emphasize still more the necessity that one be thoroughly acquainted with the philosophical thought in the USSR if one wants to understand anything of their behavior.

It is important to realize that Lenin relies more on Engels than on Marx, that is, he views their ideas as absolutely identical and reads the latter in the spirit of the former. He is also dependent on Hegel, and his ideas have been formed by his critical study of the "empirio-critical" school (Mach. Avenarius). His condemnation of all other philosophies is excessively severe and often couched in the most violent terms. Nothing has been changed basically in this system by later writers, not even by Stalin. The repeated condemnations of certain ideas have served only for a re-emphasizing of the "orthodox" doctrine.

This doctrine is, first, consistently materialistic; whoever assumes that there is in reality anything besides matter is labelled an "idealist." It is dialectic, and this entails, according to Stalin, that (1) nature be viewed as a consistent whole in which all things and events are related organically to one another; (2) that nature is in a state of uninterrupted movement and change; (3) that the process of development is not of gradual qualitative change but of sudden "leaps" which, however, happen not by chance

but by virtue of immutable laws; (4) that the things and phenomena of nature present intrinsic contradictions. Everything is material and, in reality, a form of moving matter. Matter is the objective reality, existing outside and independently of consciousness; our knowledge of the laws of nature is certain and there are no unknowable things in this world. The laws of nature include, of course, also those of society.

Within this frame of reference, Russian philosophers are expected to display great activity, especially since 1947. No deviation from the officially approved canon is tolerated. But the Russian philosophers consider themselves as the supreme judges, subject, nonetheless, to political censure, and assume in regard to Western communistic thinkers a sort of contemptuous benevolence. This attitude is related to the strong nationalistic trend which is visible also in many other fields.

Dr. Bocheński's work should be carefully studied by anyone concerned with Bolshevistic thought and its impact on the West. A critical refutation of this doctrine will not be effective unless based on a precise understanding of its philosophy, an understanding to which this work gives an easy access. It is strongly recommended to the attention of philosophers and students of politics alike.

Enthusiasm. By Ronald A. Knox. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950. Pp. 622 with index. $6.00.

Enthusiasm as it is used in the title of this book is an archaic meaning of the word, the meaning closest to the Greek ἐνθουσιασμός from which it is derived, and signifies " an ecstasy of mind as if from inspiration or possession by a spiritual influence, hence a belief or conceit of being divinely inspired." The title was well chosen for the work attempts to give a history, analysis, and comparison of the illuminist heresies.

It is a strange book and one difficult to characterize. One gets the impression reading it that it was written by two men who sent their work separately to the publisher without first consulting each other and comparing notes. One part is excellent, well-written, and lucid as though the author had complete mastery of his subject; the other part is vague, prolix, and repetitious as though written by a man on unfamiliar ground. Briefly, on the heresies that were indubitably illuminist: Montanism, Waldensianism, Quakerism, etc., Monsignor Knox writes with a master's touch. He fails most notably in treating the heresies whose inclusion in a work, such as this purports to be, could be seriously challenged, namely, Jansenism and Quietism.

It is difficult to see how Quietism and Jansenism could be considered illuminism. Both were strictly theological in foundation, a fact that Monsignor Knox himself indicates more than once. In neither can be found,

certainly not as a tenet of faith, the principal dogma of the illuminist sects that interior and individual illumination by the Holy Spirit is the highest, if not the sole, authority, superseding even the authority of Sacred Scripture. What though Jansenism produced the convulsionaries whose antics resembled those of the early Quakers, Holy Rollers and adherents of illuminist sects generally; what though the Quietists seemed to put more faith in passive contemplation than in revealed truth; the resemblance in both cases was but superficial. Both Quietism and Jansenism were aberrations and exaggerations of Catholic doctrine; illuminism is the negation of it.

It is difficult for the reader to understand just why Monsignor Knox included the two French controversies in his otherwise splendid work, for they mar that work's symmetry. But it is even more difficult to read his confused and confusing account of them. His exposition is anything but lucid. It is heavy reading and a task that is not worth the trouble to anyone who has access to *The Catholic Encyclopedia* which expounds in a few pages what Monsignor Knox labors over in one hundred fifty.

The Infinite in Giordano Bruno. By Sidney Greenberg. New York: King's Crown Press, 1950. Pp. 203, with index. $3.00.

This book consists of 78 pp. of Introduction, discussing the philosophy of Giordano Bruno in general and in regard to the problem of the infinite in particular, and 95 pp. of translation of the dialogue *Concerning the Cause, Principle, and One*; there are 22 pp. of notes and an index. It is a solid work of scholarly research which will prove helpful to the student of Bruno and his age. Its usefulness might have been greater if more attention had been given to the medieval background without which Bruno's philosophy is as little to be evaluated as that of his contemporaries. There are several references, justly, to Cusanus, some brief and hardly sufficient references to Aquinas and Bonaventure, and a mention of Ramón Lull. But the author speaks of Bruno's notion of *Deus forma formarum* without realizing that this formula played a great rôle in discussions of older times, and he overlooks the reference by Bruno himself to David of Dinant. It would be an interesting problem to investigate how far Bruno's knowledge of the twelfth-century pantheist went and whence he derived this knowledge. It is known that Cusanus was acquainted with, and probably possessed, the condemned *quaternulae*; this work has disappeared altogether and any further reference might be of value. Bruno, in the argument of the third dialogue, points out that " David of Dinant was not stupid "; this might be an allusion to the criticisms of either St. Albert or St. Thomas. In any case, this remark seems to show that Bruno was not ignorant of many of his predecessors. It is a certain defect of the work that the author did not try to identify many allusions of references, as e. g., to a French " arch-

pedant who has written . . . on the liberal arts," and an Italian "who has soiled many pages with his *Discussiones Peripateticae*." A careful consideration of sources will, no doubt, show that Bruno was much less original than many believe him to be, and surely much less than he claimed. The failure to make the background clear has also prevented the author from realizing the significance of certain passages in which Scriptural expressions figure, as on p. 32 he quotes Bruno "that there is a kind of subject from which, with which, and in which nature effects its operations . . . ," a phrase more than reminiscent of a well-known phrase of St. Paul. The author's insufficient acquaintance with Bruno's predecessors allows him to quote, apparently with approval, the "emphasis on the importance for the history of philosophy of Bruno's conception of the transcendence and immanence of God," made by Carriere in 1847. Nor is it correct to say that prior to Carriere and Bartholmess in 1847 or the publication of the first newer edition of Bruno's works in 1830, there was only the report, indeed inadequate, by Bayle in his *Dictionnaire*. There is a chapter of not less than 50 pp. in vol. IV, part 2 of Bruckner's *Historia philosophiae*, published in 1766. *The History of Philosophy* by Hegel, vol. III (Berlin, 1836) likewise deals extensively with Bruno (pp. 224-244) and, particularly, with the work translated by the author.

The disregard for a thorough historical study of Bruno's dependence on his predecessors and the resulting distortion of perspective are a serious defect of this, for the rest, conscientious and instructive work. The text chosen for translation is well suited as an introduction into the thought of Bruno. It also lets one discover the vanity, self-adulation, and self-advertising of this man. The analysis and presentation of the content is well done.

Filósofos Mexicanos del Siglo XVI. By Oswald Robles. Biblioteca Mexicana 4. Mexico City: Porrua, 1950. Pp. 134 with bibliography and 16 plates. Mex. $20.00.

The Hispano-American who devotes himself to the intellectual life may be faced with a dilemma, all the more cruel because it is false. For in the social and political upheavals of the 19th century whence the present Hispano-American polities have sprung, the alignment of prominent ecclesiastics with the conservative defenders of class privilege and the colonial *status quo* produced in the triumphant revolutionaries a strong, and at times violent, hatred of the Church, which led them to attempt to overthrow and obliterate every vestige of the Church's work and influence, to deny, in a word, the very culture that produced them. The ancient universities, Santo Domingo, Mexico, Lima, Córdoba, Bogotá, Havana, were

among the first to fall; if they reopened, it was only as oracles of anti-clerical liberalism and defenders of the new order. In the choice between his ancestral faith and its institutions and his progressive patriotism and its abolitions, many an American south of the border has chosen the latter—unwisely, because blinded by misinformation.

Dr. Robles is not one of these. A Catholic first of all, he is fully aware of the rich cultural tradition of his faith. He is also a good Mexican, proud of his country's past, and is not ashamed to excavate from the rubbish of "official" historians of the Revolution the true foundations of modern Mexican civilization for his students. This present work, subtitled "a contribution to the history of philosophy in Mexico," is based on some *printed* works, upon which he came in the National Library of Mexico, of three sixteenth-century teachers of logic and philosophy in Mexico through whom the magistral words of Vitoria, Soto, and Cardinal Toletus resounded even to New Spain. All were anti-nominalists, and though they adhered to the scholastic mode of expression, each was original enough to catch the attention of admiring contemporaries, even in that golden age of learning.

Alonso de la Vera Cruz Gutiérrez, O. S. A., student of Vitoria, master and doctor of Salamanca, though the first professor of Holy Scripture in the new University of Mexico, spent most of his career, 1536-1584, teaching the Arts, which, of course, is the *corpus Aristotelicum*, and published the first course of scholastic philosophy in the New World, Mexico 1554-57. Tomas de Mercado, O. P., a sort of Ruiz de Alarcón in philosophy, born in Spain but professed (1553) and ordained in Mexico, received his master's and doctor's degrees from the new University under the first professor of theology, Pedro de Pravia, O. P. He was later sent to Seville to teach, where his commentaries were published, and died on shipboard in sight of the coast of Mexico in 1575. Antonio Rubio, S. J., student of Toletus at Alcalá, began his teaching career in Mexico in 1577 as successor to Pedro de Hortigosa, S. J. Called to Alcalá, he there published his course, called the *Logica Mexicana*, and commentaries on natural philosophy, 1603-1620.

But lest the early intellectual activity of Mexico seem confined to logic-choppers, Dr. Robles also mentions briefly three "Christocentric Humanists," the pioneer social reformers, all bishops, Fray Juan Zumárraga of Mexico, Fray Bartolomé de las Casas of Chiapas, and Don Vasco de Quiroga of Michoacan.

A bibliography of works cited and other sources offers opportunity for further study of what is only suggested in the course of these modest essays. Slight as they are, they do more than hint that the wealth of sixteenth-century Mexico was not all in its mines, and that in the schools and convents of Mexico, which progressive Mexicans are taught by word and picture to despise as devices of ignorant, avaricious friars to enslave, brilliant torches of learning were shedding light and warmth on Mexicans long before the

liberty-loving Anglo-Saxons arrived, not to enslave, but to exterminate promptly and thoroughly whatever natives they could find.

Psychanalyse et conception spirituelle de l'homme. By Joseph Nuttin. Louvain: Public Univers. de Louvain, 1950. Pp. 434, with index. $2.80.

The subtitle of this work by a professor of the University of Louvain reads: "A dynamic theory of normal personality." One of the main propositions is that a theory of human nature has to start from the facts known about normal people, and not as Freud, his followers, and many others do, with that of abnormality. This is, obviously, a methodologically sound principle and its neglect has been the origin of many misconceptions. Professor Nuttin is, on the whole, rather critical of the Freudian doctrines the faultiness of which he fully recognizes. Nonetheless, he is willing to concede that psychoanalysis has discovered many important facts. On this point one might disagree. The notion of "fact" is by far not as simple as it is commonly assumed. Facts, as one comes to know them, are but in too many instances more than "findings"; they are couched in the terms of a theory. This is unavoidable; but it is something of which account must be taken. The author sees clearly that some of the so-called facts are mere hypotheses; but he does not apply the same caution to all the ostensible facts. The author's criticism of psychoanalysis, it seems to the reviewer, is justified but is not deep enough. In this regard one may note that, the extensive and annotated bibliography notwithstanding, the author might have profited from works pertinent but apparently unknown to him. In particular, there are several critical studies on his subject which should have been considered.

Another feature seems of a more fundamental significance. The author shares with the analytical school and with many students of human nature the basically "subjectivistic" approach. That is, he founds his theory of human personality on the "basic needs." That these needs must be studied is quite true. That their study furnishes a sufficient background for a true understanding of human nature is questionable. The common mistake of most psychologies and inquiries in "anthropology" is that they fail to consider the objective counterpart of the subjective phenomena. Although the author well knows that human behavior is fashioned by the personality on one hand and the situation on the other, he does not take sufficient account of the latter.

His criticism of many concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis is much to the point. He is still convinced, however, of the value of many statements and ideas which on more penetrating analysis may prove to be untenable. Because of his adopting several of Freud's concepts, he seems to overlook

the fact that many observations allow for explanations which are simpler not only than those of Freud but even than the author's.

This study might have gained notably had the author not deliberately excluded all philosophical problems. A complete theory of human nature, even one of a fundamentally psychological intent, cannot be developed without some consideration of the metaphysics of the human person.

Professor Nuttin sees the historical importance of psychoanalysis in its having initiated a "dynamic" conception of human nature. The Freudian conception, however, needs reconstruction. The transformation Freudian psychoanalysis is undergoing to-day, especially in America, is noted and carried further. Instead of "instincts" the author speaks of "needs," and, incidentally, he ignores the extensive literature that may be found on this latter notion. There is one truly helpful and also original viewpoint: that of the "constructive development of personality" which allows doing away with the doubtful notion of repression and overcomes the difficulties, in psychoanalysis, of arriving at a satisfactory idea of the unity of the person.

The book is provocative and worthwhile studying. It is remarkable also by the attempt at utilizing many data of experimental psychology which have seldom been integrated with those of abnormal psychology. If this work is not, to this reviewer, the final answer to Freud, it is surely an important step in the right direction.

The Concept of the Mind. By GILBERT RYLE. London: Hitchinson, 1949. Pp. 334, with index. 12/6.

The author sets out to prove that "there is no ghost in the machine." He does so with much ingenuity, an evident ability for psychological analysis, and with the temperament of a convert, as one gathers from a remark in the introduction. The "ghost" whose existence is to be disproved is of Cartesian origin. Curiously, the author does not know of any other conception of the mind but that of Descartes on one hand, and that of Hobbes-Gassendi on the other. He even overlooks the fact that the much disliked Cartesian ghost has some respectable ancestors, or that the ghost's absence in Hobbes is not a new concept. Prof. Ryle neglects other things, the consideration of which might have shown to him that he is, in some way, fighting against windmills.

Although there are many provocative remarks in the book and some of the studies on particular aspects of behavior or human situations are clever and probe rather deeply into problems often ignored, the whole argument is circular. Only when the proposition, ostensibly to be proved, is presupposed, namely that there is no "ghost in the machine," does it become possible to make the analysis of verbal significance the exclusive technique.

To rely on such an analysis may be highly misleading and should not be without a control by studies of expressions of other languages. But even within the frame of this procedure, the question ought to have arisen: since the linguistic expressions are utterly independent of the Cartesian theory, how did it come about that almost all languages agree on certain fundamentals, that there are references to certain experiences, which we, though not Prof. Ryle, call mental, and that Descartes did not invent the ghost but found it ready made, so to speak, and did not give to it more than his own interpretation?

If the author had thought it worthwhile to inquire into other views besides those of Descartes or Hobbes, if he had also been not so utterly contemptuous of psychology, he might have come across a concept which would have saved him much trouble and eliminated several of his problems. He does not know the meaning of *habitus* nor of its equivalents in modern psychological terminology. The term "attitude" seems unknown to him as that of "determining tendencies." Since he does not recognize any mental facts, it is but natural that he denies the existence of anything like will. Here, his usually keen sense of observation fails him, because he is blinded by his prejudices.

The "Waynfleet Professor of Metaphysical Philosohy" at Oxford probably conceives of himself and his work as heralding a new age in the philosophy of human nature and, hence, of many other problems, too. This reviewer, however, cannot envisage his work as pointing a new way. Rather, it appears to him as one which had better keep company with Helvetius. It comes two hundred years too late.

Altruistic Love: A Study of American Good Neighbors and Christian Saints. By P. A. Sorokin. Boston: Beacon Press, 1950. Pp. 260, with index. $3.00.

This volume is the first publication of the Harvard Research Center in Altruistic Integration and Creativity, of which the author is the director. Professor Sorokin would turn the forces of social investigation from the negative type of human beings—the criminal, insane, stupid, etc.—to such positive types as the creative genius, the saint, the "good neighbor." This study seeks to determine the characteristics of altruistic persons by an examination of two groups—the persons selected as good neighbors by a committee for the late Tom Breneman's "Breakfast in Hollywood" radio program, and the Catholic saints as found in Butler's *Lives of the Saints*, revised by Herbert Thurston, S. J.

The motivating idea of the author centers around the conception of "love as a dynamic force effectively transfiguring individuals, ennobling

social institutions, inspiring culture, and making the whole world a warm friendly, and beautiful cosmos." (Preface, v). The conclusion is that some of the beneficial effects of unselfish love and sanctity are remarkable vitality, a long duration of life, an unperturbable peace of mind, and an ineffably rich happiness. The author says further: "the study suggests that the potentials or the 'fission-forces' of altruistic love are so gigantic and so sublimely rich that a better knowledge of these potentials is the noblest and the most powerful force humanity can have for its self-control and for a gigantic renaissance of its creative forces in the field of truth, beauty, and goodness." (p. 213)

Between the expression of the central theme and the impassioned conclusion, in both of which the sincere reader could heartily concur, there is, however, a strange melange of inadequate or oversimplified statistics, moral preachments which (however noble) go far beyond the data, curious misrepresentations or misinterpretations of established religious truths. The statistical inadequacy is most patent in the analysis of Butler's *Lives* where data which are frequently inadequate are nevertheless used to formulate such generalizations as this: "the production of Catholic saints is beginning to cease: the total number of saints from all classes and strata is tending to decrease." (p. 135) Later on the author says: "We can expect that among the saints who live in the first half of the twentieth century and who will be canonized in the future, the proportion of martyred and catastrophic saints will be much higher than they have hitherto been, and the proportion of 'fortunate' saints will be much lower than it was for the second sensate period up to roughly 1910." (pp. 193-94)

Along with effective moral preachments on the value of neighborly love, etc., we find, for example, this curious conclusion: "The moral of these statistics is that, among the saints, about two thirds attained sainthood without self-mortification; that such a technique has been unnecessary even for saints; and that it is still less necessary for 'good neighbors'." (p. 178)

When Sorokin points out that the supply of saints is dwindling so steadily that "the traditional Christian-Catholic and Russian Orthodox saints may become an extinct social type," he concludes with considerable violence to theological truth, that saints are "becoming synonymous with 'good neighbors' and altruistic persons in general, persons who have diverse religious affiliations and in a minority of cases are not even affiliated with any institutionalized religion (free thinkers or atheists)." (p. 205) The author's whole concept of Christian love would profit much from a study of Aquinas' tract on the nature and order of charity; an exaggerated altruism can be as socially destructive as an exaggerated egoism.

The author's constant and broad references to his own published or forthcoming works, the manipulation of data to fit his famous sensate-

ideal-ideational hypothesis, and the neglect of other writings on the subject depreciate considerably from scientific altruism.

Die Religionen der Menscheit. By Anton Anwander. (2d ed.). Freiburg: Herder, 1949. Pp. 416, with index.

The first edition of this book appeared twenty years ago. This edition has been modernized to include the present state of our knowledge on the history of religions and their comparative study. The textbook proper comprises 294 pages; the rest are selected passages from all sorts of sources to illustrate the varieties of religious ideas. The author, professor at the Seminary at Landsberg, Bavaria, distinguishes the more primitive religions, in which natural forces play a preponderant role (*Naturreligionen*) from those of higher civilizations (*Kulturreligionen*); the latter are discussed to greater extent. They are those of old Peru and Mexico, the religions of China, Japan, India (Brahmanism), Persia (Zoroaster), Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome. The next section deals with "World religions"—Buddhism, Islam, and the Jewish faith. A short concluding part summarizes the essentials by which revealed religion differs from all others. A bibliography of 10 pages is added as well as a helpful index. Well written and informative, the work will surely serve its end, to furnish necessary knowledge to anyone interested in the comparative study of religious ideas. Questions pertaining to the philosophy of religion or to apologetics have been discarded so as to present as much of concrete material as possible. The readings are a particularly useful addition and are well chosen.

Untersuchungen zur Theologie der Seelsorge. Vol. I. *Dienst am Glauben*; vol. II. *Grundsätzliches und Geschichtliches zur Theologie der Seelsorge.* By Franz X. Arnold. Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1948, 1949. Pp. 261, with index.

The author is professor of pastoral theology at the University of Tübingen. He has written on problems of natural law, on social questions, on the position of women in the Church, and recently on pastoral care for displaced persons. Prof. Arnold is convinced that our times make necessary new approaches to pastoral tasks. To prove his thesis, the author discusses the nature of pastoral theology on one hand, and its state to-day on the other. This reviewer will simply report briefly on the works of this German theologian, and try to convey something of its spirit, at once one of scholarship and of Christian charity.

"Truly, the pastoral theology of old is no longer sufficient." In quoting

these words of Pope Pius XI (1933), the author summarizes his program. The annunciation of the faith — or, as the author loves to say, using the technical term of the Patristic age: the *kerygma* — is always in danger of being dominated by the currents of an age, of becoming subordinate to the form of scholarly theology prevalent at any time, and to remain fettered by such ideas and habits even when neither *kerygma* nor theology are adequate to the tasks posited by the social and historical developments. Pastoral theology and pastoral care must find the courage to free themselves of superannuated forms, approaches, and methods. The historical studies will prove valuable by rendering evident the influence which speculative theology and its controversies, philosophy, and contingent temporal circumstances have had on pastoral activities. The historical analysis and comparison will also furnish the means for a better understanding of the present situation.

One observes here another of the many efforts made to-day to establish a more direct relation between the concerns and needs of the people on one hand and the teaching, explaining, and formulating of the revealed truths and of the moral law on the other.

The present work envisages almost exclusively the situation in Germany. This is understandable, since the author teaches at a German institution and writes for German students and priests. It diminishes somewhat the immediate value of the author's work for non-German readers. However, there are, so far as this reviewer is able to judge, some remarks and approaches which may well deserve attention also outside of the author's country. They would have, of course, to be translated, as it were, into terms of other countries. But the fundamental problem, of a certain loss of contact, may exist, although in a latent state, elsewhere as well. It surely does exist in France and has given rise there to some noteworthy new ideas to which there is occasional reference in Dr. Arnold's treatise. For this reason, and for the general tendency of the work, this volume may be studied with profit by anyone concerned with the question of Catholic life all over the world.

L'Enfer. By Gustave Bardy, Michel Carrouges, Bernard Dorival, C. Spicq, V. Héris, Jean Guitton. Paris: Les Editions de la Revue des Jeunes, 1950. Pp. 357, with index. Fr. 450.

The aim of this collection of essays is to set forth the clear traditional doctrine on hell, as distinct from the accretions of preachers' meditations. Thus, in the first essay, Michel Carrouges tries to find in literature this clear traditional doctrine. Then the fonts of revelation are considered, first in "Revelation concerning Hell in Sacred Scripture" by Père Spicq, then

in "How the Fathers of the Church Treated Problems Arising from the Revelation of Hell" by Gustave Bardy, and "The Dogma on Hell and Theology" by Père Héris. These articles are followed by considerations on "Hell in Art" by Bernard Dorival and "Hell according to Modern Acceptation" by Jean Guitton.

The outstanding articles are those of Gustave Bardy and Père Héris. Granted that at times the Fathers were not as clear in their expressions as later systematic theologians might wish, Bardy has made a careful study of the available patristic texts, with an added carefulness in pointing out that there never was a question of change of the Church's doctrine in this matter.

Père Héris is to be commended especially for his care in indicating the theological notes which the Church uses in connection with particular teachings, and for his excellent exposé on the nature of sin and its relation to hell.

In his essay on "Hell in Art," M. Dorival limits his explicit treatment to the realm of French and Italian painting and sculpture representing Hell.

Obscurities and confusion creep into the work of several of the contributors. Yet to these difficulties Père Héris has given the answers as propounded by Saint Thomas, manifesting once more the simple truth that a worthwhile article on any theological subject, viewed even from the vantage point of literary criticism, presupposes long study of what tradition has afforded us.

The Morality of Mercy Killing. By Joseph V. Sullivan. Westminster: Newman Press, 1950. Pp. 84 with index. $1.50.

This study was first published as a doctoral dissertation at Catholic University of America under the title *Catholic Teaching on the Morality of Euthanasia.* The main core of the work is now published in brochure form. In five chapters Fr. Sullivan develops the main outlines and history of the problem, the Catholic teaching on the taking of human life, certain case examples and solutions, as well as allied matters.

There is no doubt that this brochure is both timely and necessary. The growing practice of so-called mercy killing, the organized movement for its legalization, and the discussions which have centered around recent disclosures, require that this evil be frequently and ever more widely combatted by the solid and forthright dissemination of the truth.

Fr. Sullivan reiterates the traditional arguments and refutations based upon reason and faith in a clear and concise manner, to which he appends a summary of Catholic teaching on the value of suffering, with an additional few paragraphs on the possibility of invincible ignorance with respect

to the malice of mercy killing. A few pages discuss the very important questions of therapeutic euthanasia or the mitigation of suffering by drugs, and the obligation to prolong the life of incurables. The latter problem especially — not without its complexities in practical circumstances — is seldom adequately treated in the manuals. The author here points up the great area of relativity that must obtain in the judgment of the ordinary and extraordinary means of prolonging life. The brief explanation of this medico-moral question and the few case solutions presented are valuable contributions in this work for both professional and non-professional reader.

Die neue Psalmenübersetzung. By Arthur Allgeier (ed.). Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1949. Pp. 347, with index.

The new Latin translation of the Psalms, ordered by Pope Pius XII in 1941 and published in 1945, has been the object and occasion of many studies and articles. Translations of this new version have already been made in various languages. Dr. Allgeier, member of the Biblical Commission and known by his studies about the Old Latin versions of the Psalms (A. Allgeier, *Die Altlateinische Psalterien, Prolegomena zu einer Textgeschichte der hieronymianischen Psalmübersetzung*, Freiburg i. B., 1928) presents in this book a German translation of the new Latin Psalter, preceded by an introduction (pp. 5-18) and followed by a vocabulary (pp. 260-347).

Allgeier planned the German translation but could not realize his project, because of his appointment as Rector of the University of Freiburg i. B., in December, 1945. The translation is therefore the work of three of his younger friends, Dr. Heinrich Scheider, Dr. Alfons Deiszner and Dr. Othmar Heggelbacher, each of whom translated 50 Psalms. They wanted to produce a translation which would be faithful and present a good idea of the new Latin version, and which at the same time would conform to the spirit of the German language. German is a foreign language to the reviewer; he has, then, to leave to more competent judges whether the translators have succeeded in presenting a truly "German" translation. Our impression is favorable; the translation reads easily and is clear.

In the introduction, written by Dr. Allgeier himself, the author wishes to give an idea of the character of the new Latin version, comparing it with the Vulgate. Therefore, he gives examples of translations which differ in the Vulgate (V) and the New Version (N). A first group of differences can be explained by the fact that N wished to use the more clear and better Latin expression. A second group has to be explained by the different character of the two translations; V is a correction according to the Hexapla of an existing Latin version made from the Greek, and N is directly translated from the original Hebrew text.

Allgeier exposes the same differences by comparing the translation of Psalm 4 in N and V, which gives him occasion to make interesting observations. He comes to the conclusion that V offers a verbal translation, while N offers a translation according to the sense. " N translates *sensum e sensu* instead *verbum e verbo*." (p. 13)

The introduction contains further pertinent remarks about the relation of the Vulgate to the Old Latin versions; we meet the affirmation that the analysis of the vocabulary of the Vulgate and the Psalterium iuxta Hebraeos (the translation made by St. Jerome from the Hebrew text) proves the priority of the latter in relation to the Vulgate. The author concludes with the wish, that theological study will pay attention to all, even to the smallest details of the New Version, because without such attention no profound understanding of it is possible.

We understand that its character as an introduction, and perhaps also the exterior circumstances of editing and printing in post-war Germany, have obliged the author to give only a short exposition and to limit himself to the comparison of only one psalm. We lament this fact and hope that Dr. Allgeier may be able to publish a critical comparison of all the Psalms of V and N.

In the third part of the book, Dr. Allgeier compares the vocabulary of N with that of V. The new words of N are alphabetically arranged; next to them appear the corresponding translations of V (with indication of Psalm and verse) and the German translation. The vocabulary not only contains the words which do not occur in the translation of the Psalms in V, but it gives also the words which are not used by V in the translation of this particular text, although they may occur in other places of the Psalms in V. It would have been helpful if the author had indicated by a special mark those words which are not used in any place of the Psalms of the Vulgate (or even in any place of the whole Vulgate) and therefore are quite new in the New Latin Version. It is clear that this vocabulary presents in a practical way important material for the comparison of N and V and that it is a great help for those who wish to get a better idea of the character of the New Version.

The Failure of Technology. By Friedrick Georg Juenger. Tr. by F. D. Wieck. Hinsdale, Illinois: Henry Regnery, 1949. Pp. 196. $2.75.

This is a remarkable bill of particulars showing technology's dehumanization of man. A sharp distinction must be drawn between the philosophy and the facts in it. The facts are disconcertingly evident. The philosophy, for the most part an egregious interpretation of Kant and Leibniz, is hopeless, and fortunately incidental. The style is terse, each chapter averaging four pages.

One theme is that mechanization has invaded every human field: work, food, sports, amusements, thought, education, science, politics etc. Another theme points up the falsity of the myths of classical economics. Production is shown to be consumption of resources on an unprecedented scale. Labor-saving machinery is shown to have increased as well as degraded the total amount of human labor. For the machine must be built and serviced; and before that, the metal of which it is made must be mined, transported, etc. The distribution of wealth turns out to be a distribution of poverty, for where technological perfection is the only norm resources are soon depleted on a planetary scale. A third theme is that mechanization as such destroys the intelligence and liberty of man, and therewith all human values. It is irrelevant whether it assumes a socialistic or a capitalistic form — both of which succumb to technocracy in any event. As several French writers, Catholic and Protestant, have recently pointed out, their materialistic industrialism makes Russia and America brothers under the skin. Moreover, labor is as guilty as capital, for both classes have acquiesced in the system.

It is the effect of technology on the human person that is paramount. "It is precisely these efforts to subject man completely to technical rationality, to a purposeful, all-embracing functionalism, which gradually undermines the resistance that man puts up as he tries to adhere to a more profound, a spiritual order of things. Far from taming or enlightening the instinctive side of man, his blind urges, his mental confusions, the mechanization of life, on the contrary, intensifies these dark sides of human nature . . . The automatism in which man is trained and drilled day in and day out not only inures him to perform without a will of his own his mechanical operations; it also breaks down certain resistances in his personality by depriving him . . . of that self-reliance which alone can halt the inroads of chaos" (pp. 143-4).

The criticism of industrialism by Chesterton, Belloc, Gill, the Catholic Workers et al. is based on a much sounder theoretical basis than is Juenger's volume. The value of the latter is that it has a command of particular evidences for each criticism. What neither set of critics makes quite clear is this: The mechanization of human life is fact, and history is not reversible. What are the alternatives to simply waiting for the clear implication of mechanization — a total planetary struggle for control of this "perfection without purpose"?

Goethe and the Modern Age. By Arnold Bergstraesser (ed.). Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1950. Pp. 402. $5.00.

This book is made up of the papers presented at Aspen during the celebration of the Goethe bi-centennial. The three main divisions of the work

are: 1) six essays on Goethe's personality and work; 2) six on Goethe and literature; 3) seven on Humanität Today. The rest of the book consists of short papers on ethics and politics, concluding with an address by Robert M. Hutchins.

If this group of learned gentlemen had followed the theme of Barker Fairley, the book would be of a higher caliber. Mr. Fairley tells us that we must stop mythologizing Goethe and start treating him as a human being. This is a move in the right direction. The collected papers do not contain quite so much Goethe-idolatry as some previous works. But, as in most volumes of this kind, the good and the bad are bound up together. Far too many of the essays smack of "me-too-ism." Some are scholarly and well thought out, while others give the impression that the authors were trying to jump onto the band wagon after it got started. The first section, with the exception of Schweitzer's rambling and useless generalities about Goethe's personality, has been well done. Stephen Spender's "Goethe and the English Mind" is, in my opinion, by far the best of the essays. Lewisohn and Wilder are disappointing. We have a right to expect better from them.

Over-praise is worse than none at all. We must confess that Goethe was a very good poet. No one can maintain, however, that he is the key to the universe. Yet, this is the impression given in the book. In the section on Humanism we are told to go to Goethe for the solution of the world's troubles. This section is the weakest of all. Dripping with honeyed words, it puts Goethe on a pedestal in the role of a guiding genius. Goethe would be the first person to turn his back on such adulation. Geradus van der Leeuw, "Goethe and the Crisis of Civilization," gives us a serious study on the extent to which we can use Goethe as a guide. His conclusion, that we cannot live by Goethe alone, is against the spirit of the book, but very sound. After reading this section on Humanism, we can still ask: Did Goethe help or hurt the world?

No intelligent person can question Goethe's stature as a poet or his greatness as an individual. Goethe produced some of the best of German Literature. He was in some respects far in advance of his day. His mightiest influence has been through his literary creations. As to his effect on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries outside the field of letters, there is much room for prudent doubts. This book labors the point that his effect is good and would have been wonderfully good, had his views been followed religiously. *Gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.* His effect on letters was great, but it could have been greater. His effect on the course of world affairs, science, politics and religion is scarcely visible; it certainly does not exist to the extent that some of these writers would have us believe.

For Goethe's sake, we give honor where honor is due. We look on the poet as a man, not as a god. He is great enough in his own right without building up a myth about him. If the myth continues to grow, the bubble

is bound to break. That will hurt no one but Goethe, the guest of honor. It is a shame that no one was present to tell these men, "You came here to honor Goethe, not to destroy him." On the strength of the good essays this volume may be recommended. We must take the bad with the good. There is always hope for a revised edition.

English Blake. By Bernard Blackstone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949. Pp. 455, with index. $6.50.

Dr. Blackstone's proposed thesis, that William Blake is primarily English in his sources and thought, is an interesting and important one. It would have been more valuable, however, had he treated it in a more scholarly and less partisan manner. Few scholars have managed to be objective about Blake, but Dr. Blackstone is a worse offender than most. So completely has he espoused Blake's doctrines, or what he conceives to be Blake's doctrines, that it is frequently impossible to tell Blake from Blackstone.

This confusion is especially evident in Dr. Blackstone's attacks upon religion. It occurs particularly in his exposition of Blake's sallies upon organized religion, by which Blake usually means the Church of England, or the early Church. Dr. Blackstone's own more specifically anti-Catholic animus is revealed in such passages, as for example when he says, "How many Catholic saints are famous for their childishness, their complete want of brains." Or again, "The Catholic Church has been violently opposed to the translation of this subversive matter [the Gospels] into the vernacular." To reenforce this very erroneous statement, he then quotes Ernst Sutherland Bates, a somewhat dubious source for scholarly material.

It is unfortunate that Dr. Blackstone has permitted defects in scholarship and a more general confusion of thought and rambling arrangement to mar an ambitious and potentially valid contribution. Much excellent interpretative material is to be found, especially in the discussion of Blake's position in English thought, in particular as he reacted negatively to the rationalistic tradition of Bacon and Locke, and followed, quite consciously, the more mystical strain of Milton and Berkeley. Again, the discussion of Blake's theory of art is of considerable value, especially the analysis of Blake's interest in medieval art; and his treatment of Blake's belief in Christ as the central figure of art and of history touches on one of Blake's seminal ideas, one which has greatly influenced aesthetics in our own day.

On the whole, however, this book is confusing, as has been indicated. Such serious flaws in Blake's thought as his antinomianism, his often fantastically childish views, and his dangerous perversions of Christianity are heartily endorsed and elaborated. Dr. Blackstone's faults clearly outweigh his virtues; his work must be set down as one of the least distinguished of the recent spate of Blake criticism.

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